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2Abstract
The city is a complex space, comprised of a multitude of cultures, languages, and influences 
that interact, clash, and communicate, resulting in a space of dynamic violence. It is through 
this violent interaction of different forces that the city attains its potential as a space offering 
hope and opportunity. Such fragmentary and rapidly changing influences do, however,
present problems for the investigation and interpretation of the city, in that conclusions seem 
only fleeting and provisional. For this reason, it is important to write towards a universal 
hope for the city; a hope that can never truly apply in practice, but nonetheless extends an 
inextinguishable hermeneutical possibility to all cities. 
In the Western, Judeo-Christian framework, the intersection of universalism, hermeneutics, 
and the city begins with the collapse of the Tower of Babel. Through violent rupture, 
humanity’s differences are revealed and thus a Fall into a schema of translation occurs, where 
humanity must exist side-by-side with each other in the absence of divine presence.
Subsequently, cities are necessarily diverse and violent, for it is alterity that allows for cities 
to contain hope for something other than what is. 
To prevent the city from becoming totalitarian and without hope, alterity must be consciously 
maintained in both the physical environments of the suburb and the city-centre, and in the 
idea of the city: what the city could be. Achieving alterity in the suburb and city-centre 
requires hospitality toward the other, an openness to the other that coincides with a schema of 
justice. The maintenance of alterity in the idea of the city requires a messianic conception of 
hope that cannot be called forth, and remains perpetually as a possibility that is no possibility, 
violently rupturing all claims of completion in the present. With the extension of hospitality 
and justice, combined with the conscious maintenance of alterity, the violence inherent in the 
interaction of different forces in the city is put to its most positive and regenerative 
applications.
3Introduction
“The city in its complete sense, then, is a geographic plexus, an economic organization, an 
institutional process, a theater of social action, and an esthetic symbol of collective unity. On 
one hand it is a physical frame for the commonplace domestic and economic activities; on the 
other, it is a consciously dramatic setting for the more significant actions and the more 
sublimated urges of a human culture. The city fosters art and is art; the city creates theater 
and is the theater. It is in the city, the city as theater that man’s more purposive activities are 
formulated and worked out, through conflicting and co-operating personalities, events, 
groups, into more significant culminations.”
Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities.1
“This city never allowed itself to decay or degrade. It’s wildly, intensely growing. It’s a loud 
bright stinking mess. It takes strength from its thousands of cultures and the thousands more 
that grow anew each day. It isn’t perfect. It lies and cheats. It’s no utopia and it ain’t the 
mountain by a long shot—but it’s alive. I can’t argue that.”  
Warren Ellis, Transmetropolitan.2
When one approaches the topic of the city, they quickly encounter the question of what 
exactly is meant by the term “city?” You almost certainly know when you are within a city,
and you can be relatively certain as to when you are viewing a city - large structures and high 
population density are obvious indicators - but where does this certainty end? Where does the 
border of any particular city extend to? Outside of the city-planner’s drawing board, the city’s 
physical borders tend to be subjective, fluid, fragmentary, and prone to change. Approached 
from the statistical perspective of census data, the city can be defined by a particular 
population threshold, but this is rarely a satisfying gauge able to be applied universally. What 
is statistically termed a city here in New Zealand, 50,000 people, may not compare in terms 
of diversity, structure, or economic possibility to a settlement of 50,000 in Western Europe, 
and may not be regarded as a city.3 This is why such a definition is unsatisfying, and yet it 
remains important to arrive at least at a provisional definition of the city, so that discussions 
and conclusions may extend beyond a particularly closed milieu. From this definition it will 
be possible to engage with, and perhaps beyond, a Western context that arises out of 
relatively cohesive roots, such as Judeo-Christianity, the Enlightenment, and the continuation
of Western capitalism. Once this definition has been broadly outlined, it can be used as a base 
  
1 Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York, 1970), p. 480.
2 Warren Ellis, “Summer of the Year”, Transmetropolitan, Vol. 1 (1997), p. 17.
3 In New Zealand, “[a] city, as defined in the Local Government Act 1974, must have a minimum population of 
50,000, be predominantly urban in character, be a distinct entity and a major centre within the region.” 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/census/2006-census-information-about-data/2006-definitions-questionaires/definitions/
geographic-definitions.htm.
4from which to investigate the centrally important necessities of alterity and violence in the 
city, all the while the definition itself should be open to hermeneutics and necessarily be 
provisional. 
In an attempt to provide a somewhat universal definition of the city, Max Weber writes:
“[t]he many definitions of the city share the commonality of separate yet closely spaced 
dwellings.”4 This surely is the broadest of definitions, but within its simplicity are the key 
ingredients available to be extrapolated into a far more comprehensive expression. In the act 
of synthesising the definitions of the city, Weber correctly identifies the possibility of 
commonality between cities, thus providing a hope that as expressions, cities may be 
universal, and can potentially be experienced as such. Universalism is important for the city, 
both as physical structure and as idea, because it indicates freedom, the opportunity for all to 
enter the city and be able to share in the diverse, hopeful, and rupturing experience. However,
universalism in practice does indicate totalitarian violence as it precludes alterity that is 
necessary for the functioning of a diverse city, which is why universalism should always be a
negotiated offer rather than a concrete reality. Alterity must be carefully fostered in the city, 
because it is alterity that gives the city hope for that which is other to what is, a futurity. What 
is central is that the hope that is alterity must not be able to be expended or called-forth into 
being and thus lose its function as alterity, and so it must remain as a potentiality without the 
possibility of application. Cities are diverse spaces imbued with hope and have a centrifugal 
effect of bringing humanity into close proximity; as Robert Neuwirth writes: “[e]very day, 
close to two hundred thousand people leave their homes in rural regions and move to the 
cities.”5 This is what gives the city its universal quality: the possibility of hope and the 
freedom with which all people may enter the city and engage with each other in the 
understanding that the hope cannot be called-forth and extinguished. If the city remains as a 
city and extends the offer of hope and inclusion to all, it will be a space filled with 
opportunity and exchange, in which the maintenance of alterity guarantees that the temporal
will never be ultimate and everything remains open to hermeneutics.
  
4 Max Weber, “The Nature of the City”, in, Classic Essays on the Culture of Cities, Richard Sennett, ed. (New 
York, 1969), p. 23.
5 Robert Neuwirth, Shadow Cities: A Billion Squatters, A New Urban World (New York and London, 2005), p. 
9.
5As Weber suggests, the city is made up of closely spaced dwellings, the creative products of 
humanity: techne. As techne, cities are culture, reflect culture, and contain culture; they are 
solely human creations built in the absence of presence. God is necessarily absent from the 
city, because the presence of God would deny humanity’s full possibilities of creation and 
interpretation. Cities are not sacred spaces because this would indicate stasis and presence, 
places predicated on a particular interpretation, demanding a particular range of responses,
whereas cities are dynamic, violent, and uncertain. To claim that a city is sacred is to prevent 
a city from functioning as a city, through the extrapolation of a particular idea of the sacred 
into the idea of the city, thus calling-forth alterity and extinguishing it in the temporal. Sacred 
spaces are exclusionary in the particular demands they place on reaction and interpretation, 
and so for the city to be free, it must not be sacred, nor can public expressions of the sacred 
be allowed to be elevated beyond the gaze of hermeneutics. The city is the place humanity 
builds to interact in without the certainty of presence and without the sacred, to engage with 
fellow humanity and to invite the other to enter into an exchange. As techne, provisional 
structures created by humanity, cities are always hermeneutical, uncertain in the sense of 
constantly negotiated provisionality; this is both a defining feature of the city and its most 
positive attribute. The city should always be a structure that contains the possibility of 
defying totalitarian expressions.
Contained within Weber’s phrase, “separate yet closely spaced dwellings”, is a key dialectic 
for the city: autonomy against community. The individual in the techne of the city is 
surrounded by humanity in close proximity, and with this comes the opportunity for 
community. However, the intense concentration of humanity in a space can be 
overwhelming, and it may provide the individual with a sense of alienation and 
impersonality. Upon entering the city, the individual may feel there is no community at all, as 
the violent pace of the city continues potentially oblivious to the individual’s presence. The 
anonymity and alienation that one might experience in the city is not necessarily negative, it 
can emancipate the individual of old bonds, imbuing one with the characteristics of an exile, 
free to create a personal identity and remake oneself. This is the dialectic of city-life, the 
opportunity for community balanced against the opportunity to be anonymous. It is 
predominantly in the city that the balance between anonymity and community can be best 
achieved, because beyond the city experience tends to be polarised between complete 
anonymity and the overwhelming, claustrophobic surveillance of the close-knit community. 
A loose definition of the city can be, therefore, that they are spatial manifestations of a hope 
6for open, free, universalism that cannot be called-forth and extinguished; they are techne, 
humanity’s manifestations of and as hermeneutics; and they contain a dialectic between 
autonomy and community.
Upon reaching a rather broad working definition of the city, it becomes important to 
contextualise the place of violence within this definition of the city. The term violence is 
associated with many negative connotations, including: the domination of another, a
particularly unpleasant shock, the causation of suffering in another, extending to the taking of 
a life. These aspects should always remain within the discussion of violence, for paring them 
away would be an act of negative violence in itself, clouding the true possible impact of 
violence. There are positive aspects, however, as violence is a vital and dynamic force, 
changing individuals and the environment that surrounds them in ways that are not 
necessarily negative. Indeed, it is violence that adds the dynamic quality to the city and 
enables the hope of rapid change, upward mobility, and the possibility of remaking oneself. 
Due to its cosmopolitan, rapidly changing environment based on interaction, the city is an 
inherently violent milieu; it is unavoidably violent and this should not be flinched away from, 
nor should it be denied. The necessary step regarding violence in the city is to find ways in 
which to maximise the positive expressions of violence (and there are many), and reduce the 
negative expressions of violence. Of course, neither extreme of positive or negative can be 
reached in exclusion of the other, for they are antonymic subsets within the term, unable to be 
separated.
Violence arises in the interaction of two or more subjects or objects, so it is indelibly linked 
with communication. Whenever one interacts with another there is some level of violence 
involved, with the other disrupting interiority, introducing another set of needs, and the 
exigencies of translation. This is a positive function preventing the individual from being 
overwhelmed by the anonymity of the city; the other is allowed for, and through this their 
violent alterity ruptures the inwardness of the lone individual. It is the responsibility of the 
individual to undertake this act of translation, this rupturing of both the self and the other, 
because the mere presence of the other, whilst disruptive and potentially violent, does not call 
or summon the individual forth to responsibility for the other. To engage violence in its most 
positive manifestations, the individual interacts with the other through the hermeneutics of 
translation: the attempt to understand the subjective other that can never be fully understood. 
The negligence of translation, with its inherent yet mostly positive violence, can lead to the 
7denial of alterity, whether through the objectifying ignorance of the other as fellow subjective 
other, by the radical attempt to overcome alterity through physical violence, or the retreat 
from the other into the solitude of interiority. For the city to remain as positive a space as 
possible the potential for violence should not be fled from; rather it should be approached 
knowingly, investigated and engaged with via the hermeneutics of translation and hospitality 
toward the other.
In engaging with and via these broad definitions of the city and violence, no particular city 
should be taken as the singularly universal and complete representation of the city, because 
this would preclude the possibility of alterity necessary for the maintenance of hope. Just as 
no singular should be vaunted as an ultimate expression of the city, no individual should 
approach their city life as complete or secure; one should never be totally ‘at home’ in the 
city.  In order for the positive functions of violence (change, hope, dialogue, translation) to 
occur, one should adopt an approach to city-life similar to that of Christians as described by 
Nicholas Berdyaev:
“A Christian has no city – he is in quest of the City of God, which can never be the city of “this world”; 
whenever an earthly city is mistaken for the New Jerusalem, Christians cease to be pilgrims and the 
bourgeois spirit reigns supreme.”6
This approach should not be limited to the Christian community, and in fact, it should be 
secularised and embraced as the maxim for cosmopolitan city-life. Recognition is required 
that the city is a polyglot that is under the conditions of constant violent change and as such 
one cannot have “a city”; one cannot be attached to a singularity, because that would deny the 
real structure of the city. Hope may not necessarily be for the City of God, it can simply be 
for alterity at its most refined, a messianic hope for something other than what is, that cannot 
be called-forth from the temporal. Being that no particular city should be vaunted as complete
and no individual can ever truly be home in the city, it is important to investigate cities in 
ways that speak towards a universal, whilst knowing the universal can never really be so.
Knowing that no one can ever truly be home in the liberating violence of the free city, there 
remains a desire for some stability within the bounds of the city, thus the dialectic of the 
suburb and the city-centre arises. This is an essential facet of the city, with the need for 
security balanced against the need for change, hope and vitality. The relationship between 
these spaces can be positive when the suburb maintains its links with the city-centre and
  
6 Nicholas Berdyaev, “The Bourgeois Spirit”, in, The Bourgeois Mind and Other Essays (London, 1934), p. 28.
8engages in it, is a polyglot in its own right, whilst maintaining distance necessary to retain 
security. This distancing can go too far, however, when the suburb shuts itself off or others 
are shut off in a community of singularity: homogenous of race, income, religion, or 
introverted shared space. Gated communities and homogenous communities, which are 
exclusions by choice, and ghettoes and tenements, which are imposed exclusions, are all 
destructive to the city space because they create zones without real interaction, denying the 
freedom and universalism that should be explicit in the city. The dialectic between home and 
the violence signified by the city-centre should be carefully investigated and kept in place, so 
that neither becomes ultimate and the city stays as a liveable yet hopeful space.
As spaces that should maintain a sense of universalism through the free offer of inclusion, the 
concept of the messianic - the rupture of alterity - is important to the city. The messianic is 
alterity, hoped for and maintained in the temporal that nonetheless remains beyond in
exteriority, unable to be brought closer. It is a liminal concept, between the interiority of the 
maintenance and the exteriority of the hope, which ruptures both interiority and exteriority,
denying either an absolute position. For the messianic to remain a universal claim, it must be 
secular like the city, available to all, beyond the totalitarian claim of a singular in the 
temporal. As the messianic is maintained in the temporal it is open to hermeneutics, is not 
absolute in any respect other than being inexhaustible, and as such the Messianic can never 
truly arrive. The messianic is the alterity central to city-life, maintaining the alterity in the 
temporal by rupturing critique of any claim of completion in the world as it is. 
As a polyglot containing alterity, the city requires inhabitants to exercise a great deal of 
humility and hospitality. The city is a space where one should make space for the other, 
extend an offer of hospitality and in doing so be prepared to be less than one’s own personal 
potential. Richard Sennett writes that, “[t]he humane is much less than what people are 
capable of. That is what we are struggling for • not fulfilment but to be less than we could 
be.”7 In recognising the autonomy and significance of the other and subsequently making 
allowances for her or him, the possibility for justice arises, first in the self through an 
autonomous decision of responsibility, rupturing the self as egotistical interiority, and then 
extending this rupture as hospitality into exteriority toward the other. The need for both 
hospitality and justice in the city is made apparent by the city’s violent nature, and without a 
  
7 Richard Sennett, The Conscience of the Eye: the Design and Social Life of Cities (New York: 1990), p. 190.
9full appreciation of these aspects the city pushes toward singularity and domination. 
Therefore, hospitality and justice need to be closely examined in relation to the city in order 
to minimise the totalitarian impulses that could otherwise go unchecked.
With the city relying on the continuance of alterity in order to remain free of totalitarianism, 
it is important in the discussion of the city to use a methodology that underscores this vital 
understanding. Therefore, in the interests of maintaining alterity throughout the text, the use 
of direct quotation and literary fragments are used, up and against each other and also against
the text, to use conflicting voices to create new possibilities beyond the scope of the original 
authors. Scott Holland, discussing Dietrich Bonhoeffer in reference to the thought of Walter 
Benjamin, writes:
“...Benjamin would have likely told Bonhoeffer, “In the fields with which we are concerned, 
knowledge exists only in lightening flashes. The text is the thunder rolling along afterward.” Like 
Benjamin, Bonhoeffer would later see that it was the literary fragment - - the letter, the paper, the 
poem, the story, not the systematic manuscript - - that best reflected traces of the lightening flash.”8
Through the use of fragments and direct quotations placed in conversation, it is hoped that 
new “lightening flashes” of knowledge will emerge and the text continually roll along with 
these.9 The same applies for the city, where fragments collide violently and are experienced,
offering change, inspiration, and new ideas, whilst the city continues rolling along as a 
continually developing structure. 
Containing the conflicting alterity of fragments, the city is a text, a collage of discourse and 
interpretation. The city is also encountered similarly to the way one encounters a text; as 
Kevin Hart writes regarding the position of a reader of a text: “A text may address you 
familiarly, in the second person singular, but this intimacy is conditioned by an impersonality 
to the extent that it addresses all readers this way.”10 Through the free offer of inclusion the 
city mirrors the text, it addresses one personally with the offer, but is conditioned by the fact 
that this offer is made to all, that no one is especially included. In Jay McInerney’s novel, 
Bright Lights, Big City, a young man, working in New York as a fact checker for a literary 
magazine modelled on The New Yorker, begins a downward spiral of personal crisis brought 
  
8 Scott Holland, “First We Take Manhattan, Then We Take Berlin: Bonhoeffer’s New York, in, Crosscurrents, 
Vol. 50, Issue 3 (Fall 2000), p. 370.
9 This is similar to the notion of the “short-circuit” described by Slavoj Žižek, which will be discussed and 
expanded upon further in “Chapter 1: Babel The Beginning of Beginnings.
10 Kevin Hart, “Jacques Derrida: The God Effect”, in, Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and 
Theology, Phillip Blond, ed. (London and New York, 1998), p. 263.
10
on by an excessive lifestyle.11 Through the use of a second person narrative address, 
McInerney gives the novel a distinctly urban atmosphere. For example, McInerney writes: 
“You walk up Fifth Avenue along the park. On the steps of the Metropolitan Museum, a mime with a 
black-and-white face performs in front of a small crowd. As you pass you hear laughter and when you 
turn around the mime is imitating your walk.”12
This is how the city should address the individual - anonymously yet personally - one is 
singled-out in the offer of inclusion, but this offer is open to all and addresses all in the same 
way. It is this urban space, containing the dialectic of anonymity and community; city-centre 
and suburb; personal inclusion and universal indifference to the particular; that will be 
investigated, beginning with its Western Judeo-Christian roots, in order to understand and 
maintain alterity and maximise the positive opportunities of violence.
  
11 Jay McInerney, Bright Lights, Big City (New York, 1984).
12 Ibid., p. 152. Italo Calvino also uses the second person narrative in his influential novel Invisible Cities. For 
instance: “Your gaze scans the streets as if they are written pages: the city says everything you must think, 
makes you repeat her discourse...” Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities, (New York and London, 1972), p. 14.
11
Babel: The Beginning of Beginnings
“A beginning is a displacement into the present; a place of beginning is where one can make this 
displacement happen.”
Richard Sennett, The Conscience of the Eye.13
“To distinguish the other cities’ qualities, I must speak of a first city that remains implicit…”
Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities.14
Enoch and Babel
To investigate the important fragmentary, dynamic, and violent tensions that exist within the 
modern city – a secular, cosmopolitan, free city - the Abrahamic roots of the city must be 
investigated.15 This is because the Abrahamic texts form the mythological dialectical roots of 
modern cities. The Judeo-Christian traditions especially, are of most significance because 
they offer an initial dialectic between the particular (Judaism) and the universal (the offer 
arising from the Christ-event).16 This dialectical tension is at the heart of the modern city, and 
it will be explored in various ways throughout this essay in order to develop an understanding 
of the importance of alterity and violence. 
Cain’s city Enoch marks the starting point of the Abrahamic traditions’ urban history. The 
context of the city’s creation is of vital importance, as the city is an expression of sin, a fall 
out of relation to the divine. Fratricidal Cain, spurned by God for the jealous murder of Abel, 
is cursed to be hidden from the face of God, “a fugitive and a vagabond... in the earth.”17
  
13 Sennett, The Conscience of the Eye: the Design and Social Life of Cities, p. 195.
14 Calvino, p. 86.
15 The term “modern city is used here to denote a city that is secular, cosmopolitan, universal (in its openness 
and in its ability to be translated), but this does not sit in opposition to postmodern, and is not a call to return to a 
lost essential nature of the city. Modern is used here for its self-reflexive and open connotations, it contains the 
space to include the postmodern - that which challenges and moves beyond the modern – but to label a city 
“postmodern”, as entirety, would be to step beyond the bounds of what makes a city successful. The modern city 
contains the modern/postmodern dialectic; it constantly challenges and fragments itself, and is never an end-in-
itself. 
16 By focusing on the Judeo-Christian roots of the city, the modern city described is a modern, Western city, 
which, via the forces of globalisation, informs the reading of all other cities. This is not an effort of assimilation, 
but rather a clear statement of position, which opens the avenues of critique and conversation, rather than 
overcomes them. 
17 The Bible: Authorised King James Version with Apocrypha, Robert Carroll and Stephen Prickett, intro. and 
notes, (Oxford, 1997), Gen 4:1-17. Quote from: Gen 4:12. The Authorised King James Version has been used 
because of its central role in Western culture and literature. In its central position in the Western cultural canon, 
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Cain then proceeds to create Enoch, a city that is hidden from God’s face. The name itself
bears a great deal of importance, named after Cain’s son, Enoch means “initiation”, 
“dedication”, or “inaugurate”.18 This dedication is not to God and the initiation is not into 
God’s fold; rather the name is expressive of the beginning of humanity without God. Enoch is 
dedicated to the first generation born hidden from God’s face; it is the initiation of humanity 
into a life with the possibility of being without God. The city is, therefore, immediately 
posited as the place where God is absent; the God that was once present is no longer and yet 
the world does not end - the city continues. God’s beneficent gaze is no longer guaranteed
and humanity must construct an existence as humanity alone. Enoch is the location of 
creation (spatial, cultural, and biological) separate from god, and as such the city is the space 
of a dual rejection; God rejects Cain and his children, and they in-turn reject God through 
their own creation and dedication. Yet, while God is not necessary for Enoch, God remains 
implicit in the city as that which is consciously negated. The city’s origins arise from the 
punishment of Cain and so its subsequent creation expresses a relationship (albeit a damaged 
one) between humanity and God. Enoch, the first city, is necessarily a sin city, a fallen city, a 
singularly human reaction to being rejected.
Jacques Ellul contends that “with Cain’s beginning... we have a sure starting plane for all of 
civilisation. Paradise becomes a legend and creation a myth.”19 Cain marks the end of God’s 
acts of creation in “the time that remains” and ushers in the era of humanity as creator and 
destroyer.20 Through his actions Cain justifies and completes the exile from Eden, so 
humanity having the knowledge of good and evil, being creators and destroyers are only
separated from the divine by their mortality.21 It is the mythical beginning point of a 
    
the King James Version is important to the modern city, the hub of culture. All Biblical referencing from this 
point on can be assumed to be from this source.
18 “...chanakh: to dedicate inaugurate, initiate”. Jacques Ellul, The Meaning of the City, John Wilkinson, intro., 
John Pardee, trans. (Grand Rapids, 1970), p. 5.
19 Ibid., p. 6.
20 The term “time that remains” has been borrowed from Giorgio Agamben’s commentary on the “Letter to the 
Romans”. Agamben uses the term in a messianic Christian context via the figure of Paul, but it should be noted 
that it is used in this work via Cain and Enoch and so is extended to further include the Jewish/pre-Christian 
context. Through the extension of this term, it becomes imbued with the dialectic of the particular (Jewish/pre-
Christian) and the universal (Christian), thus aligning creation in the world (in the time that remains) with the 
dialectical space of the city. Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the 
Romans, Patricia Dailey, trans. (Stanford, Calif., 2005).
21 After Adam and Eve eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, God declares, “Behold, the man is 
become as one of us, to know good and evil; and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also the tree of life, 
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materialist history and is in some ways the myth of both the fall into and out of myth. This 
relates to George Steiner’s comment that “there was, presumably, no need of books or art in 
Eden”, because in Eden, presence was immanent and everything was apparent.22 It is only 
with the distance created by the fall that mythologising becomes necessary, and this is clear 
in the (anti)myth of Enoch. The distance from God, the possibility of sin, and the birth of 
civilisation is mythologised in the absence of an apparent explanation. However, as Ellul 
hints, this is not the most significant aspect of Cain’s beginning. The most important aspect is 
the beginning of civilisation, a starting point for humanity’s material construction of the 
external world. It becomes the myth of the possibility of no longer needing myths, the 
potential to create and thus know the world. Humanity’s creative potential is opened, 
allowing the transcendence from mere interpretation of surroundings to the creation of 
surroundings, and thus humanity truly becomes self-reflexive (interpretation-creation-
interpretation-creation) leading to the possibility of full self-knowledge. This particular 
possibility of the end of myth is not the eschatological end of myth that otherwise exists in 
the Abrahamic traditions, but rather an immanent self-knowing that is opened as an 
alternative end to the time that remains. The alternative end is perpetually postponed by the 
irreconcilable differences that exist in humanity that challenge any particular creation or 
interpretation claiming to be comprehensively inclusive. As an endeavour, the city of Enoch 
is not hubris, it is not the will to become God, it is the acknowledgement that God is no 
longer present and understandable for Cain, thus his surroundings are no longer 
understandable.
Enoch is the place where the fall is expressed spatially, as the physical place where God is 
not to be encountered. The location of the Abrahamic God, the nomadic God, tends to be in 
the desert outside the city-limits. This is not to say that the city is the location of Baal, the 
immanent God of place; rather the city is place that exists as if the nomadic God is not there. 
Even Enoch is not precluded from the possibility of God’s intervention or rupture, but the 
inhabitants are forced by God’s rejection to exist as if the nomadic God is not present. 
Augustine noted the essential difference between Cain and Abel, in that:
    
and eat, and live for ever”. Gen. 4:22. Through his evil action and subsequent creation hidden from God’s 
presence, Cain makes true the claim that the tree of life is all that separates humanity and God.
22 George Steiner, Real Presences (Chicago, 1989), p. 224.
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“Cain founded a city, whereas Abel, a pilgrim did not found one. For the city of the saints is on high, 
although it produces citizens here below, in whose persons it is a pilgrim until the time of its kingdom 
shall come.”23
The finger is not pointed at Cain for building the city as such, but instead for becoming static,
with the city becoming an end-in-itself. It is one thing to create the city and attempt to 
spatially express that which is otherwise internal, but to lose any sense of alterity, any 
possibility of exteriority, is to become static, without hope. 
The creation of Enoch may have been understandable in terms of Cain’s myth, but it serves 
as a warning against overwhelming singularity, the attempt to close the city-as-text. A city-
as-text includes adequate space, for interpretation, for continued narrative, and for differing 
perspectives. In real terms, as a closed text Cain’s city was not really a city but monument, a 
secular Kingdom with nothing but self-reference; which is why it is best approached in 
metaphorical terms.24 Enoch sits at the heart of the Abrahamic tradition as a beginning that is 
actually no beginning at all, an anti-myth that must be broken apart. Written, created as a 
retrospective solid beginning, Enoch is subsequently rejected as illegitimate, and so from the 
closed beginning the narrative possibilities are opened once more. Rejection of the closed and 
definitively located space is addressed with the argument that “Judeo-Christian culture is, at 
its very roots, about experiences of spiritual dislocation and homelessness... [the] faith began 
at odds with place, because our gods themselves were disposed to wander.”25 The conflict 
that the Judeo-Christian tradition has with the city is its potential to negate the nomadic God 
by creating a ‘place’ that the ‘God of no-place’ cannot be ‘of’ until time reaches its 
conclusion. Cities must be spaces that contain the possibility of alterity, without becoming 
sacred spaces that God is of. To avoid becoming monuments (and thus stop being cities) 
cities must be resistant the part of the mythology that calls towards singularity, the self-
  
23 Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, R. W. Dyson, ed. and trans. (Cambridge, UK, 1998), p. 635.
Richard Sennett argues that “Augustine’s book would lay the theological foundation for a city whose 
architecture and urban forms would give the restless spirit a home.” Richard Sennett, Conscience of the Eye: 
The Design and Social Life of Cities, p. 7. While this may seem antithetical to Augustine’s claim for a nomadic 
existence, there is truth in Sennett’s claim. Augustine did make parallels between earthly and heavenly cities, 
but an amendment that has to be made to Sennett’s quote is to pluralise the city into cities, thus encompassing a 
world where one can move and still feel at home (although never completely at home in this world).
24 To paraphrase Walter Benjamin, the absence of monuments is a useful criterion for deciding as to whether a 
city is modern or not. Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, trans. 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1999), p. 385.By asserting a sacred space, a monument is an attempt to deny the individual 
the opportunity to construct his or her own meaning in the city. Enoch was a monument in its entirety, an 
attempt to create a singular sense of identity following the dual rejections. 
25 Sennett, Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities, p. 6.
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defeating core expressed in Enoch, that attempts to break the dialectic with alterity and 
luxuriate in the safety of singularity. Cities must be spaces where both the particular and the 
universal are engaged with; as such they must be open to alterity and the hermeneutics of 
interpretation of the city-as-text.
The Judeo-Christian tradition is not in complete conflict with cities, however, and in fact
eschatology reaches its conclusion with the heavenly city. As Graham Ward writes:
“The only city sanctioned is the heavenly city Jerusalem; the city of the resurrected and redeemed. This 
is the other city, what might be called, after the postmodern architect and architectural historian Charles 
Jencks, heteropolis – the Greek for other city – in contrast to metropolis – the Greek for mother-city, 
capital city.”26
So the city as redemption is posited as beyond this world, or more precisely, other to this 
world, in opposition to the Metropolis.27 Augustine broke down earthly cities into two 
simplistic categories: “...the earthly by love of self extending even to the contempt of God, 
and the heavenly by love of God extending to the contempt of self. The one, therefore, glories 
in itself, the other in the Lord”.28 By confining cities or the inhabitants of the cities to such 
unwavering, distinct boundaries, Augustine fails to address the true nature of cities. Timothy 
Gorringe redresses this:
“The city is both Babylon, the place of alienation, exile, estrangement and violence, and Jerusalem, the 
place where God dwells, sets God’s sign, and invites humankind to peace. This twofold imaging of the 
city calls for a dialectic... the danger with dialectics is that they tend to fall apart.”29
The city is a dialectic containing both heteropolis and metropolis within it, thus resisting the 
violent reductionism committed by writers such as Jacques Ellul, who Graham Ward notes as 
having a profound distaste for cities.30 The Judeo-Christian tradition is, therefore, highly 
ambivalent toward cities, with history beginning with a fallen city and ending with the 
redeeming Holy City; the space in between is just that - the dialectical space of conversation 
opened between these possibilities. 
  
26 Graham Ward, Cities of God (London and New York, 2000), p. 33. 
27 The difference between the city of redemption being “beyond” this world and “other to” this world is that 
“beyond” signifies a city that is reached after the completion of this one, whereas “other” allows the dual 
existence of the heavenly and earthly city. By using the term “other”, the dialectic of universal and particular is 
opened as negotiation that continues, rather than one that must wait until the very end, the “beyond”. 
28 Augustine, p. 632.
29 Timothy Gorringe, Theology of the Built Environment (Cambridge, 2002), p. 140.
30 Ward, p. 49. The distaste arises from Ellul’s basic equation of technology and technique with sin and evil; as 
seen in works such as, Ellul, The Meaning of the City. Ellul, The Technological Bluff, Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 
trans. (Grand Rapids, 1990).
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While Jacques Ellul recognises the dialectic in the Bible: “we must remember how often, 
throughout the Scriptures, Babylon and Jerusalem are connected, as inseparable as the two 
sides of a hill, as two forms of a single reality,” he unfortunately turns this into a 
characteristically negative reading of all cities by adding: “So all that is said about Babylon 
can be applied to every other city, to today’s cities even more than to any cities known by the 
seer.”31 By writing in this fashion, Ellul accentuates the negative aspects and removes hope 
from the city, thus shunning the redemptive possibilities of the other side of the dialectic. In 
negating one side of the dialectic, Ellul is an extreme antimodernist, refusing reflexivity and 
equating increased technology with increased evil.32 Ellul is guilty of essentialising the cities 
of today into almost purely negative terms and comes close to Gnosticism in finding no good 
in humanity’s constructions.33 By focusing on the overwhelmingly negative Babylonian 
qualities from the Bible every city does not become negatively Babylonian, it becomes an 
Enoch - bearing the mark of Cain – one-sided hills with no hope of redemption. The cities 
become void of interpretation - only containing sin - and by shutting out the possibility of 
alterity, either from beyond or from within the city, hope is absent. The answer to this is to go 
back to Augustine’s dialectical reading of earthly cities and then move beyond the reading by 
allowing ambivalence - the insecurity and lack of definition that exists between Enoch and 
the end - to break down the radical polarity. This means that both sides of the hill exist 
together, inseparable, often indistinct, and unable to be cleaved apart in the time that remains.
To enter into the dialectic, the basis of the myth of the Tower of Babel needs to be 
investigated, for it is here that the earthly city is truly spawned. At the beginning of the Babel 
myth it is written that “the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech.”34 The 
importance here is the later part of the sentence indicating the commonality of 
communication; they do not just share a language, they share an unhindered exchange of the 
  
31 Ellul, The Meaning of the City, p. 50.
32 Arthur Versluis aptly defines antimodernism as having, “...at its core the awareness of decline. If the essence 
of “modernism” is progress, a belief in technological development means socio-economic improvement, the 
heart of antimodernism is a realization that “progress” has an underbelly•that technological-industrial 
development has destructive consequences in three primary and intertwined areas: nature, culture, and religion.” 
Arthur Versluis, “Antimodernism”, in, Telos, No. 137 (Winter, 2006), p. 97. Where Ellul goes wrong is he 
monomaniacally excludes the positive aspects, rather than balancing them against the bad.
33 Ellul comes close to Gnosticism in the sense that he equates humanity and their creations with evil, where the 
more that humanity creates, the more they move away from the good and purity. This comes close to the heresy 
that the body contains a pure spirit in an imperfect body, and that all that the impure body creates moves the 
spirit away from good and purity. A more helpful position would be to argue that in the knowledge of good and 
evil, humanity’s creation contain both good and evil in ambivalent measures.
34 Gen. 11:1.
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language. Importance lies in the communication of the language, not simply existing in 
commonality, but speaking and being understood completely. In the bounds of the 
completion of communication the people seek a location on which to actualise their unity. 
Thus it is written: “And it came to pass, as they journeyed from the east, that they found a 
plain in the land of Shinar, and they dwelt there.”35 So the people become placed like Cain,
the first man of historical place and went against the nomadic God. The nomadic tribes settle 
and under Nimrod’s guidance begin to break the bond with the God that sets no place of rest 
in the world until the eschatological conclusion.
As the people settle the bond reaches a tenuous breaking point with: “Go to, let us build us a 
city and a tower whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be 
scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth."36 The creation of the city is based on the 
fear of being dis-located; it is the compounding of the particular and the universal in such a 
way that leaves no room for alterity. Particular people and particular space, by abandonment 
of all other possibilities, simultaneously become universal people and universal space. By 
bringing the universal and particular together, the people under Nimrod’s guidance seek to 
bring about an immanent eschatology, an end of choice. In Jacques Derrida’s words, it is the 
attempt to:
“...give themselves the name, to construct for and by themselves their own name, to gather themselves 
there… as in the unity of a place which is at once a tongue and a tower, the one as well as the other, the 
one as the other.”37
The creation is an act of hubris as it attempts to redefine the locus of existence, to reach to the 
heavens and extend down to the united people within and below. Babel is the self-
glorification of humanity that extends beyond the realm of earthly existence. It is the self-
naming of humanity claiming the role of divinity, of humanity as a Baalim - a God of place 
that is named, placed and available. Humanity fulfils the opposite role of the self-emptying 
kenotic God, by pouring their energies into the creation of their own name they become a 
self-consuming deity. Their efforts construct the name which names both themselves and 
their construction, becoming a solipsistic closed circuit of unwavering homogeneity that 
feeds on itself. 
  
35 Gen 11:2.
36 Gen 11:4.
37 Jacques Derrida, “Des Tours De Babel”, in, Acts of Religion, G. I. Anidjar, ed. and intro. (London and New 
York, 2002), p. 107.
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Next it is written that “the LORD came down to see the city and the tower, which the 
children of men builded”, whereupon, “the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they 
have all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from 
them, which they have imagined to do.”38 The issue here is not that they are becoming “gods”
alongside the monotheistic God, but rather they are closing the door to alterity and so are 
becoming self-appointed Baalim, knowing only themselves as creators and destroyers. Babel 
is, therefore, a second Fall narrative, as humanity once again threatens to make God obsolete 
and God is compelled to intervene.39 Babel is not a myth of humanity becoming limitless
only to be hindered by God’s intervention; rather, humanity is precisely limited by their
insularity and inability to introduce alterity into the milieu. In the Babel myth, God 
recognises that the people are putting themselves into self-bondage by building a world 
limited by what they already know. Just as the first Fall narrative was also a narrative of 
knowledge and freedom, Babel is also an emancipatory narrative in which God frees 
humanity from a tyranny of their own creation. The completion of the tower – the tower that 
is simultaneously a tower, a name and a people – would be the end of progress. In effect, the 
Tower of Babel would be an anti-eschatology where instead of time reaching completion, 
humanity remains without hope in perpetua – an end without any end. Part of the lesson for 
today’s cities is they must remain open to the possibility of alterity, not necessarily God, but 
simply that which is other to what is known. 
God’s reaction against the tower is the most telling aspect of the myth and the whole 
understanding must hinge upon it.
“Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's 
speech. So the LORD scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth: and they left off 
to build the city.”40
Before all else, God is that which is beyond the limits of language and can rupture that which 
was previously a self-contained, complete system of language. God ruptures the homogenous 
  
38 Gen 11:5-6. However, as Augustine makes clear, when God is said to “see” something he does not so much 
see it as make it be seen. “...He is said to see and to discover at a particular time anything which He causes to be 
seen and discovered.” Augustine, p. 704. This is in a very similar manner to the way in which God’s face was 
hidden from Cain; it is God choosing to remain hidden.
39 Daniel Eilon, in his discussion of Jonathan Swift’s reading of Babel as confusion caused by tyranny, also 
makes the point of a second Fall occurring. Daniel Eilon, “Swift Burning the Library of Babel”, in, The Modern 
Language Review, Vol. 80, No. 2 (April, 1985), p. 271.
40 Gen 11:7-8.
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community, first by letting his alterity be seen and then confounding their language, making 
them ‘other’ to each other. Jacques Ellul writes:
“The emphasis is not on speaking as such, but on understanding... By the confusion of tongues, by non-
communication, God keeps man from forming a truth that is valid for all men. Henceforth, man’s truth 
will only be partial and contested.”41  
The passage provides an insightful cosmopolitan anti-myth in that understanding is posited as 
unattainable. The plethora of languages is not really the issue, it is the fallibility of 
communication, thus in this instance, requiring the external unification by God.42 Cities are 
subsequently framed as places of confusion and inalterably, destined to remain as incomplete 
unifications of humanity. So secularity, as the dialectical partner of religion, is also always 
incomplete, without unity – a temporal human construction in dialogue with the potentially 
singular religious. Secularity is predicated on self-limitation, so that no particular can be 
considered beyond critique and interpretation. Remaining completely in the realms of 
hermeneutics, secularity is always incomplete because communication is fallible, and thus it 
is imperative that it remains in place balancing those that would seek to compound the 
particular with the universal. 
In being the story of the confounding of language, Babel is situated in opposition to Enoch. 
Babel is the myth that ends the possibility of living without myth, thus closing the window of 
possibility that Enoch opened. In the words of Jacques Derrida, Babel is:
“...the myth of the origin of myth... the translation of translation... It would not be the only structure 
hollowing itself out like that, but it would do so in its own way (itself almost untranslatable, like a 
proper name), and its idiom would have to be saved.”43
Babel, like Enoch, began as a filling-in of identity, the creation of a singular definitive 
narrative. Humanity built the Tower up toward self-completion as a singular all-
encompassing proper name, almost untranslatable and yet almost completely universal. Babel 
was an attempt to physically build secular time to a collective standstill and thus fall into 
sequence with the eternal, divine time. The Tower was, therefore, becoming a monument; a 
monolith that draws on a singular historical narrative and sits outside of time as an inalterable 
  
41 Ellul, The Meaning of the City, pp. 18-9.
42 Slavoj Žižek also writes of language being the first and greatest divider (although in this instance the focus is 
on the multitude of languages) writing: “So, perhaps, the fact that reason and race have the same root in Latin 
(ratio) tells us something: language, not primitive egotistic interest, is the first and greatest divider, it is because 
of language that we and our neighbours (can) live in different worlds even when we live on the same street.” 
Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (London, 2008), pp. 56-7.
43 Derrida, “Des Tours De Babel”, p. 104
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sacred edifice, reducing all interpretation to the status of sacrilege. With the removal of 
humanity’s ability to understand each other, interpretation and mythological language is 
needed in the gaping absence of direct understanding. Hermeneutics, mythology, literary 
invention, and interpretation take the place of the God who is now absent. So where the Fall 
narrative is the myth of the need for myth and the Enoch myth is the possibility of suturing 
the wound opened in the Fall, Babel is the mythological beginning of myth. It is the point of 
no return – the hollowing out of understanding, the birth of humanity as kenotic, emptying 
into the world through language. So the real Fall actually occurs with Babel, because before 
this there remained a chance of human unity. Babel’s destruction demands art and books, it is 
the birth of cultures in the plural. Before Babel, humanity unified by language and 
understanding, interpreted the world together; after the Fall, the interpretation turns to the 
newly discovered multitude of others, those who now incompletely share the world.
Through the denial of the closed text (singular location and monumental, self-addressing 
Proper name) and opening of a space which precludes stasis (demands interpretation), Babel 
is the perverse mythological birth of the ideal earthly city. The ideal earthly city has the 
characteristics of the exile, of Abel the wandering pilgrim, never at rest in the world. An 
exilic city is at once a place, a home, a concrete location, and yet in the same moment it is 
transitory, never at rest, yearning to include more than it ever can. As open texts, caught in-
between place and no-place, muddled with the restless and frustrated violence of incomplete 
communication, earthly cities are all progeny of Babel. By being incomplete and transitory, 
cities are open to the dialectic with the heteropolis, preventing the transitory violence of the 
city becoming endless nihilist movement without hope or purpose. 
Babel is the story of the fracture of humanity, with the rupture coming from outside. Derrida 
writes that by confounding language, “[God] destines [humanity] to translation, he subjects 
them to the law of a translation both necessary and impossible...”44 Humanity is faced by a 
gulf of difference and can only attempt to cross it through language, and thus it could be 
claimed to be crossed by the Word of God in Christ.45 The dialectical gulf would be initially 
bridged in this case, but subsequently reopened in the time that remains, with the ascension of 
Christ. So the secular dialectical process is doomed to be incomplete, for humanity has been 
  
44 Ibid., p. 111.
45 This is the inherent genius of the universality of Christianity, the Logos underwrites and sits beneath all logos, 
thus comfortably insinuating itself into almost any other mythos.
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revealed to be foreign to humanity, and thus the Tower is actually revealed to be a 
multiplicity in the false guise of singularity. God, as complete Other, is the paradoxical 
rupturing word revealing the false nature of Babel, so that after God’s rupture, the more the 
Tower-as-logos is built up, the further it gets from singularity. Walter Benjamin quotes 
Mallarmè, writing: “the diversity of idioms on earth prevents everybody on earth from 
uttering the words which otherwise, at one single stroke, would materialise as truth...”46 In 
the face of such plurality, the answer is not to avoid language, but to be aware of its 
incompletion, of the constant need for translation. As intensely textual sites, cities are always 
pushing toward both edges of the Babylon/Jerusalem dialectic. Engaging in language, they 
strive toward the capitalised Word - signifying at its most simple something complete and 
other to that which is.47 The engagement has the effect of perpetuating both the quantity of 
translations and the task for humanity as translator. To not engage in language is to fall into 
nihilism and see nothing beyond the violence and incompletion of the present. To blindly 
engage in translation is to blunder into hopeful mystification, the task of translation getting 
ever more complex with each attempt at understanding. This is not to say that one should not 
enter this task, but rather that it must be entered with an understanding of its increasing 
incompletion, thus one can be somewhat insulated from the potential for despair in the task.
Necessity for Translation
The engagement with language is the engagement with translation - the attempt to make the 
other understandable – thus translation sits at the core of urban life. Translation is by nature a 
violent process; it shatters, rearranges, and remoulds language as a process of interpretation 
and yet also occurs before interpretation. But, the truly destructive violence occurs in the 
denial of translation, where there is no attempt to understand the other or understanding is 
prevented from occurring. This is not the same as the rupturing violence of God in the Babel 
myth, because that was wholly beyond language, rather than the rejection of it. Via the 
rejection of language, violence becomes an exclusionary and negative force that closes 
  
46 Mallarmè’s quote asserts the idea that a singular language would by default be a “supreme one”, in absence of 
otherness it would be “immortal word” that at present is “remaining silent” as thinking. This comes close to 
Gnosticism in arguing that all people contain a universal truth or essence, and like Ellul’s Gnostic tendencies, 
should be avoided. Mallarmè, as quoted in, Walter Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator: An introduction to 
the Translation of Baudelaire’s Tableaux Parisiens”, in, Illuminations, Hannah Arendt, trans. and intro. 
(London,1970), p. 77.  
47 The capitalised “Word” in this case is not the Christological Word as Logos; it is the secular hope for what yet 
is to occur.
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borders and seeks to eliminate the other. Through translation, otherness undergoes a 
multilayered interpretative process; it violently confronts the self with alterity - engages with 
it rather than rejects it - before being interpreted and broken down into familiar symbols, all 
whilst being constantly reinterpreted and always haunting with a chasm of unknowable
subjectivity. The main error made in translation does not arise from the radical otherness 
encountered; rather it occurs when the translator “preserves the state in which his own 
language happens to be instead of allowing his language to be fully affected by the foreign 
tongue.”48 So the most violent potential in translation is the colonialist assimilation of the 
foreign, turning one’s back on the chasm of difference. 
Colonialist translation seeks to cover up the unknowable core of the other, rather than attempt 
to extend it beyond its original bounds by uncovering it more than the originator ever could. 
Seeking to put the other into familiar forms, colonialist translation is the attempt to 
domesticate that which cannot be domesticated and is, therefore, opposed to the dialogue of 
cosmopolitanism.49 This is the fundamental difference between quoting an author and 
paraphrasing an author; to quote is to keep the original alterity whilst recontextualising and 
reinterpreting in a new context, whereas paraphrasing diminishes the otherness, making it 
hardly distinguishable from the colonialist’s text. In his discussion of citation, Giorgio 
Agamben attributes the following quote to Walter Benjamin: ““[citation] summons the word 
by its name, wrenches it destructively from its context, but precisely thereby calls it back to 
its origin”; at the same time it “saves and punishes””.50 In the acts of both citation and ideal 
translation, both the original and the new context are violently sustained. The colonialist 
translator, however, is fascistic in attempting to purify language – a violent conclusion that 
only sustains the new. Whilst the translator does seek purity, it is a purity that is never 
  
48 Benjamin, “Task of the Translator: An introduction to the Translation of Baudelaire’s Tableaux Parisiens”, p. 
81.
49 This was the case in nineteenth century India, where the British colonialists sought to produce “Indians in 
blood and in colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect”, largely enacted through the 
strict control of the interpretation and criticism of English texts. Helen Tiffen, “Colonialist Pretexts and Rites of 
Reply”, in, The Yearbook of English Studies, Vol. 27. The Politics of Postcolonial Criticism (1997), p. 220. 
Quote attributed to: Thomas B. Macaulay, “Minute on Indian Education”, as cited in above source. Through the 
denial of the full potentiality of interpretation, the colonialists sought to overcome the otherness of the Indian 
people and limit their perception of the internal differences that existed within the English people. It was an 
attempt to create an idealised monoculture through strict control of hermeneutics.
50 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Vol. 2, 1927-1934, Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith, eds., 
Rodney Livingstone et al. trans. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), as quoted and cited in: 
Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, p. 139.
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singular and sits in dialectic with the translator’s own tongue.51 However, the other should 
not be idolised for simply being other, this would be a fetishistic desire for purity of the other, 
and so would be in a dangerous dialectic with fascism’s concern for purity of self.  
The translator ideally lets the two languages sit side-by-side in a dialectic that invariably 
produces the short-circuit that is the translation.52 This conceptualisation is partly borrowed 
from Žižek, who adopted the short-circuit in the following way:
“...to take a major classic (text, author, notion), and read it... through the lens of a “minor” author, text, 
or conceptual apparatus (“minor” should be understood in Deleuze’s sense... marginalised, disavowed 
by the hegemonic ideology, or dealing with a “lower,” less dignified topic”.53
Translation performs a dual short-circuit, the first breaking the hegemony of the text in its 
original language, challenging any claims of sacredness. The second occurs in challenging 
the boundaries of the translator’s language by introducing alterity that defies complete 
assimilation. By translating a text, the translator breaks the closed circuit of the original 
language. This circuit is then repaired (albeit in altered state) when the translation is finished 
and it itself enters into the realm of translation (short-circuit).54  
Translation hinges upon the idea that there is some commonality between languages, between 
people, and thus the act of translation engages with the idea of universalism. Derrida writes:
  
51 Benjamin writes of this purity in translation: “A real translation is transparent; it does not cover the original, 
does not block its light, but allows the pure language, as though reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon 
the original all the more fully.” Benjamin, “Task of the Translator: An introduction to the Translation of 
Baudelaire’s Tableaux Parisiens”, p. 79.
52 Once again it seems necessary to quote Benjamin as an influence and echo: “Translation is so far removed 
from being the sterile equation of two dead languages that of all literary forms it is the one charged with the 
special mission of watching over the maturing process of the original language and the birth of its own.” Ibid., p. 
73.
53 Žižek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, 2006), p. IX. Žižek appears to have adapted the idea of the short-
circuit from writings of Jacques Lacan, as Clayton Crockett’s analysis of Lacan shows: “To open a door is to 
break the circuit, or short-circuit the current. Lacan refers to the use of digital numbers 1 and 0 to represent a 
closed (0) or (1) open door. Feedback is what allows the successive states of open and closed to affect each 
other in increasing layers of complexity, so that doors open and close in a sequence or meaningful operation.” 
In, Clayton Crockett, “Contact Epistemology for the Sites of Theology”, in, Secular Theology: American 
Radical Theological Thought, Clayton Crockett, ed. (London and New York, 2001), p. 208.
54 This idea runs in parallel with Crockett’s writing on short-circuits: “Closing a door closes the circuit, allowing 
the current to flow. Opening a door is a short-circuit, which redirects the current but does not allow a circuit to 
form and a current to flow unless there exists a closed door further out to establish a new circuit.” Crockett, pp. 
208-9.
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“Translation promises a kingdom to the reconciliation of languages... appeals to a language of the 
truth... Not to a language that is true, adequate to some exterior content, but to... a language whose truth 
would be referred only to itself.”55
The reconciliation of languages refers to a pre-Babel state, before the illusion of solidarity 
was shattered. Translation is, in effect, the mythological overcoming of Babel – the claim of a 
recoverable essence post-Babel. As Alain Badiou writes, “Every name from which a truth 
proceeds is a name from before the Tower of Babel. But it has to circulate in the Tower.”56
Hope remains for the mythological unity of understanding and truth, the hope for an a priori
transcendent language, but this is engaged with in the myriad of idioms. “Translation thus 
ultimately serves the purpose of expressing the central reciprocal relationship between 
languages”, writes Benjamin.57 Such a metaphysical expression can never be defined, 
because to do so would relativise the truth and degrade it to the wasteland of history, and so it 
remains as a necessarily unspoken possibility.
These ideas share many parallels with Jorge Luis Borges’ short-story “The Library of Babel”, 
in which the world is constituted of a series of hexagonal rooms, each containing the means 
for survival and four walls of five bookshelves, each containing thirty-five books.58 Each 
book is of uniform format, with each containing a seemingly random arrangement of 
orthographic symbols. The library conceivably contains every book ever written, or that 
might ever be written, and whilst this gives no solace to the characters that despair and find 
the books useless to them, they surmise that:
“On some shelf in some hexagon (men reasoned) there must exist a book which is the formula and 
prefect compendium of all the rest: some librarian has gone through it and he is analogous to a god.”59
So the book is conceived of as the hope of unification of language, the singular that 
completes all others and renders them unnecessary. The folly of the story is the violent search 
for the singular book to the detriment of all else, when the real object would be to recognise 
the unity underlying the individual texts: the library itself. Despair arises because the library
is a closed system with nothing that is not already conceived, and so “each work within the 
literary array is unstable and relative; it exists only as a negligible fraction of an 
  
55 Derrida, “Des Tours De Babel”, p. 130. 
56 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, Ray Brassier, trans. (Stanford, 2003), p.110.
57 Benjamin, “Task of the Translator: An introduction to the Translation of Baudelaire’s Tableaux Parisiens”, p. 
72.
58 Jorge Luis Borges, “The Library of Babel”, in, Labyrinths: Selected Stories & Other Writings (Middlesex, 
1970), pp. 78-86.
59 Ibid., p. 83.
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unencompassable whole.”60 Due to the existence of so many texts that are almost identical,
one cannot even know whether one has read the authoritative text, leaving the task of finding 
it eternally incomplete. The perfect compendium thus can only ever exist as an ‘idea’ that 
gives a unifying meaning to all others by encompassing (though it can never be encompassed 
itself) them within a singularity. Cities, on this level, encompass a hope that they are 
universally readable as echoes of humanity, rather than being an overwhelming disunity. 
In “The Library of Babel”, always and already containing all possibilities of language, “no 
one can articulate a syllable which is not filled with tenderness and fear, which is not in one 
of these languages, the powerful name of God. To speak is to fall into tautology.”61 Every 
word is filled with an excess of meaning, it overflows with the sacred, and translation is made 
impossible. A response to this is to make no word sacred, nothing able to be uttered that 
cannot be translated, and this is one of the key messages able to be extrapolated from the 
Tower of Babel myth. Babel is the rupture of the profane where the Tower, which would 
have been the link between sacred and profane, is destroyed revealing the multiplicity of 
humanity and language – a multiplicity that in accepting its vast differences can only be 
secular. The God who “imposes and opposes his name” is “pleading for translation... not only 
between the tongues that had suddenly become multiple, but first of his name, of the name he 
had proclaimed, given, and which should be translated as confusion to be understood”, writes 
Derrida.62 This is the first incarnation of God in the world - the God as name that must 
undergo the endless cycle of death and rebirth of secular translation, and yet remain as a 
possible mythological root of language itself. God’s name incarnated alongside all other 
words, translatable and yet not, like all language, it “hints at something else behind itself.”63
It hints at the “signifier [that] does not have to answer for its existence in the name of some 
hypothetical signification.”64 God enters into the realm of signification and pleads for 
translation, but offers no guarantee of response and no justification for the imposition of the 
word.
  
60 Eilon, p. 271.
61 Borges, “The Library of Babel”, p. 85.
62 Derrida, “Des Tours De Babel”, pp. 111 & 118.
63 Bernard Tschumi, “The Pleasure of Architecture”, Architecture and Disjunction (Cambridge, Mass. and 
London, 1994), p. 93.
64 Tschumi, “De-, Dis-, Ex-”, Architecture and Disjunction, p. 221.
26
God entered into the world as language and demanded to be translated in an act that at once 
signalled the end of the city-that-is-no-city and ushered in the era of true cities, polyglots
contending with a word whose attachment to its signifier is unknowable. Cities as spaces of 
language, of writing; paradoxical spaces where the absence of, and the potential engagement 
with, the God who must be translated is experienced.65 For, as Graham Ward writes, “the city 
itself is a writing within which all other writings are circumscribed.”66 The city necessarily 
contains God as logos, but this inclusion is limited in that the claim is made relative by its 
repeated translation, to impose the universal farther than this is to attempt to rebuild Babel. 
To assert a singular translation as finality would be the end of the city - the end of logos - an
in-filling of a self-relating truth-claim. God is necessarily absent from the city because God’s 
presence would automatically preclude the existence of the city; the city-as-polyglot, secular 
multiplicity, would cease to exist under the gaze of the Singular. This is why cities are either 
secular or they are theocracies; the imposition of the universal negates any chance of a 
middle-ground between the two. The mere existence of cities is a sign of absence, which is 
not to say Ellul’s assertions should be followed and we desert them, rather they should be 
approached as necessary locations that in signalling absence also signal the maintenance of a 
future hope. Cities are texts that ideally signify future hope, a hope that can never be called 
forth, which must be engaged with as logos, hermeneutics of hope in this world that offers the 
possibility of alterity. 
City as Text
After Babel, the city is a text able to be written, read, and experienced as an eminently 
malleable environment. This seems to be what Graeme Gilloch had in mind when he wrote: 
“It is under the mournful eyes of the allegorist that the modern city is transformed into a 
series of signs to be deciphered, a text to be read.”67 With myth and allegory essential after 
the second fall, all human-endeavour becomes open to individual readings. Michel de Certeau 
continues the idea of the city-as-text with the addition of “walking as a space of enunciation”, 
  
65 With translation always comes interpretation; as Susan Sontag writes: “Interpretation thus presupposes a 
discrepancy between the clear meaning of the text and the demands of (later) readers. It seeks to resolve this 
discrepancy.” Translation and its partner interpretation seek to best overcome the discrepancy of meaning that 
exists in the continuing time that remains. Susan Sontag, “Against Interpretation” (orig. 1964), in, Against 
Interpretation and Other Essays, (New York, 1967), p. 6.
66 Ward, p. 4.
67 Graeme Gilloch, Myth & Metropolis: Walter Benjamin and the City (Cambridge, UK, 1996), p. 171.
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the ““wandering of the semantic” produced by the masses that make some parts of the city 
disappear and exaggerate others”.68 The proposition is attractive, especially when appended 
with: 
“To walk is to lack place. It is the indefinite process of being absent... exoduses that intertwine and 
create an urban fabric, and placed under the sign of what ought to be ultimately, the place but is only a 
name, the city.”69
Such a conception echoes Augustine’s Abel, the eternal pilgrim whose footsteps echo with 
the promise of Jerusalem, the heteropolis. The idea of walking as that which gives the city its 
fluidity and dynamic qualities is excellent; problems arise, however, with walking as speech. 
“The idea of “speech” implies presence, whereas writing “writing” implies absence.”70
Writing is, by necessity, the act of recording events, thoughts, experiences, that have already 
occurred and been deemed deserving of record. To walk in the city is not to engage with 
presence; it is to investigate and manipulate mythologies, the text of the built environment. 
Michel de Certeau is following the postmodern tradition of denying metaphysics thus 
insinuating presence into the horizontal plane of the everyday. 
The bustle and flow of ambulatory travel is not a direct experience as it has no direct 
recipient; the only potential recipient of the oratory walkers would be one in an omniscient 
position observing the totality of the city. Graham Ward points out that such a position is 
partially afforded in de Certeau’s writing as he “likens the geometric space of city-planners 
and architects to the ‘literal meaning’ constructed by grammarians and linguists”.71 The 
“literal meaning” is an attempt to arrive at a singular purity, which is then dimly reflected in 
the speech (spatial habits) of the inhabitants. De Certeau understood the heterologia of speech 
and thus grappled with the legacy of Babel, but failed to appreciate it in its entirety by 
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71 Ward, p. 232.
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inserting glimpses of direct and untranslatable presence. Derrida, on-the-other-hand,
understands the legacy of Babel perhaps best, and so for him, in Ronald Michener’s analysis,
“meaning cannot be final – if it was it would be a form of “presence”.72 Whilst walking is the 
true experience of the city, it is not a proclamation, a speech act, and this is because (to use a 
cliché) when one is speaking they are not listening. While it is true that de Certeau intended 
the speech act to be part of a continual dialogue, the ebb and flow of conversation, there is
still a troubling will to remake walking into a revolutionary proclamation. Speaking in this 
sense is a form of finality that includes a mirage of presence, thus denying the hope for the 
alterity by breaking down the dialectic, collapsing the Metropolis and Heteropolis.
The city is a place of absence, not in the Levinas/de Certeau sense of presence that is 
temporarily overlooked in the space of conversation, but in the sense of no presence, thus the 
city must be secular. It is in this capacity of absence that humanity comes together in the city, 
engaging in the incomplete, never to be completed. Lewis Mumford, one of the greatest 
writers on the social implications of cities, writes:
“Before man can be fully humanized, the social man must break up into a thousand parts: so that each 
grain of aptitude, each streak of intelligence, each fiber of special interest, may take a deeper color by 
mingling with other grains, streaks, and fibers of the same nature.”73  
Cities at best are the challenging milieus that allow the modern man to break up and mingle 
with the diversity of humanity. The problem would be to expect modern man to be able to be 
made whole again, to be reconstituted as some kind of prototypic modern human. Modernity, 
the creation and milieu of modern man, is an obsessively ordered system which continues to 
seek finality at the same time that it punctuates history with a successive series of 
beginnings.74 There is danger in the idea that one is fully-human when one is whole rather 
than when one is fractured. The danger being that completion is analogous to death, it is the 
end of modernity’s task of self-reflexivity, and so too would the completed man be the death 
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of humanity.75 To be fully-human is to be incomplete, an ongoing project that ends with 
death, not a project that will live to experience its own completion. This also goes for the city, 
for “it was early recognised that it was the community, and not the built environment, which 
makes the city.”76 Cities are the reflections of fractured humanity and it is here in the city-as-
logos that humanity engages with the fully-human capacity of difference.
Le Corbusier’s Violence against the Saeculum
Swiss-born architect Le Corbusier could not stand the disordered and fractured nature of the 
modern city, and rallied against the conditions with a religious zeal. Streets filled with a 
cacophony of automobiles and unordered pedestrians gave Le Corbusier a “glimpse of 
purgatory”.77 The proposed solution was the insistence on order, with life meaning 
“something brought to perfection... mastery, not abortive chaos.”78 Such extreme ordering 
meant that Le Corbusier was a hyper-modernist who bordered on the violent revolutionary 
ideals of Futurism: focusing on straight-lines, order, and technology.79 Being a revolutionary, 
Le Corbusier did not aim at reformation as much as revolution, cities were not to be 
remoulded and shaped for the better, but torn down, cleansed from memory.80 So this 
becomes a modernist attempt to build a secular Tower of Babel, to tear down the disordered 
and replace them with a singular vision, which, because of its singularity, can never be truly 
secular, only profane. The singularity of vision that Le Corbusier dreamed of was 
megalomaniacal in presuming to be able to quell the unavoidable violence of cities, and 
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misguided in using a singular founding violence to quell a multitude of smaller violence.81 As 
James Donald argues: 
“...those who fantasise about turning the city into an efficient machine, with all its component parts 
flawlessly engineered and geared, misrecognise the space of the city... This is the overweening dream 
of Enlightenment rationality...”82
Whilst Le Corbusier should be commended for his dream of a humane city, it was simply not 
feasible in its singularity or method, the founding violence alone parallels the anti-humanism 
of Italian Futurist F. T. Marinetti. Either the city would slip back toward its chaotic nature or 
the violence needed to keep it in check would resemble that of a despotic state.  
For Le Corbusier, the singular vision is the “city of light that will dispel the miasmas of 
anxiety now darkening our lives”.83 This is strikingly similar to Calvin’s puritanical attempt 
to reform Geneva, and much of Le Corbusier’s writing echoes with Protestant values, albeit 
in secularised form. Le Corbusier was attempting to extend the proposed purity of Calvin’s 
Geneva to the world, thus collapsing the particular and the universal into a profane 
singularity. The modern, secular ideals of Le Corbusier are apparent in his reading of the
airplane: “The airplane instils, above all a new conscience, the modern conscience. Cities, 
with their misery, must be torn down. They must be largely destroyed and fresh cities 
built.”84 Humanity, via humanity’s creation – technology - assumes God’s position, the God’s 
eye view that allows a critical overview. Le Corbusier’s plan acts as a precursor counter to 
Lewis Mumford’s claim of the impotence arising from the claim that “no human eye can take 
in this metropolitan mass at a glance.”85 Rather than instilling a sense of vertigo, the airplane 
gave Le Corbusier a sense of self-deification, where cities that offended his vision could be 
razed and replaced with radiant glass towers. Graham Ward correctly argued that Le 
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Corbusier dreamed of creating the “godless, but nevertheless light-filled, spatially 
harmonious, timeless city” of Revelations.86 For Le Corbusier, eschatology is transferred 
from the Bible to the sanitised drawing boards of architects and city-planners. The violence 
of Revelations is made to be an immanent human action, and therein resides the great 
inhumanity of Le Corbusier’s reformation; he used models that were never intended for 
humanity as it is. To plan to destroy homes and neighbourhoods in order to rid humanity of 
suffering is oxymoronic at best and calculatingly cruel at worst. 
Le Corbusier’s proposed violent reforms deny the very structure set out in the Babel myth. 
The fall of the Tower of Babel did not only make myth a necessity, it also made the saeculum
a permanent demand in the world.87 “Saeculum with all the connotations evinced by this 
term: temporal (siècle) as well as spatial (world), as in “world without end.””88 Le 
Corbusier’s proposal would be analogous with the completion of the Tower, almost the 
equivalent of eating from the tree of life. Time in its capacities of progression and decay 
would almost cease to be as all efforts become expended in the maintenance of the single 
vision. Translation and interpretation would be absent in Le Corbusier’s model because they 
are both symptoms and causes of the degradation he is seeking to purify. With the completion 
of the Tower, temporality would cease, rather than reaching completion. Through the
confounding of language God submits humanity into the full grips of the saeculum, the world 
of shared human experience in which religion and secular exist together in time. Humanity is 
denied direct, unmediated access to the eternal and so out of necessity must engage with 
religion, the logos of faith for the eternal. And so the secular follows, as Vahanian writes, 
““secular” was only the antonym of “religious,” not its antithesis: they formed a pair, never to 
be cleaved one from the other.”89 Le Corbusier was compounding the pair into immanent 
singularity, leaving no space for both by removing time and creating a world-end. The 
impetuous rush to overcome the time remaining and create the heavenly city denied the 
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dialectical structure of the city itself. Paradoxically, Le Corbusier was creating a purgatory 
that he had found so distasteful; a null-time beyond the saeculum dialectic of the heavenly 
and earthly city. Le Corbusier was nihilistic in his plan for a city where meaning is found in 
built presence, rather than humanity or God. The purgatory Le Corbusier would offer no 
expiation or hope, however, just an end to future sin in the capacity that there would be no 
future.
Secular and religious are temporal forms; the religious points to the eternal city and the 
completion of time, whilst the secular limits this by not allowing religion to be all-
encompassing. The secular prevents the religious from becoming a Tower in itself, a singular 
language of memory that overwhelms all else, and it is the religious that prevents the secular 
from being a Tower with no memory at all. While religion derives from the Latin religare, to 
bind, it is the “secular - a language all the religions have in common” - that actually binds 
universally.90 Religion without the secular can have no claim to be universal (and indeed 
cannot claim to be religion in the Judeo-Christian framework), and yet the secular must not 
be thought of as a kind of original form or essence, because “the secular as a domain had to 
be instituted or imagined, both in theory and in practice.”91 Secular is not an a priori form, it 
is a political construct of language, and is in dialectic with the religious. Language, binds the 
religious and the secular, but in the post-Babel world this is an incomplete, subjective 
unification because “no language was ever handed down from heaven”, no language is a 
priori.92
Binding the secular and the religious, language must be regarded as the most important aspect 
of the city; the confusion of dialogues that remain in the same space despite, and indeed
because, of their bewildering difference. As Vahanian notes:
“It is Nietzsche who points out that, after the collapse of Christian culture, what remains is the Bible. 
Not a book but a trace – the emblematic trace of a language, if not language tout court. What remains is 
a theology of language, the cutting edge of discourse reduced neither to the religious nor to the 
secular.”93
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The city is also a trace; not of the divine but of Babel before the fall, which if nothing else 
was language tout court. Cities contain and at once are the cutting edge of discourse;
theologies of language, both secular and religious. It is essential that they are both religious 
and secular, so must therefore, retain the trace of a language, the common discourse. Larry 
Shiner argued that “the elimination of the Jewish-Christian God as the ground and the end of 
Western culture removes the transcendent limit that keeps secular society secular.”94 In the 
death of God era, the religious language must remain as the trace, or otherwise the secular is 
no longer secular. In the absence of the secular, the religious would be undifferentiated from 
the political, leading to expressions of Volk, nationalism, and theocracy, and yet without a 
foil with which to limit them. Language must remain as the bond that strengthens both the 
religious and secular positions, keeping the violence of the city, the religious, and the secular 
in its most positive functions.
In this world, there is no city without the secular. The city must be secular to make space for 
the religious to be available in all its forms. Vahanian writes that the “world is what the city 
of God and the city of man have in common”.95 This needs to be defined further, however, as 
it is more accurately language which the city of man and the city of God have in common. 
Vahanian writes:
“The secular is what outgrows religion; it looms on the incompressible horizon of memory as what’s 
left when religion is loosened from the fossilizing effects of memory and fades into hope.”96
Out of the language of religion the secular emerges to encapsulate the political sphere, the 
day-to-day machinations, and the historical memory. The detachment from the daily 
machinations of the world allows religion the critical space for hope. That is not to say the 
religious is not engaged, but rather it is engaged from outside in a space of humility and 
compassion, through a shared mythical genus, and shares in the linguistic confusion. Writer 
Andrew Sullivan argues that:
“...secularism alone does justice to the profundity of the claims of religion... Humility requires 
relinquishing the impulse to force faith on others, to condemn those with different faiths, or to 
condescend to those who have sincerely concluded that there is no God at all.”97
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Cities are necessarily secular spaces that allow the space to interact with humility, granting 
the full profundity of religion and dialogue between faiths. The city is the critical space for 
language, as it is both an expression of language in its own right and also a space for sharing 
in the dialectic.
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Intermezzo: “The City Coat of Arms”
Franz Kafka’s short story, “The City Coat of Arms”, retells the Tower of Babel myth, but the 
Tower is never actually built, rather it is the proposed culmination of a dream of peaceful 
unity.98 As a European Jew living a semi-exilic existence in both Vienna and Prague, Kafka’s 
move to re-imagine the Babel narrative makes sense. His uneasy use of a language (German)
that was not quite his own echoes the fractured and multilingual nature of Babel, the 
incompletion of language. As George Steiner writes, “The translucency of Kafka’s German, 
its stainless quiet, suggests a process of borrowing at high, very intolerable interest.”99 The 
reinterpretation of the myth, the change of narrative perspective, and the unresolved 
messianic ambiguity, all reflect the Jewish tradition. “The arcane wit, the delicacy of probing, 
the finesse of Talmudic, of Midrashic and Mishnaic commentaries... Franz Kafka was heir to 
this methodology and epistemology of commentary, of “unending analysis” (Freud’s 
phrase)”, writes Steiner.100 Unending analysis is the task of the modern; the continual acts of 
translation and expression enable the individual to experience and express otherness in a 
world of vagary and absence. With this background Kafka presents Babel as a far more 
ambiguous place, where divine intervention is suspended, and the world exists already with 
the knowledge of difference.
In “The City Coat of Arms”, for those that came to the city, it was the idea of building a 
tower that reached to heaven that was essential, rather than the physical completion of the 
Tower itself. Inhabitants of the city exist in messianic time, because it is the messianic that 
can achieve that which no Tower can, true unity through a divine act, or rupture that 
overcomes. “The idea, once seized in its magnitude, can never vanish again; so long as there 
are men on earth there will be the irresistible desire to complete the building.”101 Alterity is 
created by humanity as the dream of perfect unity that will subsequently reach to heaven. 
There is little desire to build the Tower in the present because technology is increasing at 
such a rate that it is “...likely that the next generation with their perfected knowledge will find 
the work of their predecessors bad, and tear down what has been built so as to begin 
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anew.”102 Under the cloud of this concern, the focus turns to the construction of the city to 
house the workers, with every nationality wanting “the finest quarter for itself”.103 The varied 
people fight, postponing the building even further as they wait for a time when they have 
perfect unity. “City Coat of Arms” can, therefore, be interpreted as a critique of nationalism 
and sectarianism which ghettoises populations, defeating the opportunity to work 
cooperatively toward a meaningful objective. The narrative of the short story differs 
substantially from that of the Torah/Bible, as the people in Kafka’s story are aware of their 
differences and are in no need of God’s intervention in this way. They do not need to undergo 
a second fall, because they are already experiencing the trials of interpretation and 
translation, and yet they are not without hope. The inhabitants of the city live with messianic 
hope, the interpretable idea which, for Kafka as a European Jew, formed a base for 
interpretation in and of the saeculum.
The people living in Kafka’s Babylon do not spend their entire time in conflict; “the town 
was embellished in the intervals, and this unfortunately enough evoked fresh envy and fresh 
conflict.”104 By ornamenting the city the inhabitants were illustrating their differences, 
mythologizing their separation from each other, and engaging in an action which irrevocably 
showed their increasing distance from the unifying task of the Tower. Ornamentation of the 
city meant that those living in the city were accepting the increasing futility of their proposed 
task and instead engaging with their surrounding inhabitants. The actions of the inhabitants of 
the city in Kafka’s short story, bear comparison to those in a scene described by Slavoj Žižek
(in discussion of German writer and theatre director, Heiner Müller), in which those waiting 
for the trains in Communist Eastern Europe are continually announced but never come, thus 
fostering a messianic attitude. “The point of this Messianic attitude was not that hope was 
maintained, but that, because the Messiah did not arrive, people began to look around and 
take note of the inert materiality of their surroundings”, writes Žižek.105 The hope of arrival
begins to be abandoned and instead the people turn to the saeculum and the expression of 
cultures. There is unmistakable violence in this task, but it is less than the totalitarian 
violence involved in uniting all people, because the unification of all people can only occur 
through that which is other to all humanity. By moving away from the task of unification, the 
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city comes closer to the principles of secularity where differences are accepted and met with 
hermeneutics, without an assimilatory attempt to overcome them.
By the second or third generation, the inhabitants had realised “...the senselessness of 
building a heaven-reaching tower; but by that time everybody was too deeply involved to 
leave the city.”106 Meaning becomes invested in the everyday as the inhabitants turn to the 
city itself, uniting people in their experience of absence in this world. A second Fall occurs in 
this narrative, not through God’s intervention and revealing of the differences of humanity, 
but instead through the abandonment of the hope of unity and acceptance of differences that 
are unable to be overcome. Kafka’s story is a secular myth of the chasm of difference that 
exists between humanity and the impossibility of Utopianism. The myth is not without a 
God-figure however, as “all the legends and songs that came to birth in that city are filled 
with longing for a prophesised day when the city would be destroyed by five successive 
blows from a gigantic fist.”107 Linear time, which haunted the city-dwellers with the 
expectation of technological improvement, remains firmly in place, re-imagined as an 
apocalyptic expectation. They long for the day when they will be spared the difficulty of 
living amongst difference, the day when that which binds them is destroyed through the 
agency of complete alterity. In Kafka’s “The City Coat of Arms”, the inhabitants of Babylon 
never become one people and in the end do not desire to be so. Existence is emptied of both 
the hope of building to heaven - transcendence from this world by human agency - and also 
Utopianism - the overcoming of the forces of time and difference. In the space of the city, 
humanity remains existing side-by-side as different-yet-together, longing for respite. Kafka’s 
story shows the difficulty and necessity of engagement with difference in the face of an 
uncertain future that refuses to be called-forth; that turns us to the saeculum and keeps the 
city open to the possibility of alterity.
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Kierkegaard, Culture, and the Messianic Violence of Potentiality
“Violence is undone, violence is easier now, it’s uprooted, out of control, it has no measure anymore, 
it has no level of values.”
Don DeLillo, Underworld108
“For people who are really uprooted there remain only two possible sorts of behaviour: either fall into 
a spiritual lethargy resembling death... or to hurl themselves into some form of activity necessarily 
designed to uproot, often by the most violent methods, those who are not yet uprooted, or only partly 
so.”
Simone Weil, The Need For Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties Toward Mankind 109
“Paul’s experience is that the new community arose from nothing. At the moment when legitimacy
passes from an old community to a new one, justification is strictly speaking not possible.”
Marin Terpestra and Theo de Wit, ““No Spiritual Investment in the World As It Is”: Jacob 
Taubes’s Negative Political Theology”110
Culture(s)
Cities contain and are contained by culture, a word imbued with such a seemingly endless 
variety of meaning that it has lost the majority of its avant garde impact. To try and define 
the term seems to be a quixotic task, and yet also hugely popular if the continuing abundance 
of broad-outline cultural studies texts is anything to go by.111 Despite the incredible breadth 
that the term culture spans, it is essential to engage with it in order to achieve a greater 
understanding of the city. And indeed, ‘culture’, in its popular usage is distinctly urban in its 
orientation and focus.112 This being so, it is necessary to begin with at least a general working 
outline of the term, which is adequately and succinctly provided by theologian Sheila 
Davaney: “the notion of culture points simultaneously to the totality of relations and 
dynamics that constitute human life and to the specificity and concreteness of particular 
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human historical configurations.”113 Culture contains both the universal and the particular of 
human relations and is, therefore, homologous with the saeculum. As totality, culture
encompasses secular, religious, and all cities as humanity’s creations, and so in itself is 
relatively worthless as a critical term. When regarded solely in the particular sense, culture
becomes meaningless again, because cultures:
“...are internally pluralistic, continually in process of being made and remade, conflictual and, 
importantly, lacking unifying unchanging cores, essences or centres that provide their inhabitants stable 
identities, roles, or direction.”114
Cities as lived-realities could be defined in an almost identical manner, reflecting that cities 
are cultures made manifest, always internally inconsistent, never existing as the singularity of 
vision that planners such as Le Corbusier suggested. The critical value of the analysis of 
culture, in its mirroring of the city, arises from the short-circuit between the singular and 
pluralistic conceptions of culture. With the city, like culture, the interest lies not in the 
particular city, but in the dialectical gap between the idea of the city and the city-itself. 
Culture raises issues for Christianity and theology, most of which are far beyond the scope of 
this work, but a brief discussion is necessary to generally determine the role of theology in 
relation to culture. H. Richard Niebhur writes that, “in Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek, 
bond nor free, male nor female; but in relation to other men a multitude of relative value 
considerations arise.”115 Christianity asserts the possibility of a singular culture, but must 
contend with the plethora of difference that exists in the world. The difficulty arises in 
relating to the differences without becoming just another relative cultural consideration. So 
theology of culture, by necessity, “must employ metacultural norms of judgement.”116 Whilst 
being metacultural, these norms of judgement must be open to cultural critique or else 
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theology dies through becoming a closed culture-sphere. Theological metacultural norms of 
judgement must also undergo rigorous internal, theological evaluation or risk voiding the 
theological, which is inherently hermeneutical, of its validity. “The promise of cultural 
studies for theology lies in its potential to break down the fairly rigid boundary that has 
demarcated religion from its surroundings”, writes Linell E. Cady.117 Cultural studies is the 
other in the conversation, it questions the legitimacy of theology’s metacultural norms and is 
likewise interrogated by theology. Through dialogue, cultural studies and theology are freed 
from their respective spheres and both can enter into a full discussion of the saeculum.
Kierkegaard, Banksy, and the Messianic Potential of Religiousness B
A critical figure in the discussion of culture and religion is the 19th Century Danish 
theologian (although he was uncomfortable with the term theology, it was theology he was 
writing) Søren Kierkegaard. The existence-spheres that Kierkegaard proposed (aesthetical, 
ethical, and religious) provide a valuable platform for analysing culture.118 An issue that must 
be immediately addressed at this point is whether or not existence or culture spheres are valid 
given the porous nature of a culture that has experienced the fragmentary process of 
postmodernity. Richard Rorty mused along such lines, that a “wrong turn was taken when 
Kant’s split between science, morals, and art was accepted as a donné, as massgebliche 
Selbstauslegung der Moderne.”119 As has previously been discussed, cultures have no core, 
no essence that can attribute identity; so do Kant’s or Kierkegaard’s descriptive structures 
actually describe anything? Or in fact, can we be certain that there are no essences to be 
found in cultures? To answer the first question, no they do not describe any thing that could 
be considered concrete; rather they are working models that, following the event of 
postmodernity, are open to even greater possibilities. Via critics such as Rorty, the models 
have been voided of their essential status and have been returned fully to the realm of 
hermeneutics. They are open-ended expressions of language that contain no consistency in 
actuality, but can point to what could be, and critique what is. In response to the second 
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question, we can be sure that there is no essence to be found insofar that the only complete 
consistency that could occur at a specific point in time would be in culture in the singular
metacultural sense. Culture in the singular metacultural sense, includes everything, excludes 
nothing, and thus is functionally worthless. Kierkegaard’s existence-spheres must be treated 
as hermeneutical constructs of critique rather than descriptive realities.
For the aesthete in the aesthetical sphere, “all that matters is the now as a potential erotic 
instant... there is recognition of the other but only as other-for-me; as an objectified and 
faceless other...”.120 The aesthetical sphere is a sphere of hedonism and would pose a great 
threat to the city, for it sees no future and reduces others to the status of consumables. This 
sphere concerned Kierkegaard most, because it was the one he perceived to be most prevalent 
in the emerging industrial/capitalist society that surrounded him. With no concept of a future, 
other than its waiting to be another consumable ‘now’, the aesthetical sphere has no frame of 
reference from which to judge the world, and so it slips toward equality without referent. 
“[B]ecause no events or ideas catch hold of the age”, Kierkegaard argued, “the process of 
levelling (will) become a harmful pleasure, a form of sensual intoxication.”121 The argument 
that Kierkegaard presents is not with the idea of equality that the age was bringing to the fore, 
but the idea of equality without referent, where no event is significant because it is 
completely devoid of transcendent meaning. Here Kierkegaard could be read as making a 
prescient argument against the excesses of postmodernity, where high and low culture are 
undifferentiated, and everything (and therefore nothing) is potentially imbued with 
transcendence. To exist in such a way in the aesthetical sphere is to exist violently; it is a 
sphere of consumption that cannot even be considered individualistic because individualism 
recognises others as individuals, the aesthete does not differentiate. As Hannah Arendt 
asserts, “the extreme form of violence is One against All.”122 This violence is the result of the 
aesthetical sphere; it precludes community, communal meaning and the city itself; for the city 
is confusion, whereas the aesthete reduces the babble to a single other-for-me. 
The ethical sphere is an improvement on the aesthetical sphere in that it acknowledges the 
three dimensions of time (past, present, and future) in a way that unifies them, “rendering 
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possible the integrity of an ethical existence.”123 To exist in the ethical sphere is to have a 
view of history that informs the present and a concept of the future that imparts importance 
on actions in the present. It is a modern position of self-reflexive responsibility, a self-choice 
acknowledging the individual outside of the self. Calvin O. Schrag writes:
“The ethically chosen self finds that it has not only duties for and to itself but also duties for and to 
others as it is shaped by the concrete reciprocal relations with its natural and surroundings.”124
This advancement is crucial for the city as the individual consciously engages with the 
plethora of others sharing the place and also the surrounding city itself. In comparison, the 
aesthetical person sees the surroundings as possibilities for personal use and gratification, a 
personal playground of jouissance. 
Those who simply graffiti their names throughout the city could be regarded as existing in the 
aesthetical sphere, through the act of self-aggrandising themselves to a faceless world via 
another’s property.125 Some could argue that self-aggrandisement indicates a view of the 
world that includes the future (i.e. the future viewing of the tag), however, this is not the case, 
as the jouissance occurs in the action and the immediate imagination of the faceless other’s 
response; the artist is rarely privy to the reaction of the general populous. In the case of one 
artist overwriting another’s tag, it is a classical act of one in the aesthetical sphere, the 
domination of the other - the removal of the name, the face – in aid of one’s own jouissance. 
This is not to say that all graffiti can be placed in the aesthetical sphere, and indeed it could 
be argued that some fits into the ethical sphere. For instance, the street artist who goes under 
the name Banksy tends to create pieces of work that consider a futurity, that convey social 
and political messages.126 Three years after Hurricane Katrina, Banksy produced a series of 
murals throughout New Orleans depicting scenes:
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“...including Abraham Lincoln as a homeless man pushing a basket, a marching band wearing gas 
masks, an old man in a rocking chair with an American flag below the words "No Loitering," and a boy 
on a swing made out of a life preserver.”127
These works address political issues from an understanding of history and show compassion 
for other people. In a press release that coincided with the works, Banksy writes: “[t]hree 
years after Katrina I wanted to make a statement about the state of the clean up operation.”128
Whilst there may be an element of personal gratification and reward in the productions, there 
is also a message that speaks beyond the aesthetical sphere. Conceivably it could be argued 
that Banksy is not a graffiti artist because he leaves readily identifiable images rather than 
wilfully ambiguous ciphers, but he does, however, use others property to convey the 
message. Banksy has, therefore, begun to move beyond the aesthetical sphere of the tagger 
who leaves cryptic signs and names, toward the ethical sphere, which in Banksy’s particular 
case, is conveyed using the commonality of image. The image is not beyond language in the 
sphere of destructive violence, but is in itself a language of social commentary that engages 
with the urban environment. In the particular case of his work in New Orleans, it could be 
argued that Banksy is engaging in the other-for-me of the aesthetical sphere; using the 
misfortune of others to build a profitable artistic impression. This is at least partially true and 
reinforces the need for Kierkegaard’s existence spheres to be critical modes of evaluation, 
rather than, solely as culture-spheres in the everyday sense that contain such internal 
inconsistency they are incapable of content.
Kierkegaard’s breakdown of the religious sphere into Religiousness A and Religiousness B 
offers an even greater schema of critique. Religiousness A operates as a sphere of 
immanence; a culture-sphere in a similar vein to the aesthetical and the ethical, which 
potentially fractures the individual away from civic society, but retains the inherent tendency 
of interiority present in the other spheres. As Schrag explains:
“The ethically existing subject in its baptism into Religiousness A becomes aware of being-guilty, of a 
profound dis-relationship with itself as a social and civic self... Proceeding in tandem... is a 
problematization of the moral self-assurance in the ethical sphere; a recognition of the subject’s moral 
efforts towards rectifying its misdeeds”.129  
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This sphere operates somewhere between Alcoholic Anonymous’s recognition of one’s 
powerlessness against vice and subsequent need for God, and Richard Rorty’s self-aware 
irony. Religiousness A “can be understood to embody the fourth culture-sphere that has been 
glossed by the makers of modernity”, writes Schrag.130 It is the modern religious position, 
self-reflexive in its understanding of the world, and with its relativisation of values, it stands 
a step beyond the ethical existence sphere. The danger inherent in the move to relativise 
values is the potential loss of community and of humanity itself. There is a possibility of 
levelling, with the religious becoming the equivalent of all other culture, without alterity or a 
metacultural position from which critique can be engaged. The danger would be of 
Religiousness A moving back toward the aesthetical sphere, with the other so individually 
distinguished and catered-to that difference is rendered meaningless in its complete 
relativisation.
Care must be taken so that Religiousness A does not to become too much like the other 
culture-spheres, it must stake a claim of difference and yet must never become isolated as a 
sphere of pure interiority, only in-and-of itself. As Harvey Cox argued, “the church
[religious/cultural edifice] is never the creator of reconciliation. It is the agent.”131 The claim 
must be made for what would be a fourth culture-sphere in Kant’s scheme, not as a strictly 
quantifiable sphere including particular denominations, but as a critique of the modernist 
drive toward singularity. Alain Finkielkraut describes the potential horror that lies within the
drive to singularity in the modernist period:
“While rejecting all reference to religion, the modern period fulfils the biblical revelation: all humanity 
is one... In a world deserted by transcendence, fanatics no longer evoke the name of God to justify 
barbaric customs; they call on identity politics instead.”132
Clearly Finkielkraut is not advocating a return to religion as the way to solve the injustices of 
the world; rather it is the reference to religion that is needed. The dialectical partner of 
secular society must be returned at least as hermeneutics in order to return authenticity and 
legitimacy to secular modernity. Just as God can longer be evoked to justify barbaric 
customs, God or the secular can no longer be used to critique them, unless the dialectic is 
restored. 
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The religious and the secular must remain at odds with each other without losing the 
language which maintains their connection. Tanner writes:
“Christian language is, then, as Søren Kierkegaard would say, essentially transferred language. And the 
same holds as he thought, for all Christian practices... Christian practices are always the practices of 
others made odd.”133
Christianity must maintain its links with secularity or else face the prospect of not knowing 
its own practices, its own language. The link between Christianity and secular culture must 
always be recognised. Religiousness A achieves this by being a separate, wilfully odd,
culture-sphere that nonetheless is part of meta-culture. Although Religiousness A emerged 
from a Christian perspective, “as a conjugated “ethico-religious sphere” it can “exist quite 
happily in paganism as well as in Christianity.”134 In actuality, Religiousness A is the ethical 
position extended and made odd, which in fact, does not need to refer to the particularities of 
religion at all.135 Religiousness A can be secular, not just in the Vahanian sense of religious 
being inherently secular, but also as a hermeneutic of critical self-reflexivity that challenges
the surrounding culture by being wilfully different. By engaging in self-reflexivity - the self 
made odd to itself and society - the individual creates a dis-relationship with the social and 
civic self, allowing for critical reflection in the present. The individual’s task is like that of 
theologians who,
“...operate by tying things together – the Latin meaning for religare after all, is to bind. And they do so 
by the way of an innumerable series of discrete disruptions and concrete balancing acts vis-á-vis sets of 
elements already in play, disruptions and balancing acts that eventually add-up to something 
surprising.”136
These disruptions of the self and the world are crucial to the city, without them, real 
difference is not perceived and Finkielkraut’s statement becomes reality. When all humanity 
is one, there are no cities - no thriving centres of growth and exchange - all that remains of 
the city is the name, stripped of all referential meaning and content.
The truly valuable piece in Kierkegaard’s schema of existence-spheres is Religiousness B;
the part that goes beyond the temporal and the immanent. 
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“Religiousness B punctuates the decisive moment in the life of the existence-spheres by marking out 
the advent of an incursion of the eternal into the temporal, the descent of the divine into the historical, 
disclosing the ground of edification in a source other than of the self.”137
So Religiousness B is the only aspect of complete exteriority, the only part of the schema that 
does not arrive out of inwardness. It remains indefinitely as exteriority because the exteriority 
cannot be actively sought or expected by any individual, thus denying any particular claim of 
situated preference. Kierkegaard did obviously conceive of this as an overtly Christian 
rupture, but in light of Vahanian’s discussion of Nietzsche’s reading of the Bible as trace, 
non-believers can use the concept as hermeneutic of critique, a signifier of future hope. The 
existence spheres, like the Bible, are extended beyond the initial bounds; they become truly 
self-reflexive critical tools as they are extended to all humanity, believers and non-believers 
alike. A trace that is open to the full dialectic of the secular and the religious is without 
essence or transcendence, it is a hermeneutic of critique that is able to be engaged with to 
challenge any particular cultural claims. By placing the hope effectively beyond the reach of 
culture, it cannot be consumed and made redundant, so remains as a possibility, continuing to 
cast a shadow of doubt over any claims of primacy of the contemporary. Of course, the 
notion itself is a part of culture itself, it arises out of a particular time and place just like all 
else, except that as a possibility that cannot be brought closer, it continues as a hermeneutic 
of critique in the present that acts to limit and challenge cultural claims in the present
including, paradoxically, the claim of Religiousness B itself. 
Religiousness B is the decisive move beyond the culture-spheres of Kant and the dialectics of 
Hegel. It is not a part of culture, nor is it subject to human rationality; it is a rupture of both 
that remains out of reach. In “broad terms” of Hegel’s dialectic, “the aesthetic stage is the in-
itself moment of inwardness; the ethical is inwardness for-itself; and the religious stage
(religiousness A) first appears as inwardness in-and-for itself.”138 Religiousness B is the final 
piece in the schema, it transcends Hegel and gives meaning to the other existence-spheres. 
Kierkegaard’s dissatisfaction with Hegel is apparent in his ironic summation of the 
philosopher, as paraphrased by Walker Percy, “describing Hegel as the philosopher who lived 
in a shanty outside the palace of his own system and saying that Hegel knew everything and 
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said everything, except what it is to be born and to live and to die.”139 Religiousness B is the 
hope that gives meaning to the other existence-spheres, and moves beyond the realm of 
culture. Martin J. Matuštík writes: “Kierkegaard’s individual both lives in the ethical-
universal (this defies individualist atomism) and yet is not commensurate with it (this defies a 
Hegelian holism or any communitarian ethos).”140 For Kierkegaard, a key example of this 
complex existence is found in the story of Abraham, where he is called to sacrifice his son. 
As John Milbank explains, “in the Abraham story one sees how the ultimate vertical rupture 
of faith is supposed transcendentally to found and guarantee the continuity of ethical life, 
which is the life of the city.”141 The inexplicable act of sacrificial violence ruptures the ethical 
existence and yet guarantees its continuation. By being beyond language, the rupture of faith 
implicitly critiques the ethical claims of action and yet validates their continuity by the 
intervention of God that ultimately halts the unethical action.  
Religiousness B is, essentially, the messianic because it is read out of the historical, through a 
future hope, into the present. It becomes a question of time, challenging all that would make 
claim to an immanent Real by speaking through the hermeneutics of the eternal. Language is 
the transformer of time, it ruptures the present. As Vahanian writes:
“Sublating rather than merely relating temporality, language turns time, not into memory, but into 
words; it is the verb of time: time begins with the word... that times with the creation as it will with the 
incarnation.”142
Theological language becomes the trace that is necessarily read, thus defying a linear model 
of progressivism by situating time as an interpretative hermeneutic, language as the 
hermeneutic of time. Time enters the realm of the translation, open to short-circuit, 
provisionally united by the hope of mutual understanding. The messianic remains perpetually 
out of reach, provisionally uniting humanity with the hope of understanding that translation 
provides. For Christianity, the problem is that the Messiah is out of reach, not just in the 
future but also in the past, always a hermeneutical interpretation of past event or future hope. 
Franz Kafka (a Jew whose Messiah had not yet come) writes: “[t]he Messiah will only come 
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when he is no longer necessary, he will only come after his arrival, he will come not on the 
last day, but on the very last day.”143 Time is open to the messianic rupture and life is lived in 
the hope of its arrival, not the expectation. Marin Terpestra and Theo de Wit write that 
“[m]essianic expectation accepts the Messiah’s absolute transcendence, implying that people 
cannot decide who or what will fulfil this expectation.”144 The Messiah is pure exteriority and 
is thus stripped of any expectations in the temporal. In the present, the individual does not 
despair in the absence of the messianic, but busies themselves in preparing and progressing 
with time remaining open to rupture. Fundamentalism succumbs to a sense of despair in the 
present and so looks back to the past, not as a hermeneutic, but as an attempt to reclaim a 
perceived historical reality; the future is then read from this closed historical moment, rather 
than from a critical perspective in the present that encompasses subsequent development.
Religiousness B operates similarly to Augustine’s City of God; they both inform the world as 
it is and yet are distanced and unavailable. For the city, Religiousness B is the hope for 
something other than what is; a hope created by the break in time that occurred when God 
came down to Babel and confounded their language. With the second Fall, humanity is 
condemned to exist with myth and time, together in this world, yet separate as neighbours. 
Religiousness B sits as the idea of the city, the inexhaustible possibilities that potentially 
rupture the cities of the present. For Kierkegaard, “the neighbour from the perspective of 
religiousness B is the other with whom I share a common sin-consciousness, co-implicated in 
the travail of human suffering, and delivered through a free and forgiving act of God.”145
Reimagining from a secular viewpoint, the neighbour is someone who shares in the 
imperfection of humanity, never to be completely overcome by humanity. This is not the 
same as the Feuerbachian ‘Religion as Projection’, where “man denies as to himself only 
what he attributes to God” and “the yearning after God is the yearning after pure 
unadulterated feeling.”146 Religiousness B is only a matter of denial insofar as it is necessary 
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to have the concept beyond the scope of culture, as a perpetual critique; it is not perfection as 
such, rather the challenge to all claims of perfection. Religiousness B is both the kingdom 
that is becoming and the kingdom that will never be, because actual being would be its self-
defeat.
Waiting outside of the contemporary, Religiousness B questions all claims of the absolute in 
this world, not in a grand sweep that condemns all to subjectivity, but as a transcendent 
possibility that illuminates the insufficiency of the subjective and demands a shift towards an 
objective, inclusive view of humanity. Louis Dupré writes that:
“When Kierkegaard in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript describes Christianity as “essentially 
subjectivity,” he does not mean that the message of revelation is immanent in the mind itself, as some 
idealists claimed, but rather the opposite, namely, that this message is so transcendent that the mind 
cannot absorb it.”147
For the secular, Religiousness B can be transcendence that cannot be absorbed or contained.
It is hope, which ‘is the subjectivity proper to the continuation of the subjective process.”148
This is a challenge to the postmodern tendency toward transcendence that is readily 
absorbable and accessible in the present, circumventing hermeneutics: the glimpse offered in 
the other-for-me aesthetical relationship that overcomes the subjective. Yet, transcendence 
must not be able to be absorbed, because then it would proceed into the realm of power, 
becoming selectively available, and able to be controlled. The claim of transcendence 
existing beyond the realm of hermeneutics is then able to be abused as its impact is decided 
by individuals, thus metamorphosising the metropolis into a theopolis.149 All of these things 
are not conducive to equality and cooperation, which are essential characteristics of the city.
Not allowing Religiousness B to be centred mirrors the position of Paul’s action and thought 
in the Bible, as Alain Badiou argues:
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149 A “theopolis” is different to the models such as Calvin’s Geneva which aimed for a pure community, 
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“...the ex-centered dimension of Paul’s action is the practical sub-structure of his thought, which posits 
that all true universality is devoid of a center... Recall that Paul was born into a well-off family in 
Tarsus, that he was a man of the city rather than a man of the country.”150
Paul was a self-chosen exile from both Judaism and Roman citizenship; by not centring 
himself in Jerusalem he showed an understanding for the universalism of the Christ event. 
The rupture that Paul claims to experience occurs outside of the city, with the return of the 
nomadic God, but this message is then extended to the city and is open to be interpreted
within it. If the rupture were to occur in the city, the multiplicity of the inhabitants could 
diminish the singularity of the event, or vice-versa, and so it is fitting that the rupture, just 
like the crucifixion, occurred beyond the walls and subsequently extended as logos. It is 
essentially important that Paul was a man of the city, for the city offers the rupture of exile 
and the possibility of not being centred; the hope of universalism. The city demands that the 
inhabitant be an exile, because the city itself is not complete, can never be the ‘home’ that 
offers complete solace. So the city-dweller must first begin by being an internal exile, “a man 
who has taught himself to behave as if he had already crossed a frontier while refusing to 
leave his house.”151 The refusal to leave the house or the city is an unnecessary addition and 
counterintuitive because after having crossed the threshold as such, one is already a self-
chosen exile, a status which will not be diminished or increased by distance travelled. Paul is 
the prototypical ideal city-dweller; self-reflexively shedding his bonds he was free to roam in 
the realm of the universal. As a figure, Paul must be taken as a metaphorical-construct at this 
point, a hermeneutical device, because to use him as a model would be to create a centre.152
Religiousness B must be decentred so that it remains universal and is the reflection of the 
practical considerations of the city-dweller. Rupture can only occur in the city as 
hermeneutical event, because after Babel, the singular Logos must always enter into the 
plurality of translation.
Paul as a hermeneutical embodiment of thought raises significant issues for a secular reading 
of Religiousness B because the secular does not necessarily acknowledge the Christ-Event, 
the rupture of the universal into the temporal. Considered this way, Religiousness B 
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undergoes a further decentralisation and is left without a founding event. As Badiou writes, 
“...Paul warns the philosopher that the conditions for the universal cannot be conceptual, 
either in origin, or in destination.”153 Conceptual ideas are temporal and as such are able to be 
absorbed in the subjective; they are a centre in themselves. This is where the disagreement 
with Paul arises, because even with the Christ-rupture as an event, there are limitations on the 
universal. Žižek writes:
“What the Christian all-inclusive attitude (recall St Paul’s famous ‘there are no men or women, no Jews 
and Greeks’) involves is a thorough exclusion of those who do not accept inclusion into the Christian 
community.”154
By not allowing for the truly other - those who do not accept the offer of inclusion into the 
community - the founding Event becomes one of radical division. As a universal offer based 
on the event it stands as the possibility of universality, but because it is an event, a break 
already-and-becoming, the division is made real. The event alienates those that do not 
recognise or share the event, so the world continues, and there are men, and there are women, 
and now there are Christians, who operate, therefore, as a type of embodied universal (yet 
particular) transcendence. Universality should be a possibility that is perpetually out of reach,
because the radical pursuit of it results in violence ultimately ending in totalitarianism, the 
top-down exclusion of alternatives. 
Silence and the Possibilities of Potentiality without Relation to Being
A potential solution to this division can be derived from an idea outlined by Giorgio 
Agamben: 
“...one must think the existence of potentiality without any relation to Being in the form of actuality... 
This, however, implies nothing less than thinking ontology and politics beyond every figure of relation, 
beyond even the limit relation that is sovereign ban.”155
This is the philosophical position taken to the extreme and so works perfectly as a foil to the 
exclusionary offer of Christianity. Agamben’s position even goes so far as to exclude even 
the possibility of non-actualising or actualising. Under these conditions, Religiousness B 
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fulfils the true messianic potential described by Kafka; in this case the messiah will not come 
when expected, nor will it not come when expected. The messianic is a critique that even 
extends to claims of the messianic, similar to Mark C. Taylor’s description of thinking “not”:
“In thinking not, thought approaches a limit that inhabits it as if from within. The exteriority which is 
interior, rends thought, leaving it forever incomplete... So understood, the not does not exist; nor does 
the not exist.”156
“Not” cannot be made an actuality, it is potentiality that cannot be completed that opens the 
chance of thinking beyond every figure of relation. Potentiality without the possibility of 
being is the foundation of cities; it is the dynamic that can never be dimmed by application. 
The city exists in parallel to the idea of the city, with the “city itself” being antonymic to the 
“city”, rather than to the town, country, or rural. As such, the city exists in paradoxical 
tension to both experience and expectation. This distance, between “idea of the city” and the 
“city itself”, is maintained and with it the pure potentiality of alterity as the messianic. 
Beyond every figure of relation, the “idea of the city” maintains as a possibility open to all, 
never diminished or actualised, not existing yet not, not existing.
Walter Benjamin had an idea akin to Agamben’s, desiring “to produce an essay that is 
‘devoid of all theory’”.157 In being purely descriptive and excluding analysis and abstraction 
Benjamin’s proposed essay could be described as concrete silence. The essay would be from 
the position of Benjamin’s Angel of History, wings outstretched, surveying the debris of 
history in entirety as it is propelled forward.158 As Benjamin writes, “nothing that has ever 
happened should be regarded as lost for history... which is to say, only a redeemed mankind 
has its past become citable in all its moments.”159 Seemingly the opposite of Agamben’s 
potentiality, Benjamin’s concrete silence is actually on a Mobius strip with it, meeting at the 
same point from opposite approaches. By making no demands on the history presented and 
refusing to analyse it, there is only actuality, but an actuality that is beyond every form of 
relation. It is open to the potential of theory and abstraction, which necessarily stays as 
possibility, the product of unredeemed humanity and time. This reading of history is ideal for 
the city because it is universally open to all, it strips away any attempt at a particular 
transcendent meaning that could otherwise alienate or exclude.
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Nietzsche had a similar idea for architecture, “a contemporary building to his own taste, one 
that “has no name” and is “suggestive of nothing”, one in which to find himself and think his 
own thoughts.”160 Of course all architecture (and this is no exception) is at least partially 
realised potential. What this does offer, however, is the potential for all to enter and think 
their own thoughts, and is as such a universal gateway through which the individual can 
engage in potentiality without relation to being. The potential for one to think their own 
thoughts is almost entirely only a potential because we think in types of praxis, relational 
structures, both physical and conceptual. Architecture that is “suggestive of nothing” offers 
the possibility (only a possibility) of respite from the types of praxis and engaging in the 
silence of potentiality without any relation to being. 
Interestingly, Buddensieg writes that “the architecture that will suit him [Nietzsche], one in 
which he can think his thoughts, is a religious architecture that he denudes by a mental 
process (and is momentarily tempted to “remodel” physically.)”161 The temptation to 
actualise the potentiality is clearly there, but is resisted because otherwise the work of 
“denuding” – removing any potentiality of being in actuality – would be undone. As to the 
fact that, for Nietzsche, it is religious architecture (Christian) that had the potentiality; this is 
because this embodies the offer of universality that, once rejected, empties such forms of the
potentiality of being and opens them to thinking, void of potential.162 So in an unusual way, 
the Christian offer of universal inclusion actually does include all; in the space of the answer 
to the offer is a potentiality untainted by the possibility of being. The process of denuding can 
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be performed on all religious architectures; all the spaces that are overburdened with 
preordained meaning can be hollowed with silence. Potentiality without being is not even
able to be glimpsed in this world for that would an attempt to submit to a presence that cannot 
be; rather, it is the silence of absence, the lack of presence, of glimpse, of transcendence.   
Architect Bernard Tschumi continues Nietzsche’s line of thought by discussing the 
possibility that architecture’s next logical step is its own destruction. Tschumi’s reasoning 
behind this argument is that in terms of space, “architecture is both being and non-being. The 
only alternative to the paradox is silence, a final nihilistic statement that might provide 
modern architectural history with its ultimate punchline, its self-annihilation.”163 Silence 
overcomes the possibility of being and non-being, and architecture in its self-immolation is 
pure potentiality, theory at its purest. To push architecture to this limit creates the type of 
space that Nietzsche created from religious architecture. Claudia Lacour writes:
“At the moments of explanatory crisis and schematic exhaustion, the function of the art of architectural 
form within the discourse of knowing suggests a world that would contain the possibility of thinking, 
rather than one our thought contains.”164
The silence that leads to destruction is also inherently creative as it allows space for thinking, 
outside of interiority; offering the chance at something new, uncontained by previous 
thinking. Silence, for both architecture and the city, is the possibility that overcomes presence 
and denies anachronisms taking hold in present. As the limit beyond expression, silence is 
messianic, the dialectical counterpoint to the translation and hermeneutics of life in the city, 
rather than the negation of them.
The physical manifestation of this architecture is Tschumi’s folies (folie meaning madness) at 
La Villette, Paris, that:
“...is laid out on a grid structure that connects fire-engine red architectural elements with a ‘cinematic 
promenade’ comprising a series of provocative, frameworked vistas that unroll as you walk through 
campus... The insides of structures are, in places, exposed as exteriors and used as decoration; and the 
result is profoundly disorientating, as the Parc emerges as a complex organisation of ambiguous spaces 
and shapes...”165
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Tschumi’s initial reference point for the folies was Foucault’s Madness and Civilisation, 
which revealed that the “word madness changed meaning on several occasions.”166 Louis 
Martin, writing about Derrida’s response to Tschumi’s folies, includes:
“To name folie a piece of architecture that openly had no meaning was basically to deconstruct the 
architectural sign. This act was, for Derrida, to decenter architecture and thus to free it from its 
metaphysical meaning.”167
The folies are a move toward architectural silence as they have no transcendent meaning that 
can be attributed; empty shapes whose naming is not a naming at all. They defy assimilation 
and language, although they are of course not silence, for that is unavailable. Tschumi’s folies
are the unreadable signposts in that they name, but what is named is not “there”, nor can it be 
“read”. Instead, via the folies, Tschumi alludes to the possibility of silence and the possibility 
of the end of architecture. As manifestations of such architecture, the folies are not nihilistic, 
but rather, as Neil Leach writes:
“The folies affirm, and engage affirmation beyond... ultimately annihilating, secretly nihilistic 
repetition of metaphysical architecture... They revive, perhaps, an energy which was infinitely 
anaesthetized, walled-in, buried in a common grave or sepulchral nostalgia.”168
Silence sweeps away the anachronisms and nostalgia that could otherwise exclude or prevent 
the hermeneutics of translation.
Further figures that can be included in this discussion of potentiality and nothingness are 
Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, both of whom share a similar philosophy in this regard. Their 
suggestion in response to power in the world is radical inaction, to do nothing in the face of 
the tumult of dialogue and exchange. Žižek quotes Badiou’s thesis: “It is better to do nothing 
than to contribute to the invention of formal ways of rendering visible that which Empire 
already recognizes as existent.”169 The refusal to participate in this case is a political action, 
but can also be read as that which refuses being in any actuality. To do nothing is neither 
truly action nor inaction, to add meaning is to break it to turn it into something, a response. 
Theory is, therefore, the response of doing nothing as critique, the hermeneutics that follow 
the silence. Žižek uses the example of political abstention, which he describes as “a true 
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political act”, because it is not dialogue but is instead the negation of dialogue.170 By doing 
nothing, one is not inserting the possibility of something else being or not being, but is 
simply stripping-away all that is. In a modernity that is extensively derived from Protestant 
capitalism, to do nothing is the ultimate transgressive critique as silence stems the flow and 
exchange that the system founds its strength upon. It is in the critical space that exists in the 
city, surrounded by the tumult and movement of the city, that the individual has the 
opportunity to do nothing. Doing nothing beyond the city is limited by the fact that there is 
less to respond to, raising the danger that in doing nothing surrounded by nothing, one 
becomes analogous with nothing. This is not to say that beyond the city there is strictly 
nothing, rather that silence is a reaction to culture - the creation and existence of humanity -
which is most concentrated in cities, and as such the silence occurs against the clamour of 
Babel.
Silence, which is neither actualising nor non-actualising, is a deconstructive force of 
exteriority. It implicitly critiques the violence of metaphysics of presence, that which would 
try to “place the various complexities of the world into a unified, thematic, whole through 
language”.171 Metaphysics of presence are attempts to rebuild Towers of Babel, to forcibly 
construct a unification of humanity through language. The deconstructive process with the 
refusal of assimilation and the breaking of the foundations of metaphysics can be considered 
a ““constructive” therapy to overcome... tendencies of violence. Therapy is, however, often 
difficult as frequently it “cuts” through to one’s innermost being, thoughts, and emotions in 
order to bring healing.”172 This deconstruction is a therapeutic violence as it disrupts all 
claims of unification, and is as such, the ultimate act of violence. Silence of this kind is 
exteriority that exists beyond language and unites in a way that is unattainable in the present. 
In Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Christology, it is written that, “teaching about Christ begins in 
silence. ‘Be silent, for that is the absolute’ (Kierkegaard).”173 Theology is the deconstructive 
force that comes after the inexplicable silence, which is in itself neither action nor inaction. It 
is the necessary step that prevents the silence becoming prolepsis, the assumption of 
messianic presence. Silence cannot be expected, because that would place it as an expected 
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response, a part of a dialogue. Instead, this silence is the messianic Religiousness B; that 
which disrupts as pure exteriority, rendering all language impotent. 
Violence, Exile, and Architecture of Disjunction
Žižek postulates that “sometimes, doing nothing is the most violent thing to do.”174 It is the 
ultimate violent action or non-action possible in the melee of modern life, of which violence 
is a constant and necessary part. Violence is at the very core of the city, the disruptions, 
movement, and collisions all create a friction that is essentially urban. Graeme Gilloch writes 
that “shock is the key metropolitan experience... shock is a category of awakening. It disrupts 
the cosy comfort of bourgeois life, a life wallowing in the complacent conviction of its own 
immortality.175 These disruptions are vital because they encourage growth, change, and insert 
a dynamism that shatters the presentist veil of immortality. This is not to say that the city 
should be a lawless, wild space, or that physical violence against the individual is acceptable;
rather, it is recognition that some of the most positive, valued aspects of the city, such as 
hope, upward mobility, cosmopolitan cooperation, and the chance of reinvention, all 
necessitate some degree of conflict. Violence will always be present in the city because it is 
never universal in the sense of being complete, consistently totalitarian.
Change is by nature, at least to some degree, violent. Richard Sennett argues that “less 
conflicted spaces behind the borders are less active. The social center is at the physical 
edge.”176 Spaces of interaction are spaces of conflict, which is a necessary for change and 
development. As spaces of interaction, cities are spaces of hope; hope of being understood 
and being able to understand that which is not already known. Borders are spaces of 
relational liminality, where even the observer is confronted by their own difference, by their 
otherness; and the city-centre is the greatest border of all, it is a space of concentrated 
interaction, where all can come and interact. Outside of the relational liminality is the 
possibility of silence that undermines the primacy of any particular expression or violence 
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that exists in the world. Richard Sennett, writing about architecture, argued that “a condition 
of endless alteration or smeared use would soon become meaningless”.177 This can also be 
applied to the dynamic interactions of city-life, because without the critical function of 
silence that acts as an alternative and a negation, meaning loses its potentiality and thus stops 
being an “event” able to be short-circuited further. 
Existing in the confusion of a post-Babel world, cities defy attempts of unification and 
completion. They are inherently violent spaces and as such, they are ruptured and 
discontinuous. As Bernard Tschumi writes, “we inhabit a fractured space, made up of 
accidents, where figures are disintegrated, dis-integrated.”178 These spatial qualities in turn 
fracture the lives of the inhabitants, changing the way one sees and thinks. Robert Alter 
identifies Gustave Flaubert as an author who understood the chaotic nature of cities and 
revealed the subsequent effects through his characters:
“The mind of this new urban man, grasping shards of sensory data and jagged ends of recollected 
images, becomes a maelstrom in which the centrifugal elements of experience are whirled together in 
dizzying combinations.”179
An individual in the city becomes a pastiche of influences, ideas, and experiences, and as 
such could be considered as containing the hallmarks of a postmodern. These influences are 
not to be received in a passive manner, however, because the city obligates the reflexive 
inhabitant to (re)act. To be passive and merely become a receptacle for the city’s signs and 
signification is to be overwhelmed as an individual. City life demands both an ego - the sense 
of individual significance and autonomy – and a sense of self-reflexivity - an appreciation of
irony that opens the individual to the possibilities provided by others. In its plurality, the city
acts to violently break-up, dis-integrate the claim and expression of a singular, unified, 
complete, “modern” self, whilst also challenging the claim that the city represents a
universality of modernity. Plurality in the city acts as a self-check to any claim of 
universality, whilst it maintains the tension between the “city” and the “city itself”.
To be in a city is to be an exile, fragmented from the safety of home, amid a sea of strangers 
in an ever-changing milieu. Joseph Brodsky writes: “[t]o become a needle in the proverbial 
haystack–but a needle somebody is looking for–that’s what exile is all about. Pull down your 
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vanity, it says, you are but a grain of sand in the desert.”180 The city limits the individual, 
requiring an allowance for the other and detaching the individual from a totalitarianism of 
locality. This is a violent process for the individual, one that ultimately resides as a personal 
choice; the city violently expresses the ideals but is ultimately without agency. Simone Weil 
writes of the obligation of the exile to undergo this violent process:
“Such friendship [for a land not one’s own] cannot really germinate and spring up in their hearts unless 
they do themselves a sort of violence. But this violence is an obligation on their part.”181
The same obligation exists for those entering a city, as they must cleave themselves from 
their home and be open to a milieu that is inviting, yet can never be a static “home”. 
However, as Richard Sennett writes:
“...the body can follow this civic trajectory only if it acknowledges that there is no remedy for its 
sufferings in the contrivings of society, that its unhappiness has come from elsewhere, that its pain 
derives from God’s command to live together as exiles.”182
In the post-Edenic world there is no real solution to the pain of exile, as reinforced by the 
myth of Babel and the experience of life today, where any offer of completion is hollow and 
any experience of home is incomplete. One may feel “at home” in a city, but they are also 
obligated to break themselves from the attachment in order to experience the fractured city
and the community of exiles.
The architecture of cities is as disjointed as the nature and definition of the city itself. Even if 
the city could be said to have an overall unifying schema of design and interpretation, it is not 
experienced in such a way. Bernard Tschumi writes: “[f]ragments of architecture... are all one 
sees. These fragments are like beginnings without ends...they are relays rather than signs. 
They are traces.”183 Rather than alluding to a whole, they are passages toward further traces; 
traces of the architect who is dead in much the same way God is dead - no longer necessary -
their works opened up as hermeneutics. In terms of architecture, we are like Cain: hidden 
from the objective view of the creator, we in turn interpret and create a lived reality in the 
creation. Flaubert understood, as Alter expresses, that the city is a “social and spatial reality 
so vast and inchoately kinetic that it defied taxonomies and thematic definition.”184 In purely 
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architectural terms, Cain’s city would have been a city (although, as previously discussed, the 
homogenous population precludes such a definition otherwise), because as soon as the 
construction began the city would enter into the fractured realm of hermeneutics and thus be 
thematically indefinable. Perhaps Babel can be read through this idea and as such, the Tower 
was unified because all spoke a singular hermeneutic and were conceivably all part of the 
construction, thus refining the social and spatial reality to a singularity. The destruction of the 
Tower was the rupturing insertion of hermeneutics in the plural and thus the reduction of the 
Tower to fragments. As such, the destruction of the Tower of Babel was the death of the 
architect, as singular voice and creative actor.
Architecture is violent and fragmentary, both to the viewer and the object. Reading through 
the concept of violence, Bernard Tschumi suggests “that the definition of architecture may lie 
at the intersection of logic and pain, rationality and anguish, concept and pleasure.”185
Architecture is the disjunction in the dialectics, both the break and the link between the 
unshareable and the shareable, and is, therefore, a liminal expression. Logic, rationality, and 
concepts are open to exchange in that they are bound in language as hermeneutics of sharing 
and relation, whereas:
“Whatever pain achieves, it achieves it in part through its unshareability, and it ensures this 
unshareability in part through its resistance to language... Prolonged pain does not resist language but 
actively destroys it”.186
This statement could also be extended to include pleasure and anguish. They are experiences 
that stretch language to breaking-point, seemingly universal yet inconclusively so. By 
destroying language they break through the barrier imposed in the confounding of languages, 
but by doing so they also are radically unshareable thus leaving them as radically alienating 
experiences. As a violent, liminal disjunction, architecture is both exteriority and interiority;
it is a language and yet is also partly unshareable. Architecture is a language that seeks to 
transcend its own limits and perhaps even demand silence in response, but because it exists 
against a multiplicity of interpretation, the silence is never absolute. This reflects the nature 
of the city, as the city is also confrontational in the same manner, shareable yet intensely 
alienating and personal, silent yet multifarious and engaging.
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As a disjunction, architecture ruptures time by creating a present, a unity that is distinct from 
that which has come before. Yet, because of the gap between the conception of the 
architecture and the completion, architecture is always the past made physically manifest.
Architecture is a prophetic violence that is always overcome in its fulfilment and its 
completion that opens it up to the plurality of translation in the present. Friedrich Schelling 
writes:
“There can in fact be no past without a powerful present, a present achieved by the disjunction [of our 
past] from ourselves. That person incapable of confronting his or her past antagonistically really can be 
said to have no past; or better still, he never gets out of his own past, and lives perpetually within it 
still.”187
The present demands the radical self-violence of the exile that breaks from the past, and is 
open to the new possibilities; built architecture is a spatio-temporal expression of this. 
Indeed, “[a]rchitecture is interesting only when it masters the art of disturbing illusions, 
creating breaking points that can start and stop at any time.”188 It breaks open time in 
unexpected ways, allowing the dialectic with hope for alterity. In an uncertain position
between interiority and exteriority, architecture at its best ruptures the damaging tendencies 
that occur if either is singularly present; whether in the form of other-for-me exteriority or 
nihilistic interiority as with Sartre’s protagonist in Nausea.189 In the novel, the periods of 
greatest interiority, uncertainty, and withdrawal are also often accompanied by a fog 
enveloping the city, which renders the architecture and other inhabitants insignificant. This 
emphasises that whilst architecture can rupture, the impetus is on the individual to be ready, 
but not expecting, change. The internal fracturing that occurs in Nausea is at the detriment of 
all else, because it breaks the individual from his past, without extending into exteriority and 
creating a strong present. Individuals that are responsible and reflexive beyond continual self-
analysis, and allow themselves to be open to exteriority, reflect and enhance the positive 
qualities of the city as they continue to explore the possibilities of alterity.
Mythical, Divine, and Meaningless Violence
In any discussion of violence it is important to distinguish between types of violence, or face 
the risk of having potentially positive aspects and readings tarnished by the most cruel and 
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self-serving varieties. In his “Critique of Violence”, Benjamin differentiates between 
“mythical violence” and “divine violence, where “mythical violence is bloody power over 
mere life for its own sake, divine violence is pure power over all life for the sake of the 
living. The first demands sacrifice, the second accepts it.”190 Divine violence is a rupture 
much akin to religiousness B, and this is why Žižek writes that “it is neither aesthetic, nor 
ethical, nor religious (a sacrifice to dark gods)” - that is an action stemming from human 
agency (religiousness A).191 It is violence that refuses to have meaning attributed to it, and for 
this reason divine violence “is the sign and seal but never the means of sacred execution”.192
It is the ideal form of violence because it ruptures and inserts change whilst defying any 
attempt to classify it, claim it, or particularise it within culture. Just as God in the Babel myth 
was beyond language, divine violence is without name, beyond the hermeneutical grasp of 
language. Anselm Haverkamp argues that “by naming it “divine violence” and thus calling 
this violence by its human, all-too-human name,” Benjamin has made it an ironic category, 
calling forth the discarded God(s).”193 Thus Benjamin is being self-consciously aware of “the 
inordinately violent effects of its manifestation”, its worldly shock-value, the ambiguity “in-
which there is no readability, no trace of justice, meaning, or future.”194 By virtue of its 
“divine” nature, one cannot ascertain if any particular violence is in fact pure, and so the 
event requires an act of faith, secular or otherwise, that does not claim the violence, but 
merely witnesses it.
Mythical violence is lawmaking violence and as such constitutes the “first function of 
violence”, second being the equally pernicious “law-preserving, administrative violence that 
serves it.”195 Law is also a force, an expression of power, limits, and control that is itself 
outside of the realm of violence, or more exactly, violence is outside of law. Victor Hugo
argues, in minimalist fashion, the same point:
“Whoever says law says force.
What then is outside of law?
  
190 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence” (1927 orig.), in, On Violence: A Reader, Bruce B. Lawrence and Aisha 
Karim, eds. (Durham and London, 2007), p. 283.
191 Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, p. 168.
192 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence”, p. 285.
193 Anselm Haverkamp, “Anagrammatics of Violence: The Benjaminian Ground of Homo Sacer”, in, Politics, 
Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer, Andrew Norris, ed. (Durham and London, 
2005), p. 139.
194 Ibid., pp. 138-9.
195 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence”, p. 274 & 285.
63
Violence.”196
Mythical violence is a bloody violence, a punishment that is firmly rooted in the cultural 
spheres. It is married to earthly power, with the violent means of its maintenance being the 
opposite in the dialectic with power. “Where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent,”
writes Hannah Arendt.197 There should, however, be a consciousness of the “latent presence 
of violence” for law and power to be maintained, just as there should be latent power in 
violence, otherwise it is completely impotent.198 The use of violence diminishes power; it 
exposes the limits and its own insufficiencies. Violence is unavoidable in the city as rapid 
changes occur and elements collide, but what should be avoided is mythic violence that 
demands sacrifice, blood, and attributes particular, divisive meaning to these changes. 
An ethical way to approach the violence of the world – violence that is necessary but often 
excessive - is to find no transcendent meaning in it, no deeper level. In mind of this, Žižek 
postulates that:
“...perhaps this is all we can do today... reveal the failure of all attempts of redemption, the obscene 
travesty of every gesture of reconciling us with the violence we are forced to commit.”199
This is also why Žižek proposes that Job is the proper hero today, the one who protests the 
“meaninglessness of his calamities”; a standpoint that is affirmed when finally God 
appears.200 One cannot expect affirmation, however; instead one carries on in the 
understanding that to expect is to have justification, which in turn bloodies the violence. 
Jacob Taubes seems to have a similar notion, in saying that “as apocalyptist I can imagine 
that the world will be destroyed. I have no spiritual investment in the world as it is.”201
Painfully aware of the history and implications of the Holocaust, Taubes refuses to find 
transcendent meaning in it, or anything else. In other words, Taubes gives suffering and 
violence its full meaning – something akin to purity, without subtext or justification. Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri raise the question of whether such a standpoint is actually 
achievable:
“Modern negativity is located not in any transcendent realm but in the hard reality before us: the fields 
of patriotic battles in the First and Second Wars, from the killing fields at Verdun to the Nazi furnaces 
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and the swift annihilation of thousands in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the carpet bombings of Vietnam 
and Cambodia, the massacres from Setif and Soweto to Sabra and Shatila, the list goes on and on. 
There is no Job who can sustain such suffering!” 202
Indeed, it is exactly because of these atrocities that we must find no transcendent meaning in 
those or any others that could otherwise justify or spur them on. To accept the full burden of 
this history, without meaning, is to accept the full mantle of humanity – humanity as 
humanity, responsible and alone. Perhaps no single person can sustain the suffering and 
achieve the position of the parabolical Job, but the task must remain as a constant challenge 
against the temptation of meaningful suffering. Thus the task is to attempt to be Job without 
God, buoyed only by the possibility of alterity, the messianic that cannot be expected. Just as 
one should not find transcendent meaning in any other violence in this world, one should also 
find no transcendent meaning in the exilic self-violence that one must perform; to do so 
would be to engage in irresponsible narcissism. 
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Intermezzo: “House of Asterion”
Jorge Luis Borges’ short story, “House of Asterion”, which retells the myth of the Minotaur, 
the labyrinth, and Theseus, from the Minotaur’s perspective, can be interpreted as a metaphor 
for the relation between the city-centre and suburbia.203 The labyrinth, described like a city-
centre where “all the parts of the house are repeated many times, any place is another place… 
The house is the same size as the world; or rather it is the world...” is similar to Walter 
Benjamin’s description of the Parisian arcade as “a city, a world in miniature.”204 As Graeme 
Gilloch writes, “the city-as-labyrinth was the dreamscape of antiquity, the crowd-as-labyrinth 
that of the modern epoch.”205 Through postmodern pastiche that links antiquity and 
modernity through the labyrinthine model, the city and the crowd exist in unison offering the 
dizzying possibility of becoming lost, and yet also “the crowd is the dullness of the nothing-
new, the ultimate locus of boredom.”206 Without the specific and purposeful action of the 
individual who can act as alterity the crowd is a faceless and homogenous mass, nihilistic in 
its stasis. The individual has the opportunity to find meaning in the city and in the crowd, just 
as Theseus enters the labyrinth, one must enter be open to the possibility of becoming lost 
and yet retain the Ariadne’s thread that links outside of the madness and the possibly 
overwhelming forces of the crowded city.
Read through “House of Asterion”, the labyrinth-as-city-centre also raises the idea of cities as 
a collective Babel, endlessly copying, mirroring: “Everything is repeated many times… but 
two things in the world seem to be only one: above, the intricate sun; below Asterion.”207
This retells Babel at the point of incompletion, before God intervenes; the unique structure 
exists (the combined replication of cities/Tower of Babel) and yet the complete exteriority 
still remains as a possibility (the sun as natural, eternal antithesis to humanity’s temporal 
construction/Other/God). But as Elizabeth Wilson writes, the experience of the labyrinth is 
not about completion - the overcoming of space and difference – because:
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“Even if the labyrinth does have a centre... [it] is not so much finally reaching this centre, as of an
endlessly circular journey, and of the retracing of the same pathways overtime... Yet one never retraces 
the same pathway twice, for a city is in a constant process of change...”208
One enters the city/crowd-as-labyrinth with the understanding that the completion of the 
journey is an act of assimilatory violence that is best left incomplete, because to overcome the 
Minotaur, the transgressive heart of the labyrinth/city-centre, would overcome the alterity and 
purpose that exists in the space, leaving only the nihilistic singularity of the conqueror.
Without Ariadne’s thread with which to return, Theseus would take the place of the 
Minotaur, or perhaps worse, be completely without alterity in a way that would mirror the 
completion of the Tower.
In this interpretation, Ariadne represents the true messianic, the one temporarily beyond the 
grasp of both language and its refusal, who maintains the hope of return and provides the 
possibility that Theseus’ hermeneutics will not become endlessly and pointlessly closed and 
self-referential. Mark C. Taylor writes, “Ariadne’s lure is a line•a narrative thread that floats 
atop the “sea of ex” and appears to show a way to the exit from the labyrinth of time.”209 The 
thread links the temporal and the eternal as a hermeneutic that gives hope in the present. It 
gives Theseus’ journey a continuous narrative that can be traced as a history, one that can be 
retraced but never re-experienced as the same journey. By virtue of its finitude, the twine’s 
ends pulled farther and farther apart, thus history is opened to the possibility of the messianic 
that, paradoxically, cannot be expected, and cannot not be expected. The thread imbued with 
hope can be engaged with as a narrative, a hermeneutic that skewers interiority and 
exteriority. 
The Minotaur represents the transgressive, dangerous heart of the city, who also gives the 
city-as-labyrinth meaning, and alterity against which Theseus is able to experience the space 
as purposeful.  By itself, the Minotaur (the city-centre) is nihilistic, nearly suicidal in its self-
harm:
“Of course, I am not without distractions. Like the ram about to charge, I run through the stone 
galleries until I fall dizzy to the floor… There are roofs from which I let myself fall until I am 
bloody.”210
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It is an existence without meaning, pointless self-destruction and distraction, yet maintains a 
glimmer of hope because “of all the games, I [the Minotaur] prefer the one about the other 
Asterion”, the redeemer who comes from outside.211 When the redeemer does come, he is 
surprised that “‘the Minotaur scarcely defended himself.’”212 The Minotaur, who can “no 
longer remember” is only superficially overcome by violence, and is really overcome by 
language.213 It is the triumph of language and interpretation over the Minotaur, which is the 
embodiment of the refusal of translation, and who is “not interested in what one man may 
transmit to other men; like the philosopher, I think that nothing is communicable by the art of 
writing… A generous impatience has not permitted that I learn to read.”214 John Stark writes: 
“the writer-hero must prove the minotaur wrong by communicating through language.”215
The singular violence of the Minotaur, through Theseus’ engagement is not revealed as
beyond interpretation, but rather as the nihilistic avoidance of the multiplicity of translation. 
Stark argues that because in order to complete a labyrinth, one must exhaust all possibilities,
“the hidden key, then, is to make labyrinths instead of solving them.”216 We must, therefore,
engage in the creative act of city-making, city-living, and interact with cities through 
hermeneutics, not in order to overcome the transgression that exists, but rather to sustain it –
that which gives the journey and experience meaning.
Outside of the labyrinth (suburbia) is where the people are, the undifferentiated people who 
inspire fear in that which is different. Their reaction to the transgressive is varied, ranging 
from prostration, fleeing, to threats of violence.217 This is the reaction of a closed suburban 
community to disruptive forces. In “House of Asterion”, the community outside of the 
labyrinth is self-enclosed by xenophobia rather than by an actual physical enclosure, because 
as it is written, the doors of the labyrinth “are open day and night to men and animals as well. 
Anyone may enter.”218 Every nine years, nine men enter as sacrifices to prevent violence 
from reaching the outside, although they die without the Minotaur bloodying its hands, for it 
is nihilistic violence that they enact on themselves in the transgressive area. By performing
this suicidal violence, the nearly complete separation of city and suburb is sustained through 
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engagement with the violently nihilistic Minotaur on its own terms, rather than incompletely 
overcoming the distance via engagement with language. Theseus links the outside (suburb)
and the labyrinth (city-centre) with Ariadne’s string, but then seeks to fulfil the not/not not,
thinkable possibility of overcoming and exhausting the possibilities; as such he seems to
strive to complete the messianic. Or perhaps not, for Borges writes, “literature is not 
exhaustible, for the sufficient and simple reason that no single book is. A book is not an 
isolated being: it is a relationship, an axis of innumerable.”219 Via engagement with language,
the Minotaur enters into hermeneutics and translation, remaining in the labyrinth in the telling 
and retelling, and also following Ariadne’s string out with Theseus as logos, as continuing 
alterity.220
In his poem “The Labyrinth”, Borges writes:
“I know that hidden in the shadows there
lurks another, whose task is to exhaust
the loneliness that braids and weaves this hell,
to carve my blood, and to fatten on my death. 
We seek each other. Oh if only this 
were the last day of our antithesis.”221
This is the situation of the city, a promise unfulfilled: the city remains inhabited by danger, 
narrative, and also hope. The labyrinth is not exhausted, text is not exhausted, and the 
dialectical distance is sustained, leaving space for rupture. If one does not sense the twine, the 
necessary, yet tenuous link between suburb and city in this text, there is a despair of being cut 
off from the outside. Ariadne allows for the continuance of alterity, with the thread physically 
linking the city-centre and suburb, providing hope for both. This is why the city-centre must 
remain linked to the suburb, because otherwise the city merely becomes a transgressive 
playground for personal transcendence; so the doors must remain open and the string must 
remain in Ariadne’s hands or the city becomes a camp.
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The Suburb and the City-Centre
“People living in cities and large towns must submit to some inconvenience, to some 
annoyance, to some discomforts, to some injury and damage...”
H. G. Wood, “A Practical Treatise on Law of Nuisance in Their Various Forms: 
Including Remedies Therefor [sic] at Law and in Equity” (1883)222  
“The spectacular view always made Laing aware of his ambivalent feelings for this concrete 
landscape. Part of its appeal lay all too clearly in the fact that this was an environment built, 
not for man, but for man’s absence.”
J. G. Ballard, High-Rise (1977)223
The Importance of the Suburb and City-Centre Dialectic 
The dialectic between the city-centre and the suburb is one of the most significant 
relationships within the city. City-centres are spaces of movement, upheaval, and violence 
and as such they are the heart of the city; they are what make a city a city. It is the centre that 
draws the humanity into the city, as its dynamism offers the hope of change and the chance to 
create a better life. The city, by virtue of the city-centre, offers what the rural, village, and 
even town is less able to – the chance of rapid change and reinvention. This is evident in 
Maximum City: Bombay Lost and Found, in which Suketu Mehta writes: “what makes 
Bombay overpopulated is the impoverishment of the countryside, so that a young man with 
dreams in his head will take the first train to Bombay to live on the footpath.”224 In the city 
there is hope, the city-centre is a repository of dreams and desire. No matter how desperate 
the situation may seem, the opportunity for change exists. Of course the young man who 
arrives in Bombay cannot (nor wishes to) live forever on the footpath, constantly exposed to 
the full violence of the city, because the individual exposed to the full force of the city-centre 
would invariably be overwhelmed, and so arises a desire for stability in the city. This search 
for stability led to the creation of the suburb – a ring of relative calm encircling the chaos of 
the city. Suburbs can often be problematic because in the search for stability individuals
residents may seek to exclude difference. The city must negotiate this difficult dialectic, 
  
222 H. G. Wood, “A Practical Treatise on Law of Nuisance in Their Various Forms: Including Remedies 
Therefor (sic) at Law and in Equity” (Albany, 1883), p. 11, as quoted in, Robert M. Fogelson, Bourgeois 
Nightmares: Suburbia, 1870-1930 (New Haven, 2005), p. 39.
223 J. G. Ballard, High-Rise (London, 1977), p. 25.
224 Suketu Mehta, Maximum City: Bombay Lost and Found (New Delhi, 2006), p. 18.
70
between the unbridled creative violence of the city-centre and the exclusionary violence of 
exclusive suburb. 
Suburbs have the potential to prevent a city from being a city, or more exactly, they can 
riddle the city with spaces that can no longer be considered as part of the city. The reason for 
this is, as Lewis Mumford argues, that “the mark of city is its purposive social complexity” 
and “the suburb was a pharisaic way of passing by on the other side: leaving the civic 
organism in the gutter.”225 In reaction to the violence and perceived threat of the inner city, 
suburbs were created as an escape that nonetheless remained in proximity of the centre 
leaving it available for use when convenient. This immediately creates wealth-based 
divisions, where the poor are left in the full violence of the centre and in being in the 
turbulent environs continue to add to the creative dynamism of the city, whilst the rich are 
spared the full brunt of the violence and are free to experience it at their whim. Or, as occurs
later, the poor are excluded to ‘poor suburbs’, whilst the wealthy gentrify the city-centre. 
Such separation is problematic and undermines the social complexity of the city, thus leaving 
void spaces in the city. As Mumford argues:
“Except for a small detail of tradesmen and handymen, the suburb was a one-class community: it 
boasted, in fact, of its “exclusiveness” – which means, sociologically speaking, of the fact that it was 
not and could not become a city.”226
As gated and homogenous communities, both the first suburbs and their modern, gated 
simulacra are attempts to exist as a horizontal Tower of Babel, where acceptance into the 
community is offered as immanent transcendence from the world beyond the gates. At their 
worst, suburbs destroy the social fabric of the city by deciding not only where the wealthy 
will reside, but also by virtue of exclusion where the “other” will reside. The city becomes a 
series of villages, economically stratified, and closed to the level of interaction that defines a 
city.
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the side of the road. A priest and a Levite travelling separately down the road both pass by on the other side of 
the road. A Samaritan travelling along the road takes pity on the man, bandages him, and pays for innkeeper to 
look after him. In Mumford’s allusion to the parable, the Good Samaritan is the one who stays in the city-centre, 
or at least engages with the civic-centre, rather than turning away. The Good Samaritan is the person who does 
not turn his back on the neighbour or the degradation and violence that exists. 
226 Ibid., p. 215.
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The segregation that can occur in suburbs is a violent process, but not in the manner of the
short-circuits and friction that occur in the freer city-centre; rather it is a top-down exertion of 
controlling forces, a preemptive violence that seeks to block out violence of chance. The most 
prevalent expression of this preemptive violence in the last century is the use of covenants
that restrict the type, use, and aesthetics of property, and historically, also restrict the race of 
the inhabitants of property. Whilst the use of restrictive covenants began more than a century 
ago, they are often still used largely due to fear. Robert Fogelson writes:
“That so many people have been willing to submit to so many restrictions for so many years is the most 
telling sign of the deep-seated fears of unwanted change that have plagued Americans since the mid-
nineteenth century”. 227
The unwanted change arises out of the violence of the city-centre, so that those with the 
necessary means often seek to distance themselves and subsequently block unwanted others 
from following. This preemptive violence is far more insidious than the dynamic violence of
the city-centre because it excludes those that would insert change. Simone Weil suggests that 
“crime alone should place the individual who has committed it outside the social, and 
punishment should bring him back again inside it.”228 Restrictive covenants create Enochs:
ends in themselves where the exclusive (self-excluded) people can exist without interruption 
of any kind, and without reintegration.
Gated communities are the most insidious form of this self-exclusion because not only do 
they exclude particular others, but by virtue of their walls they also cement their 
introspection. Metaphorically speaking, these communities no longer face toward the city-
centre; instead, they turn in upon themselves in an endless self-referential state. This is aided 
by the inclusion of shopping areas within the community which accommodate the exclusion. 
Setha Low interviewed residents of gated communities in America and their responses were 
telling; “Felicia” offered the following concerning shopping in her gated community:
“...if you go to any store, you will look around and most of the clientele will be middle class as you are 
yourself. So you’re somewhat insulated. But if you go downtown, which is much more mixed, where 
everybody goes, I feel much more threatened.”229
  
227 Fogelson, Bourgeois Nightmares: Suburbia, 1870-1930, p. 212. Here Fogelson is making specific comments 
about Americans, but given the central position of America in Western capitalism and globalisation, and the 
trend of gated communities throughout the Western world, it is possible to extend the bounds of critique in 
parallel with globalisation, beyond America into a less contextualised Western urban modernity.
228 Weil, p. 20.
229 Setha Low, Behind the Gates: Life, Security, and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America (New York 
and London, 2003), p. 9.
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Driven by fear from where “everybody” goes, Felicia retreats into a static homogenous 
community. This retreat from everybody is a retreat from fears that the short-circuiting 
violence of the city-centre will become very real physical violence. Unfortunately, the retreat 
creates an unintentional casualty - the hope that the city can offer. As Elizabeth Wilson 
writes, fear must be overcome so the offer of freedom that the city extends is available to all:
“We will never solve the problems of living in cities until we welcome and maximise the freedom and 
autonomy they offer and make these available to all classes and groups. We must cease to perceive the 
city as a dangerous and disorderly zone from which women – and others – must be largely excluded for 
their own protection.”230  
Cities should include all in their freedom and whilst this freedom will occasionally result in 
traumatic experiences of violence, it will also offer hope and positive change through 
interaction. Violence is inescapable, but in the relatively free heart of the city it can be put to 
its most progressive uses: in the mingling of people, ideas, and spatial constructions.
Almost as destructive to the social fabric of the city are tenements, estates, slums, and 
ghettos, where the poor or those deemed socially unacceptable are segregated. Often these 
start with the best of intentions, such as aiming to adequately house those with less means or 
to protect those who could be aggressively targeted. There are sinister undertones (sometimes 
overtones) of purity in this move, however, as the undesired are eventually singled out and 
contained, often reduced to a state of introspection. In regard to tenements, Richard Sennett 
writes:
“In retrospect we see the tenement as a devil’s construction. As these apartments were abandoned to 
the poor, each railroad flat became like a city of its own. The corridor became an internal street; 
families crowded into the individual rooms.”231  
This punches holes in the fabric of the city as areas become like cities of their own, yet they 
are not cities because they lack the fundamental the heterogeneity that define cities, thus they 
are situated as the anti-city. An aspect that makes the tenement and ghetto slightly better than 
the gated community is the fact that often they are usually not completely self-contained 
resulting in the inhabitants regularly moving beyond the boundaries. Also, there is very little 
internal surveillance in the tenement and the ghetto, whereas if there was it would be more 
  
230 Wilson, p. 9.
231 Sennett, The Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities, p. 27.
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akin to a camp.232 The lack of internal surveillance allows a certain degree of freedom and 
self-expression, thus tenements may harbour the possibility of alterity, and of future hope.
Constructed as self-contained communities, undergoing rigorous internal surveillance, and 
centred on the idea of purity, the gated community is an obscene parody of a camp. Low 
writes that “gating exacerbates this tendency to monitor and be concerned about “marked” 
intruders by creating a kind of “pure space” for residents.”233 Spaces within the city-limits 
that become almost exclusively introspective, whether by choice or circumstance, are 
detrimental to the functioning of the city. They are mono-tonous spaces that by facing 
inwards do not demand responses, but rather they are oblivious to response. Silence, the final 
act of critique would go unnoticed in these places that place no emphasis on dialogue, and so 
the answer to them is to follow Elizabeth Wilson’s advice and make the city as free as 
possible, thus highlighting the grotesque camp-like structure of the exclusive community.
The desire for a secure home within the city should be not abandoned completely however; it 
simply needs to be re-evaluated in terms of the nature of the city. The suburb and the home 
should be oriented toward the city-centre, offering a degree of refuge from the dynamic 
violence of the city yet never becoming closed-off finalities. As James Donald writes:
“This urgent desire for home is real enough, and should not be dismissed as hopeless nostalgia. 
Equally, though, we have to admit that, in the end, no such place exists outside of the grave. That is 
why Le Corbusier’s Radiant City has the chill of the necropolis about it”.234
Cities should follow the model of Abel, never still and content in this world, or indeed that of 
Jacob Taubes, never invested in the world as it is. The desire for home must be tempered by 
the acknowledgement that it does not really exist; it is a feeling that must continually be 
overcome in order to continue living as humans in our greatest capacities - creative and 
communicative. 
In a confessional-style journalistic piece concerning suburbia in Auckland, New Zealand, 
Warwick Roger writes the following:
  
232 Writing about the 17th Century Jewish Ghetto in Venice, Richard Sennett wrote: “...in the Jewish Ghetto 
there was to be no internal surveillance.” Sennett, Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western 
Civilisation, p. 234. This shows the fundamental difference between the camp and the ghetto; the ghetto is 
autonomous within its own borders.
233 Low, p. 143.
234 Donald, “This, Here, Now: Imagining the Modern City”, p. 200.
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“In the suburbs we talk to our neighbours over the back fence, hold street parties, stroll around the 
leafy streets after dinner... We find our security and our happiness in backyards and bungalows... 
We’ve come here in search of the golden dream, and most of us have found it in suburbia.”235  
It is hard to fault the sentiment of this piece, although it does seem to be an overly optimistic 
assessment of New Zealand suburban life, one that falls into a self-satisfied complacency.
The passage expresses a profoundly middle-class viewpoint with such a nostalgic air of 
dream-realised finality that it also has the chill of the necropolis, or in this suburban case, the 
closed confines of a mausoleum may be a more appropriate approximation. There is a sense 
of contentment and even though a degree of exclusion is acknowledged, this casual excluding 
violence must be avoided. The “golden dream” is a highly nostalgic dream that locates itself, 
at least partially, outside or beyond the city. As Richard Sennett writes, “[n]ostalgia is the 
mirror opposite of Le Corbusier’s now”; both nostalgia and Le Corbusier’s now are attempts 
to create static and complete visions, eschatologies in the present. 236 In attempting to rekindle 
a sense of community that never really existed, the “most of us” exclude the ‘few of us’ (and 
perhaps all of ‘them’) that do not find completion in the community. This is why the “golden 
dream” should be engaged with as a hermeneutic, and as such it is a constant negotiation, 
rather than something to be found by a particular group that may then seek to erect 
boundaries to protect their sense of realised nostalgia. 
Suburbs should have weak boundaries, open to the city-centre and reflecting the values of the 
city. An impression of security should be maintained, but this should not be at the expense of 
engagement and interaction. An understanding is required that risk cannot be eliminated and 
instead should be celebrated as a defining and positive mark of living in the city. As Simone 
Weil argues, risk encourages growth because it “is a form of danger which provokes a 
deliberate reaction... it doesn’t go beyond the soul’s resources to the point of crushing the 
soul beneath a load of fear.”237 Creating firm boundaries limits the development of the 
individual as risk is eliminated in preference of safety or fear. Richard Sennett writes that for 
people in sealed communities, “the wounds of past experience, the stereotypes which have 
become rooted in memory, are not confronted.”238 Such boundaries are dangerous because 
violence is made to be their raison d’être, where the violence of the external world is deemed 
  
235 Warwick Roger, “In Suburbia” (March 1988), Places in the Heart: The Best of Warwick Roger (Auckland, 
1989), p. 215.
236 Quote taken from: Sennett, The Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities, p. 175.
237 Weil, p. 34.
238 Sennett, The Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities, p. 201.
75
unsuitable for a particular group of people and so obtains a negative transcendent and 
defining value. Any area within the walls becomes hallowed ground supposedly absent of the 
violence outside, and so any violence that does occur obtains heightened value. Boundaries
are also a rejection of the example of Job who placed no reason or blame on the violence he 
encountered, and so boundaries are also, therefore, signifiers and manifestations of a lack of 
faith, hope, and trust.
Cities are spaces of risk and violence, but this must not be vaunted as a transcendent 
experience, nor avoided through the imposition of boundaries that puncture the city with null-
zones. City living is an ambivalent experience that defies strict definition, and the city space 
itself should reflect the porous and indistinct nature of this experience. Graeme Gilloch 
argues that “porosity refers to a lack of clear boundaries between phenomena, a permeation 
of one thing by another, a merger of, for example, old and new, public and private, sacred and 
profane.”239 This is an apt description of the open, dialectical nature of the city, where various 
forces come into contact, merging, short-circuiting and becoming indistinct. It also offers a 
guide for city-planners, those who draw the lines, the semi-permanent bounds of the 
cityscape exerting tremendous influence on the city-dweller. Richard Sennett offers the 
following advice that proceeds along similar lines:
“The planner of the modern, humane city will overlay differences rather than segment them... Overlays 
are also a way to form complex, open borders. Displacement rather than linearity is a humane 
prescription.”240  
By designing spaces that purposively engage with difference, the planner also opens the 
space to change, whereas “the life of the enclosed space ends when the designer lays down 
his or her pen.”241 Enclosed spaces are dead spaces, offering no hope of change and having
no concept of time, with the interior becoming a frozen historical moment. Conversely, weak 
borders allow time to continue to accumulate through the interactions and movements of the 
inhabitants and visitors of the spaces. 
  
239 Gilloch, Myth & Metropolis: Walter Benjamin and the City, p. 25.
240 Sennett, The Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities, p. 202.
241 Ibid., p. 196.
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The Necessity of Community and its Incompletion
In a post-Babel world where translation is a necessity in the time that remains, community is 
an incomplete process, and so the idea of a fully serviced, contained and “planned-
community” is a misnomer. We should not expect or even entertain the thought that 
community can be immanently realised, for that has the air of a George A. Romero movie 
sans the flesh-eating. Realised community would turn give city the air of necropolis or the 
mausoleum, with the inhabitants little more than walking dead, depleted of hope, and of 
alterity. Timothy Gorringe, reading through “the texts of Isaiah, Ezekiel and Revelation”, 
argues that the full realisation of community is eschatological and because of this, “‘[f]ailure’ 
is something we must expect, and some failures will, perhaps, teach us nothing, but this is not 
a cause for cultural pessimism... Because community is an eschatological reality it is founded 
on faith and hope, and therefore born afresh each generation.”242 Spaces with firm boundaries 
are without hope because they deny that which hope is founded upon – a future that is other 
to what is. Cities and communities require faith and openness to alterity, not necessarily in 
Gorringe’s eschatological prescription, but certainly in a present that is by necessity 
incomplete and a future containing the possibility of alterity.  
Certainty and completion are exclusionary concepts not in fitting with the relational mode of 
living with humanity within a city environment. Concepts such as certainty and completion
are not truly ethical in their approach because that which the person in the gated community 
chooses for themselves, they potentially deny for the other through the interruption of 
barriers. Certainty and completion create an immanent false eschatology that is believed to be 
concluded in the present and yet fails to be a full realisation of community because it allows 
those exposed to the perceived danger outside to be excluded. Richard Sennett postulates that
“perhaps a more truly uncomfortable idea is that difference, discontinuity, and disorientation 
ought to be ethical forces which connect people to one another.”243 This idea should be 
embraced in the modern city because it is precisely the desire for completion and singularity 
that has degraded the modern city. Rather than creating communities, the push for singularity 
has precluded them and negatively impacted the free and imperfect community of the city. 
Graham Ward asserts that “in the collapse of the modern city what takes over is imagined 
  
242 Gorringe, p. 192.
243 Sennett, The Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities, p. 226.
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communities which you belong to by buying into what’s on offer for you... In the collapse of 
the modern city, Disneyland simulacra take over.”244 The effort and subsequent failure to 
reach a complete community in the present has led the city to atomise in fear into distorted 
reflections of a frightened, shattered dream. These boundaries must be broken down, not to 
be replaced by a unified community, but rather with the understanding that community is a 
continual process requiring faith and interaction.
Therefore, community should be embraced in its true sense, a way that understands its own 
frailties and does not completely shelter any one person. Like culture, community does not 
describe anything consistently real and any attempt to complete or define it reveals gaping 
instances of exclusion or at least incomplete inclusion. Andy Martin’s response to this is:
“...the very notion of inclusivity needs to be ventilated by the reference to the notion of the autistic 
outsider, who is already inside the group. The group always tends to overestimate commonalities, and 
to converge on oneness; the existential attitude, in contrast, asserts the limits of empathy and the scope 
of discord, incoherence, and “structural holes” in any network.”245
Martin’s idea of the autistic outsider is a useful companion to Sennett’s ethical differences, 
discontinuity, and disorientation, as it adds a second level of deconstruction.246 Sennett’s 
proposal reverses the idea that singularity and complete community are the ethical forces that 
bind, and Martin would continue that with the figure of the autistic outsider – the included 
outsider who prevents difference from becoming fetishised, becoming a type of totality via 
idolatry. The autistic outsider can neither be reduced to the individual as alone without 
commonality, nor can they be reduced to a figure analogous with the community. By virtue 
of being an included outsider, the autistic outsider inserts a demand for ethics through
difference, and discontinuity, which can never be overcome (included or excluded in 
entirety), only engaged with.
Homo Sacer and the Structure of the Camp
The idea of the included exclusion, a liminal figure of humanity, bears a close resemblance to
homo sacer, bare life caught in a state of exception. Giorgio Agamben has performed the 
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245 Andy Martin, “Autism, Empathy, and Existentialism”, in, Raritan, Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (Winter 2008), p. 111.
246 The autistic outsider is an individual who is included within a group, and yet incompletely shares in the 
group. He/she reveals the limits of the inclusion, empathy, and communication within the group and in doing so 
also reveals the impossibility of creating a Tower, a singular community.
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most rigorous investigation of this figure, drawing on the work of figures such as Carl 
Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt, and Michel Foucault.247 As a concept at its most 
bare, homo sacer refers to the condition of life “situated at the intersection of a capacity to be 
killed and yet not sacrificed, outside both human and divine law”.248 The sovereign, who 
decides on the exception that makes bare life possible, is also a liminal figure, at “the 
threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence.”249 As 
Agamben explains:
“In Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, the State of Exception is “...a zone of absolute indeterminacy 
between anomie and law, in which the sphere of creatures and the juridical order are caught up in a 
single catastrophe.””250
Biological life and political life become indistinguishable with the sovereign deciding on the 
exception, thus revealing the homo sacer who is almost the equivalent of Job, with no 
transcendent meaning to be found in their suffering. Difference lies in the fact that the homo
sacer is reduced to this by administrative function; they are told their mere life is without 
transcendent meaning, and exist as the negation of existential autonomy. Conversely, Job had 
the autonomous space with which to decide and deny those who would place sacrificial 
meaning on his life.
There are essential differences between the various liminal figures, the autistic outsider, the 
homo sacer, and the sovereign, most of which centre around power. The sovereign has power 
to exercise the state of exception and thus make others homini sacer, but this act is itself a 
kenotic act that empties the sovereign of power. Once the decision is made, the sovereign is 
bereft of the power, as he who decides, until the state of exception is over. The homo sacer,
who experiences the sovereign’s power, is without any real power at all other than not being 
able to be sacrificed, so exists as life at its most bare, without signification. Being without 
  
247 As part of his continuing series on the subject of the state of exception and homo sacer, Agamben’s works 
include: Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life; and: State of Exception, Kevin Attel, trans. (Chicago and
London, 2005). Less explicitly linked, yet containing many of the same themes are: Remnants of Auschwitz: The 
Witness and the Archive, Daniel Heller-Roazen, trans. (New York, 1999); and: The Open: Man and Animal, 
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248 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, p. 73.
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79
power, the homo sacer’s fate is decided by the sovereign, whereas the autistic outsider 
requires autonomy, the power to enact a self-exclusion, to be one’s own sovereign. Homo 
sacer, as the excluded and silenced figure, lacks the essential freedom that is required in the 
city.
The figure of the homo sacer is important in the discussion of the city because it is the city 
that is both the centre of the concentration of political power (the sovereign), and the physical 
space where bare life was made material. Lewis Mumford, discussing the growth of industrial 
urbanism in the nineteenth Century, wrote that it, “...worked out a minimum of life... The 
quintessence of this minimum life was achieved in the prison... The speculative spread of the 
industrial town meant the growth and spread of a dreary prison environment.”251 This stark, 
industrial creation reached its zenith in the extermination camps of World War Two, thus for 
Agamben “it is not the city but rather the camp that is the biopolitical paradigm of the 
west.”252 Agamben is not arguing that prison-like characteristics have been eliminated from 
the city, but instead that the city itself has become the location of the camp. The city becomes 
the space where biological life and political life blur into each other, and he argues: “the 
camp, which is now securely lodged within the city’s interior, is the new biopolitical nomos 
of the planet.”253 This bold claim must fleshed-out in order to ascertain the future of the city 
and to then plot ways forward.
For the city to be like a camp it requires intense internal surveillance; the complete 
eradication of privacy, and a level of personal scrutiny that leaves all bare and homogenous. 
Lewis Mumford was clearly aware of this danger, arguing that “the home without such cells 
[areas of personal privacy] is but a barracks: the city that does not possess them is but a 
camp.”254 By this definition, which is an accurate one, the areas that come closest to the 
physical reality of the camp are gated communities, and of course prisons. Internal 
surveillance creates the conditions of a camp; bare life was not found in the ghetto, because 
there was a clear sense of interiority – a lack of surveillance.255 Writing about the camp,
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255 This is not to argue that the ghetto is an ideal or even acceptable form of settlement, but rather it serves to 
further underline the problematic structure of the exclusive, internally monitored community. The issue that 
ghettoes are externally enforced is also of high importance and is damaging for the structure of the city and the 
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Agamben could easily be describing the gated community: “Whoever entered the camp 
moved in a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception and rule...”256
Surveillance is the key to the creation of the physical conditions of the camp, the liminality of 
the state of exception. This is why CCTV and the lack of public spaces are detrimental to 
functioning of a city at its most free, hopeful, and generally city-like. The problem that arises 
especially with CCTV is that it denies the city public space; a space which Jonathan Franzen 
defines as “a place where every citizen is welcome to be present and where the purely private 
is excluded or restricted.”257 Clear definition between public and private, exterior and 
interior, prevent the indecipherable state of exception and also provide the space for 
individual transformative acts such as Nietzsche’s denuding of the interior of the church.
CCTV cameras seem as if they allow time to progress in the city and not allow the timeless
nullity of the gated community, but unfortunately this is achieved by virtue of an expected 
violent narrative. Joe Moran writes:
“...we tend to read CCTV pictures in the anticipation of an unfolding narrative... the telltale digits in the 
corner of the screen revealing the date and time convey not the reality of the round-the-clock 
surveillance but the specific moment at which an extraordinary event happened or was about to 
happen.”258
The limited exposure to the CCTV footage has a dual negative impact on the city; firstly, the 
shock and violence disguises the timeless null reality of the continued surveillance (it even 
reinforces it); secondly, the expectation of violence decreases its impact, so rather than being 
a disruption of a complete narrative, it is a lone fragment able to be digested into the whole. 
CCTV deprives violence of its shock because it is devoid of comparison – all CCTV is shock, 
and therefore none is shocking. Most CCTV is also viewed as a past event made present,
which provides distantiation, thus lessening the impact in the present. Violence in this case is 
not a dynamic force, because it is expected in the same way it is expected in the gated 
community, so that when it does arrive it offers no interruption to the structure. Thus, through 
false shock it provides a structure that can easily reside in a state of exception, where the 
interior and exterior are indistinguishable. Conversely, the city must continue as if violence 
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256 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, p. 170.
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will not occur, and so must be kept as free as possible. When violence does inevitably arrive 
in the free city, it contains its full significance, creating disjunctions, and if the violence is in 
a negative form, it is accurately shocking and aberrant. This approach gives full justice to 
victims as the violence they encounter is recognised in its singularity, and in its full non-
transcendent, this-wordly horror.  
Andreas Kalyvas argues that Agamben’s State of Exception does not allow room for time, for 
“the camp, by fusing the exception and the rule into a permanent state of emergency, halts 
time”, because “what is the exception turned into a rule if not the negation of its temporal 
singularity as an event?”259 By negating time, the state of exception-made-rule destroys the 
city as it hollows out its interior, leaving the liminal conditions of a camp. Kalyvas levels a 
charge against Agamben, claiming that “[i]t is if there is no room for alterity and the event in 
Agamben’s historical reconstruction of sovereign power... He proposes a theory of history 
that does not seem to bring forth anything new.”260 This criticism of Agamben, is not entirely 
fair because he is not gleefully proposing that history cannot contain alterity (Agamben’s 
conceptualization of time is best described in the messianic work The Time That Remains), 
but rather through the history of Western metaphysics there has been a continuing move 
toward biopolitics and the timelessness that comes with it.261 Even in Homo Sacer, Agamben 
presents alterity:
“...the “juridically empty” space of the state of the exception... has transgressed its spatiotemporal 
boundaries and now, overflowing outside them, is starting to coincide with the normal order, in which 
everything again becomes possible.”262 (Italics mine)  
The normal order and the state of exception are coinciding rather than being the same and as 
such they can be considered as a meeting of dialectical ends, rather than a singular 
expression. Therefore, vigilance is needed to combat the forces that would turn the city into 
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the camp, such as the continuing prevalence of gated communities and the degradation of the 
public; for these are spaces that deny that a normal order ever existed.
Kalyvas is correct, however, in identifying time as a major issue for the state of exception, 
because as an exception it necessitates a dialectical experience of time, between the normal 
and the exceptional. The sovereign decides on the exception and in creating this event-
rupture, suspends normal order and normal time. Time continues in the state of exception, but 
it is closed to the possibility of further event-ruptures as the exceptional is already the order. 
As Agamben reveals, problems arise when there is no end to the state of exception and the 
exception and the normal order coincide; time is left open in the normal order, but this is 
unavailable as the state of exception takes precedence. When this occurs, everything becomes 
possible always already, leaving no space for silence, for the act of deconstruction; time is 
left barren. Michael Ignatieff, writing with particular regard to the endless State of Exception 
provided in the United States Terrorism Act, argues that “[s]unset clauses – setting time 
limits to extraordinary powers – seem an essential way to reconcile security and liberty.”263
Housing must also follow this prescription, with any barriers made malleable and adjustable, 
so that in the absence of real danger they are withdrawn, allowing normal time and hope to 
resume.
The space that truly coincides with the state of exception at present is the United States 
military prison compound in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. As a space it is an included exception; 
the indefinite lease from Cuba by the United States “has produced a place that belongs to the 
United States”, yet is not actually part of the United States nor is it included in the normal 
order.264 Major General Geoffrey D. Miller conceptualised Guantánamo as the “interrogation 
lab in the war against terror”, which “seems to have translated Guantánamo from its actual 
location and history to the place where, in the eyes of Bush and his supporters, “terror” 
originates.”265 Guantánamo is a non-place where bare life and political life are 
indistinguishable, where source, reaction, and result are simultaneous. By virtue of this 
indistinction Guantánamo is the place where the unlocalisable is localised, a process that in 
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264 Justice Anthony Kennedy as quoted in: William Keach, “Guantánamo, Empire, and the “War on Terror””, 
Raritan, Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (Winter 2008), p. 136.
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the past has, as Agamben points out, resulted in the concentration camp.266 With the election 
of Barack Obama as United States President and his subsequent plan to close Guantánamo 
and “to ship dozens of terrorist suspects from the camp to face criminal trial in the US,” the 
hope is that the state of exception will not be transferred to the cities of the mainland.267 In 
bringing the suspects to trial, the suspects must not be relocated to another liminal space, 
whereby they remain homini sacer. Every effort is needed to bring about the trials, thus 
reintroducing the suspects into the normal order.268
The city must also not become the space where the universal offer of free interaction is 
predicated on a base line of simply being human. As Agamben reveals with the figure of the 
homo sacer, we must not follow Ignatieff’s reduction that “humans have human rights simply 
because they are humans.”269 Universalism based on such a bare premise removes the 
demand of localisation, and as Elazar Barkan writes, “the discrepancy between having rights, 
even specific rights and having nowhere to claim them is the “abstract nakedness of being 
human.”270 Any subsequent attempt to localise this bare politics results in the camp - the 
localisation of the unlocalisable. Jacques Rancière argues that the assertion of human rights 
has achieved a negative definition, only noticed in their absence and in doing so:
“...those rights appear actually empty. They seem to be of no use. And when they are of no use, you do 
the same as charitable persons do with their old clothes. You give them to the poor... It is in this way, 
as a result of this process, that the Rights of Man became the rights of those who have no rights, the 
rights of bare human beings subjected to inhuman repression and inhuman conditions of existence.”271
In the free space of the city, the offer of inclusion and of rights must be re-negotiated with 
each and every exchange, rather than give rise to indifference. This may localise the rights, 
but the city unlike the camp, by virtue of its free public space, offers the chance of 
negotiation, of refusal of the offer, and of silence. The opportunity for silence is important 
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because rather than denoting a bare level of rights, it moves the individual away from the 
conversation regarding rights altogether, denying those who would denote he/she as the base 
measure of human indignity. Human rights are localised in the universal space of the free city 
because they are negotiated in the temporal and concretely-situated realm. The negotiation is
rescued from complete subjectivisation by the self-limiting allowances of hospitality that 
each makes coming into free space, the demand of the continuance of the space as such.
The camp, the gated-community, and the state of exception – spaces that closely coincide -
share the same motivation: purity. They are spaces and modes that push toward the singular, 
excluding difference and defining a homogeneity that by virtue of presentist singularity, 
strips history and the future of alterity, denying the city its dialectical hope. Agamben notes 
this particular modern tendency that “...our age is nothing but the implacable and methodical 
attempt to overcome the division dividing the people, to eliminate radically the people that is 
excluded.”272 Discussing the garden suburb, Jonathan Franzen writes:
“In The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jane Jacobs observed that garden suburbs, since they 
have neither the street life of real cities nor the privacy of real suburbs, succeed only if their residents 
are homogenous and relatively affluent.”273
The surveilled suburb (gated community/garden suburb) obtains purity through the exclusion 
of the poor and dissimilar; difference is excluded from sight. In the camp, difference is 
excluded, surveilled, and eliminated in methods which underscore the bare frailty of life. 
States of exception are the modus operandi of these spaces, where all can be reduced to homo 
sacer, singled-out in the glare of modernity, able to be killed but not sacrificed.
Secular Cities
Despairingly, Las Vegas seems to be the prototypical city of the future as its hyper-
technological, hyperreal, city interior decays and its public space dwindles. Roberta Low 
writes:
“The astronomical growth of gated communities surrounding the deteriorating and underutilized city of 
Las Vegas is prophetic of the future. Abandoned cities will be encircled by suburban rings of gated 
communities, many of them privately controlled and governed by homeowners associations.”274
  
272 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, p. 179
273 Franzen, “First City” (1995), How to Be Alone: Essays, pp. 185-6.
274 Low, p. 228.
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Enclaves of privately managed communities surround the perceived dangerous centre that
first attracted and now must be kept at bay. The truly damaging aspect of Las Vegas is that it 
never really had any public spaces; it is a city of private interest and desire that forms an 
interior without shelter. Public landmarks from around the world, such as Giza’s pyramids 
and the Eiffel Tower, are homogenised, scaled-to-fit, and remade with an almost singular 
voice of private consumer spectacle, and are left void of their original’s public function. 
Whilst functioning as a world in itself, Las Vegas “has virtually no commons at all: just a 
skin-flint 1.4 acres per thousand residents, compared with the recommended national 
minimum of 10 acres”, writes Mike Davis.275 The city-centre stagnates because it is not free 
and public, with those coming into the city moving to the circumference, shutting themselves 
off in their own privacy. The creation of such a hyperreal space is an attempt to control, 
interiorise, and make static that which would otherwise be exterior, and so the hyperreal city 
of simulacra is not really a city at all; it also has the chill of the necropolis about it.
In his book, About Religion: Economies of Faith in a Virtual Culture, postmodern thinker
Mark C. Taylor writes: “Las Vegas is where the death of God is staged as the spectacle of the 
kingdom of God on earth.”276 A pivotal issue for the death of God is creation, where 
humanity takes God’s mantle as creator leaving God as unnecessary. Las Vegas relies on an 
order of simulacra, the reproduction of humanity’s creation, which prompted Preservation 
magazine to ask, “Is Las Vegas so fake it’s real?”277 By circumventing the creative act and 
supplanting it with the simulacra, Las Vegas begins to enter timelessness where nothing new 
arises and the death of humanity is staged as meaningless spectacle. Mike Davis points out 
the realities of Vegas and the problem with Taylor’s claim:
“Although postmodern philosophers (who don’t have to live there) delight in the Strip’s “virtuality” 
and “hyperreality”, most of Clark County is stamped from monotonously and familiar mold. Las 
Vegas, in essence, is a hyperbolic Los Angeles, the land of Sunshine on fast-forward.”278  
Rather than being an isolated spectacle of the kingdom of God, Las Vegas is simply an 
accelerated version of the surrounding culture, not an end as Taylor implies. The problem is 
that Las Vegas is starved of the creativity of a real city, and instead it borrows prefabricated 
visions that, by virtue of their exactness, have strong borders. Las Vegas is a space largely 
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absent of original creativity and increasingly absent of even the possibility of new creation. 
To be a real liveable city, Las Vegas must provide genuinely public space that will allow real 
creativity to flourish.
If Las Vegas can be said to be prophetic of the future, then Dubai could be said to be 
completing the prophecy – not as an abandoned inner city, but as a freshly-completed, always 
already dead city. Dubai is a city that is recreating the worst aspects of the myths of Enoch 
and Babel, as best illustrated by the building of the Burj Dubai Tower, currently the world’s 
tallest structure. The marketing “vision” of the structure as “an unprecedented example of 
International cooperation – and a symbol – a beacon of progress for the entire world”, makes 
the comparison with Babel easy. Dubai is becoming a Babel anti-myth where people from all 
cultures mingle, overcoming the confounding of languages with another lexicon of signs and 
symbols: the market.279 But rather than including all, the Burj Dubai is tinged with closed-
exclusivity as it is boasted: “Burj Dubai. Monument. Jewel. Icon... will be known by many 
names. But only a privileged group of people will call it home.”280 The Burj Dubai is Enoch 
staged as the spectacle of Babel; rather than attempting to unite through the shared name, it is 
closed-off, internally repeating its own name. Burj Dubai is walled-off by financial excess,
offering no interaction, no sharing. It is a self-described monument and this seems to be the 
future of the city of Dubai, where excess is celebrated by those few privileged enough to be 
able to enjoy it, and others are excluded.
An extra dimension of complexity exists with the Dubai situation, in that it is a
predominantly Muslim city witnessing an influx of Western Christian influences. This is 
evident in the adoption of aspects of Christmas, “where many residents revel in the 
commercial hype of the Christian holiday.”281 With the focus on the commercial aspect, the 
holiday has been de-Christianised to fit the Muslim environment, reconfiguring it as an 
almost solely capitalist expression. Allowing the influence of other cultural expressions is a 
positive sign of secularity, necessary for a city, as evident in the words of Muslim resident al-
Khalifa, "I'm very proud of our traditions but happy that my son is growing up in such a 
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cosmopolitan city.”282 The influx of Western capital, culture, and persons has seemed to have 
secularised some of the day-to-day life of Dubai, but it remains governed by Islamic law. As 
such Dubai exists in a strange dichotomy, between internationalist, capitalist-
cosmopolitanism, and Islamic tradition and law. Whilst capitalism does seem to lend well to 
cosmopolitan, free cities, it also can lend itself to the exclusivity and economic stratification 
typified by gated communities and the Burj Dubai. Now, as the current world economic crisis 
begins to affect Dubai, the cosmopolitan veil is slipping because for years it has
(successfully) depended on giving itself “a real economy based on free trade, tourism and its 
position as a hub for shipping, airlines, communications and media.”283 But Dubai, without a 
strong self-reliant economy of its own, may slip away from its current cosmopolitan ideals 
that rely on external capital, and shift toward being a theocracy.  
In critiquing cities such as Las Vegas and Dubai it is important to provide alternatives, cities 
that are closer to fulfilling the prescription of a free city. New York stands out as an 
alternative, a city that has fought back from inner-city neglect and now stands closer to being 
an ideal city. Elizabeth Wilson proposes New York and Chicago as near-mythic Babylonian 
centres containing vibrant dialectics, writing:
“Babylon lives on as the supreme –almost mythical example of cosmopolitan wealth, beauty and 
refinement... In no city in the Western world were beauty and cruelty, hope and despair so closely 
associated as in the ‘Babylons’ of New York and Chicago.”284  
Wilson writes in the past tense, which may reflect the deterioration of the inner-cities leading 
up to her writing in the early nineties. Focusing on the case of New York, there was a 
subsequent revival of the city stemming from increased crime prevention and general inner-
city gentrification. As Jonathan Franzen writes, “for better or worse, the most reliable 
measure of a city’s vitality is whether rich people are willing to live in the center of it.”285
The problem with making the city safer and appealing to the rich is that it is possible to make 
the city too safe by erecting too many boundaries, destroying true public space with CCTV 
cameras. Cities such as New York must tread the fine line between safety and vibrant 
desirability, because the rich’s presence in the city is only the final outcome of a chain of 
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causes “which begins with a city’s ability to attract young people.”286 A truly free city should 
have poor, rich, and middle-class all living in relatively close proximity, critically engaging 
with the stratification that exists in society.
Writing with architecture particularly in mind, Bernard Tschumi also appreciates New York 
as a useful source of inspiration, also including Tokyo in the same category:
“Tokyo and New York only appear chaotic... [t]heir confrontations and combinations of elements may 
provide us with the event, the shock, that I hope will make the architecture of our cities a turning point 
in culture and society.”287
The interactions and disjunctions of modern cities such as New York provide the possibility 
of the event, whether that be rupture or the silence of the anti-event, they provide the hope of 
alterity. Tschumi’s statement is distinctly Benjaminian in its approach, in that:
“The fragmentary style pursued by Benjamin in his writings on the city is in keeping with his 
understanding of the modern urban complex as the locus of disintegration of experience and with his 
recognition of the need to salvage the disregarded debris of contemporary society.”288
Cities that include genuinely free areas do not discard the debris of society because their open 
borders do not exclude. By including all, the city is given a certain degree of unity and as 
such only appears chaotic. A state of exception is detrimental to the free city because the 
exception withholds, discards, and asserts order in the present, excluding both known and 
unknown quantities. The exception-made-rule ruins the fragmentary style of the city as it 
suspends the boundaries that define public and private. It is therefore necessary that care be 
taken not to idealise a particular city, because as Adam Zachary Newton writes, “idealism 
surrenders to ideology, and in a debased form of spiritual election thereby risks idolatry.”289
This is true of the city, the step from ideal form to idolatry is a small one, that once made 
freezes the city’s development, ruining its function. Idolatry is the presentation of the present 
as able to be attained and completed, violently dominated into a static form such as “the 
golden dream”. Neither the suburb nor the city should submit to notions of idolatry that seek 
to deny alterity, the future possibilities of humanity. 
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After dealing with particular expressions of city-life, it is useful to return to the general in
order to consider the possible extension of the examples beyond the particular. Harvey Cox’s 
The Secular City provides a lens with which to ground the arguments surrounding the idea of 
a generalised secular city. Cox argues that “the syntax of the secular city is identical” to that 
of the Kingdom of God, as it “renders former ways of thinking and doing wholly obsolete...” 
summoning man to action.290 Boosted by the optimism of early-mid 1960s high Modernity, 
there is an overwhelming feeling of utopianism in Cox’s writing, although to his credit he 
maintains it as a becoming, a work in progress requiring action. Cox also understood one of 
the crucial elements of the city, writing: “urban man, in contrast [to small town/semi-urban
man], wants to maintain a clear distinction between private and public. Otherwise public life 
would overwhelm and dehumanize him.”291 Whilst being correct, Cox emphasises the wrong 
side of the separation, because it is the maintenance of public space that denies the 
dehumanising conditions of the state of exception. 
The Secular City was essentially a boosterist myth for post-war America, “a call to look at the 
city in a new way... to cease using it metaphorically as an enemy and to regard it (for once) as 
a friend.”292 James Hitchcock argues that this approach had a high cost, “[i]n its enthusiastic 
approval of urban technological twentieth-century American society... the secular city 
theologians abandon this pregnant ideal, seldom realised, of Christian universalism.”293
Michael Novak counters this with the argument that the secular view had to be “taken 
seriously and appropriated deep in one’s own guts and imagination” so that society could 
assess its limitations and move on.294 This is a valid argument and outlines an important step 
for the modern city as its dialectical, Babylonian nature was opened to investigation in the 
modern, technological era. Just as the secular is primarily Western in its application, The 
Secular City is also Western in its background and expression, particularly post-Christian in 
context. Thus the limitations that were, and continue to be, assessed through the secular are
the claims of the religious. Through the prevalence of public secularity the religious is 
discharged of the possibility of idolatry and is open to the continuing possibilities of alterity. 
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However, some could not share such enthusiasm for The Secular City, as the biopolitical 
potential was already apparent to thinkers such as Richard Rubenstein, who writes:
“Then as now, I saw Auschwitz as an intrinsic expression of what Harvey Cox called technopolis in 
The Sacred City. That conviction prevented me from joining Cox in identifying the secular city with 
the “self-realizing kingdom of God.”295
Rubenstein recognised the possible foundations for the creation of bare life and the 
technological means with which to dispatch it. This is the burden which we in the modern 
city must accept, recognising that we live in dialectical and inconsistent Babylons, and part of 
this responsibility is to engage with them vigilantly. As modern Jobs we must accept the 
burden of history, engage with the city in the absence of transcendent meaning, and accept 
that by virtue of the free nature of the city, it harbours the future possibility of these horrors.
Hiding oneself from the violence and potential horror, seeking purity and security in a gated-
community only exacerbates the problem; it separates, demarcates, and leaves the other’s life 
bare, vulnerable, and exterminable. 
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Intermezzo: Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny
Bertolt Brecht’s opera Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny describes the creation by three 
fugitives, Leokadia Begbick, Trinity Moses, and Willy the Chief Clerk, of a paradise city that 
ultimately succumbs to the baser instincts of humanity.296 The three founding creators set out 
to create a “Network city” - a “Golden city” - and yet have it “far from the bustle of the 
world”, separate from the Megalopolis where “there’s too much noise; nothing but unrest and 
discord; and nothing you can hold onto.”297 It is an attempt to create an elitist Babel based, in 
a similar fashion to Dubai, on the language of capitalism, where all are united by the logos of 
exchangeable currency. Mahagonny is a place absent of an obvious moral code, filled with 
drinking and prostitution, although, strangely, certain modicums of restriction apply to 
behaviours such as the singing of bawdy songs. It is into this milieu that the central 
protagonist Paul Ackerman, a man who has spent the previous seven years as a lumberjack in 
Alaska, enters with his three friends, Jakob, Joseph, and Heinrich (introduced as Harry). 
Initially the attraction of the city is well received by this quartet, but quickly Paul becomes 
despondent and has to be dissuaded from leaving. Not long after, Paul makes clear to the 
founders the reasons for his discontent:
“In your highfalutin Mahagonny 
Mankind will never be happy
As it’s too quiet here
There’s too much concord
And as there’s too much
For us to hold on to here.”298
By inverting the charges against the Megalopolis, Paul outlines why Mahagonny is not really 
a city - there is no tension, difference, or real exchange. As a Marxist, Brecht is using the 
dialectically inverted claims levelled at the two cities to portray urban capitalism as 
ultimately inhumane. Mahagonny, like Babel, is held together by a singular concordant 
purpose that is ultimately incomplete as evidenced by Paul’s speech signalling the beginning 
of the Fall. Paul is a messianic figure, prophetically showing the inhabitants that their unity is 
false.
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The Babelesque parallel is continued when the violent intervention of a hurricane threatens 
to destroy Mahagonny and all those within it. Under the threatening shadow of the hurricane, 
Paul assumes a messianic mantle in an even more explicit fashion, proclaiming:
“Why build towers as high as the Himalayas 
If you cannot knock them over... 
Listen! You have put up placards
Upon which it is written:
This is forbidden...
Now you shall see
Nothing is forbidden!
...What’s left to terrify you
You die like all God’s creatures
And there is no hereafter.”299
In this Babel narrative, man becomes both creator and destroyer, with the assertion “nothing 
is forbidden” closely paralleling the Biblical passage concerning Babel: “...now nothing will 
be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do.”300 In Rise and Fall of the City of 
Mahagonny humanity is still fallen in that they will die, but they are now made aware of the 
near limitless possibilities available. When the hurricane miraculously misses Mahagonny, 
the Chorus proclaims: “O wondrous resolution; The Joyful City has been spared.”301 It is then 
written that “[f]rom now on, the motto of the people of Mahagonny was ‘You’re allowed to’, 
as they had learned during the night of dread.”302 The story can then be read as a realist 
parable of life in a world where the Tower has been reconstructed and without an act of God 
to intervene, it seems fated to continue without limitations or restraint. Brecht is critiquing 
unchecked capitalism, implying it will destroy itself by creating a new, ultimately self-
destructive Tower of Babel that is a God unto itself and is, therefore, idolatrous.  
So Mahagonny, where “all morals are permitted”, begins to decline as the inhabitants 
succumb to their own excessive desires.303 Jakob (by this point known as Jake) dies through 
gluttony and Joseph (known as Joe) dies in an organised boxing match with Trinity Moses, 
on which Paul was wagered all his money.304 Jakob and Joseph have become homo sacer, 
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they are able to be killed (either by their own or another’s action) but not sacrificed; their 
lives are able to be extinguished without any attachment of meaning or consequence. After
the boxing match Paul buys drinks for others that he cannot pay for, once this is realised he is 
arrested and shackled to await trial.305 So it is revealed that this place where everything is 
allowed actually contains the unspoken exception of being without money. Trinity Moses 
acts as the judge in the proceedings and before Paul takes the stand it is made clear through 
the judging of a prior case that through bribery a person can be acquitted of murder charges. 
Paul, however, without the means to bribe is condemned to die:
“For having no money
Which is the most heinous crime that
We can encounter in our world.”306
The inhabitants of Mahagonny in their quest for unity, with an underlying selfish drive for 
personal gratification, preclude any sense of true hospitality and in doing so are without a 
basis for a truly sustainable city. The offer of acceptance is false because it comes with the 
unspoken condition of being wealthy. In the Babel of unfettered capitalism, the inhabitants 
begin to be consumed, especially the poor who as embodiments of absence of money, are 
also the embodiment of absence of meaning. As soon as this silent condition of wealth is 
broken, the action that is beyond language is performed, the violent exclusion from the 
community, which for the community that allows all else, is inevitably death.
Faced with the prospect of his death, Paul challenges his (per/pro)secutors with the existence 
of God – an alterity which would judge and undermine their own corrupt alterity. The three 
founder’s response is to stage a play (which occurs as a play-within-a-play) titled God in 
Mahagonny, in which God (played by Trinity Moses) makes himself visible in Mahagonny 
and condemns the inhabitants to “March into hell with you, you scoundrels!”307 So as a self-
    
meaning beyond self-satisfaction in the present, Jake and Joe become nihilistic and self destructive, reduced to 
homo sacer.
305 By being poor in a society where everything is possible to those who have money, Paul is a transgressive 
figure who must be eliminated. This situation is similar to the totalitarian Nazi regime described by Theo W. A. 
de Wit who, in discussion of the thought of Alain Finkielkraut, writes: ““Everything is possible” was the creed 
of Hitler’s radical volunteerism, and every setback was sure to be the work of the enemy, an enemy who is 
coincidentally the enemy of mankind.” Theo W. A. de Wit, “Scum of the Earth: Alain Finkielkraut on the 
Political Risks of a Humanism without Transcendence”, in, Telos, No. 142 (Spring, 2008), p. 171. In similar 
fashion, Paul becomes the enemy of mankind that must be eliminated in an act of totalitarian purity. The society 
has a veneer of complete voluntary freedom, but this is stripped away when one steps beyond the bounds of the 
totalitarian ontology and thus become the exception that must be eliminated. 
306 Spoken by Begbick, Trinity, and Willy. Brecht, p. 33.
307 Spoken by Trinity Moses. Ibid., p. 57.
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conscious device, God appears in Brecht’s opera, making himself visible and showing his 
displeasure as with Babel. But the response of the men in the play is to deny God by stating:
“We’re all on strike. You cannot drag
Us all the way to hell against our will
Because we have been in hell forever.”308
Faced with this display, Paul realises his fate is sealed and in doing so assumes the persona
of a Christ-like figure, stating: “The joy I bought was no joy at all, the freedom that comes 
with money was no freedom at all. I ate and was not fed, I drank and was still thirsty.”309
Through his realisation and messianic condemnation, Paul transcends homo sacer and 
becomes the sacrificial alterity that breaks up the static would-be utopia. He is not a Messiah 
without sin, but rather one who fully experienced humanity in all its transgressions. Paul’s 
alterity occurs in a moment of personal realisation via hermeneutics, the catalyst for which 
being his imminent death, spurred on by the logic he had previously espoused, thus revealing
both the repressive violence and the possibility of alterity that exists beneath the veneer of 
calm singularity. Mahagonny makes no space for alterity, and as such extinguishes its own 
power through the violent suppression of the other – the destitute. The Megalopolis, for all its 
visible degradation, is actually the more positive existence as it self-consciously struggles to 
include all classes, all cultures, allowing the positive possibility of alterity; thus Rise and Fall 
of the City of Mahagonny is a parable against all utopias and the totalitarian violence at their 
heart.
Mahagonny, which metaphorically denies alterity via the death of Paul, the one who 
embodies alterity, and the play-within-a-play, begins to enter into its own destruction as it 
struggles to in the glare of revealed alterity to deal with alterity. So the inhabitants are now 
found marching in columns as Mahagonny burns behind them, holding placards on which
slogans as: “FOR INFLATION”, “FOR THE STRUGGLE OF ALL AGAINST ALL”, FOR 
THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE GOLDEN AGE,” are written.310 The people are 
divided and realise their situation but do not attempt to engage in translation, instead 
resorting to divisive proclamations and violence. Therefore, Rise and Fall of the City of 
Mahagonny takes a step further than Babel and depicts both the destruction of the Tower and 
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of the hope of a Babylon remaining after. It serves as warning not to be presumptuous in the 
overcoming of alterity and also serves as a brutal critique on the possibility of utopia, which 
is either false, relying on a brutal repressive violence for maintenance, or acts as a death, void 
of possibility. Cities must include alterity and as such are sites that cannot be emptied of
violence; however, if engaged with on the level of including difference rather than focusing 
on the quixotic task of its obscuration or elimination, violence can be harnessed toward its 
most positive and creative cultural functions, so we are not left with a society that “can’t help 
us or you or anybody.”311
  
311 Ibid., p. 60.
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The Neighbour and Other Strangers
“It was early recognised that it was the community, and not the built environment, which 
makes the city.” 
Timothy Gorringe, A Theology of the Built Environment.312
Living with Difference
The city takes its physical shape from architecture - humanity’s creation - but it is the people 
that lend the content and stress. Through the Augustinian tradition, the city has been 
approached via interiority and measured detachment, the space read via an inward sense of 
forthcoming kingdom. But as Richard Sennett writes, this approach comes with difficulty, 
because it deprives humanity of the ability to make sense of the outside world, as “sheer 
exposure to difference is no corrective to the Christian ills of inwardness.”313 Nihilism suffers 
in a similar manner as it finds little meaning outside in the world already prepared and turns
back in on itself. This is why Gorringe writes of Nietzsche in the following way:
“Nietzsche is the avowed prophet of postmodernity, but he is also the prophet of the lonely individual, 
the man of ‘azure isolation’, at home only with the eagles and the strong winds.”314
The key difference point is that Nietzsche engaged with the world and, as with the church,
stripped it of symbolism; he engaged with culture but ultimately rejected it. It is the initial 
engagement which is of significance to living in the city because this evaluates the other, the 
exteriority, and thus places the individual in relation with humanity. 
Those who live in cities must by necessity engage with the cosmopolitan nature of the city. In 
the aftermath of Babel and the plethora of Babylons that followed, humanity must engage 
with the neighbour as other in order to understand, not just humanity, but the exteriority of 
the city itself (in the same way that the city as a malleable architectural structure should be 
engaged with to better understand humanity). The culture of the city is fundamental to the 
cosmopolitan nature of the city because, as Richard A. Cohen writes in reference to the 
thought of Cassirer, “humanity is cosmopolitan not because it is alienated but precisely 
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because it is cultured, and necessarily so.”315 Cosmopolitanism is the engagement with 
difference, not as an overcoming but as an understanding, and as such it is suited to, and 
necessitated by, close-quarters city life. It should be made explicitly clear here that 
cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism are not equable; they stem from different ontological 
roots, or to be more exact, multiculturalism claims an ontology that is becoming complete, 
whereas cosmopolitanism does not. Cosmopolitanism is an incomplete sharing with 
recognition that the chasm of difference will not be overcome; it mirrors the social of 
structure of humanity after the second fall at Babel. 
Multiculturalism is the claim of a remaining ontological sameness, with difference regarded 
as ultimately unimportant. For this reason Alain Finkielkraut writes that multiculturalism and 
communities of Volksgeist “have conflicting credos but the same vision of the world. In both 
cases they see cultures as all-encompassing entities, distinctly different to each other.”316
Rather than trying to fence-off or retreat from difference (as in the case of Volksgeist), 
multiculturalism presents a façade of inclusivity without a universal basis, thus sanctioning 
all expressions of culture without a grounds for critique. It is an insidious claim because it 
potentially reduces all of humanity to homo sacer, imbued with a bare, essential humanity 
and covered with meaningless differences able to be stripped away under the convergence of 
biological life and politics. 
Cosmopolitanism and city life both contain difference as an ontological reality, rather than as 
a superficial obstacle on the path to purity. Cox’s secular city with its reference to a kingdom-
of-God-becoming, reflects a multicultural view that ultimately refuses to acknowledge the 
true depth of difference that exists and as such is rightly criticised for coming close to 
echoing the structures of Volk and purity in the extermination camps. Timothy Gorringe 
writes, and includes a passage by I. M. Young, a beautiful summation of the culture of cities 
and the necessary relation to difference:
“City life is the being together of strangers characterised by the celebration of difference, an 
ambivalence in which deviant and minority groups can flourish under the cover of anonymity, diverse 
activities, ‘eroticism’– the enjoyment of other’s difference –and the provision of public where ‘people 
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stand and sit together, interact and mingle, or simply witness one another, without becoming unified in 
a community of shared final ends.’”317
A community of shared final ends is a community of death, a necropolis that fails to allow for 
alterity. The public space where one can be observed but not known, interact with and as 
strangers, defeats expressions of multiculturalism or Volk that would reduce mutual alterity, 
strip space of ambivalence, enjoy the other but in the same process name and extinguish 
alterity. 
The question of the enjoyment of the other, of bearing witness to the stranger, also raises the 
question of power. Timothy Gorringe writes that “the built environment is the orthography of 
power and class.”318 Cities are built by those with the greater economical means and can, 
therefore, exclude those without the same level of means, or relegate them to the ghetto-like 
structure of the tenement. Graeme Gilloch writes that within the modern city the “poor are 
situated out of sight and out of mind... The modern city is not only the site of the 
disappearance of the poor in the present, but also the space in which they become 
imperceptible in the past.”319 This is where Benjamin’s historical materialism intersects with 
ethics; by including every aspect of history and refusing to forget any moment, there can be 
no forgotten people, no “purification” of space or time. Historical materialism should be the 
ethical boundaries of the city, refusing a retreat into ahistorical presentism, whilst 
maintaining that no other can be excluded from space or history. What must be avoided is 
disgust at, and subsequent flight from, the other, as apparent in the words of the developer of 
Sanctuary Cove, Australia’s first gated community:
“The streets these days are full of cockroaches and most of them are human. Every man has a right to 
protect his family, himself and his possessions, to live in peace and safety.”320
To identify the other as non- or sub- human and to proceed to systematically exclude them is 
a profoundly destructive act that seeks a paradoxical unity by exclusion and the redrafting of 
the ‘world’s’ boundaries. The building of weak boundaries and the expansion of the world to 
include more is the ethical city experience. Alterity is born in the interaction with the other, 
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not as an end, but as a new possibility of continuing. Power should not be used to exclude, it 
should be used to break down the boundaries created by inequality, knowing that ultimately 
difference cannot be escaped or overcome. 
The option of anonymity is a necessity in the city because it allows the other to be other – a 
stranger - thus imbuing the city with life and vitality. Anonymity also plays an important role 
in the Christian tradition, in the post-resurrection in particular, where upon rising from the 
dead Jesus is not recognised by his own followers: “But their eyes were holden that they 
should not know him.”321 This is an important step because he becomes ‘he who is not able to 
be witnessed’ in the properly named sense. Thus a space of alterity is created between Jesus
pre- and post- resurrection, emphasising the transformation that has occurred and also the 
distance between man and God. A distance that is briefly overcome again through his 
revelation of identity, reinforcing God’s offer of hospitality extended to humanity. Of 
hospitality, Jacques Derrida writes:
“...one the one hand, hospitality must wait, extend itself toward the other, extend to the other the gifts, 
the site, the shelter and the cover; it must be ready to welcome, to host and shelter... But, on the other 
hand, the opposite is also nevertheless true...to be hospitable is to let oneself be overtaken, to not even 
let oneself be overtaken, to be surprised, in a fashion almost violent, violated and raped, stolen... If I 
welcome only what I welcome, what I am ready to welcome... there is no hospitality.”322  
To be sacrificed is not a type of hospitality, however, because hospitality is an exchange 
where both parties attach meaning after the interaction, whereas a sacrifice is only decided by 
the one who performs the sacrifice. In exchanges where alterity is exhausted there is no 
hospitality, it is also exhausted. Hospitality requires alterity, a differentiation between self 
and other, as well as the space to be hospitable in. One extends a welcome that precedes 
itself, just as the Christian offer of forgiveness and community extends ontologically either 
side of the rupture-event of Christ. This adds the true weight of violence to the rupture that 
occurs as God is laid open to the violent acceptance of hospitality, potentially prior to the 
extension of the offer. Cosmopolitan city-life places a stringent demand of alterity, extends 
hospitality, and often accepts a welcome before a welcome is ready to be offered. The space 
where one only welcomes what one is ready to welcome is the gated community - it offers no 
hospitality, nor welcomes any - whereas the free space of the city does and as such can be 
violent and distressing, but in its alterity it can also be hopeful, ethical, and truly welcoming.  
  
321 St. Luke 24:16. It should be noted that whilst Jesus is a stranger in the Gospels of Mark, Luke, and John, he 
is not in the gospel of Matthew and is recognised upon first sight. 
322 Derrida, “Hospitality”, Acts of Religion, pp. 360-1.
100
Jews - those that have been subjected to the greatest of excessive biopolitical horrors in 
Twentieth century - have a history of maintaining their alterity, the chasm of difference that 
makes them other. As Yuri Slezkine writes:
“What seems clear is that when service nomads possessed no vernaculars foreign to their hosts, they 
created new ones in ways that resembled neither genetic change... nor pidginization... Their raison 
d’être is the maintenance of difference, the conscious preservation of the self and thus of 
strangeness.”323
By virtue of this self-maintenance, historically Jews have been adept city-dwellers, engaging 
with the inhabitants and space of the city, without the detriment that would arise if one was to 
become homogenous. This is also an insight into why the Jews have a history of being 
victimised and oppressed; as an excess that refuses to amalgamate they are always other, and 
in modernity they can be that which thwarts the violent, totalitarian claims for purity and 
order. They maintain their strangeness, like the city-dweller should, as Žižek reinforces, 
“...Judaism opens up a tradition in which an alien traumatic kernel forever persists in my 
Neighbor – the Neighbor remains an inert, impenetrable, enigmatic presence which 
hystericizes me.”324 The neighbour is the one whose alterity cannot be overcome, whose 
existence disrupts one’s own, and yet by ethical and spatial necessity must be engaged with.
In opposition to the city-dweller as stranger is the reduction of the other to a bare life that 
removes strangeness, illusion, and excess. Others must be allowed to be strangers, to create 
afresh a sense of alterity and self-definition that in the public space of the city results in 
alterity being born through interaction. The other/stranger should never be characterised as an 
absolute other who cannot be included at all, because that denies the humanity of the other 
and fails to extend the offer of hospitality. This is the charge Rubenstein levels at Thomas 
Altizer, claiming that “...in characterising the Jew as the “absolute Other,” Altizer comes 
close to Gnosticism, if he does not actively embrace it.”325 As Rubenstein argues, Altizer is 
denying the teleological roots of Christianity, but even in a political/secular sense the radical 
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“othering” of specific set of people is the equivalent to ghettoisation, self or otherwise. 
Mahmoud Shukair levels a similar charge against the current city-space of Jerusalem, 
writing: “I said the Judaization of Jerusalem is against the heritage of the city, a heritage 
derived from many cultures and molded through the centuries into a complex shape.”326
Jerusalem is increasingly becoming less of a city as it refuses to integrate and accept the 
other, and is in fact, somewhat paradoxically making Altizer’s claim a reality by self-
demarcating the Jew as the absolute Other. A major problem for Jerusalem is the 
geographical proximity of Hamas which denies the right of Israel and Jews to exist, seeking
their eradication. Unfortunately, the erection of strong barriers makes the task easier, it 
barricades and ghettoises both the land and its inhabitants, demarcating them as the absolute 
Other beyond the interaction of translation. The offer of inclusion must be extended the 
includable other (in the case of Jerusalem this cannot include Hamas the self-appointed 
complete exclusion) so it can necessarily be partially declined or even accepted before the 
offer is made, like the action of the autistic outsider who oversteps the bounds of community 
yet remains within, rupturing and offering hope. 
The Limits of Empathy
To live in the city is to be orientated toward the other, to extend the welcome of hospitality 
beyond what is expected, to welcome some degree of violence without the expectation of 
recognition. “This obligation has no foundation, but only verification in the common consent 
accorded by the universal conscience,” writes Simone Weil.327 However, obligation is a 
difficult term because it strips away the ego leaving the individual without a base for 
interaction. Jean-Francois Lyotard writes that, “obligation alienates the ego, it becomes the 
you of an absolutely unknowable other.”328 There must be autonomy and self-choice in the 
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extension of hospitality; otherwise it is only violence, rape, void of the possibility of the offer. 
Obligation only exists in the past and present, removing Derrida’s first possibility of 
hospitality that is extended in the present and accepted in the future, therefore precluding
hospitality in general. Often in contemporary society, the reaction to demands of hospitality 
has been to flee from both those that would impose obligations and those that would seek and 
extend true hospitality. Slavoj Žižek argues that “this is emerging as the central “human 
right” in late-capitalist society: the right not to be harassed, to be kept at a safe distance from 
others.”329 Whilst Žižek is prone to overstating the case against post-capitalist society, he is 
correct in identifying a worrying tendency toward the situation he outlines, where the 
fundamental right is to be inhospitable. The other is made absolutely so by lack of interaction 
thus one stops being cosmopolitan because one stops being cultured. For hospitality is 
inextricably linked to culture, as Derrida writes: “all cultures compete in this regard and 
present themselves as more hospitable than others. Hospitality•this is culture itself.”330
Those that stop being hospitable are no longer cultured, no longer cosmopolitan, no longer 
urban, and no longer truly fully human. To be fully human is to exist in relation to humanity 
which is other, and engage in dialogue which brings the individual outside of narcissistic self-
relation. 
Another significant figure in the discussion of the other is Jewish philosopher Emmanuel 
Levinas, who has written extensively and intelligently on the subject, and whose thought, on 
occasion, coincides closely with that of Jacques Derrida. Levinas writes:
“Knowledge would be the relation of man to exteriority, the relation of the Same to the Other, in which 
the other finally finds itself stripped of its alterity, in which it becomes interior to my knowledge, in 
which transcendence makes itself immanence.”331  
This is the inverse of the interiority of Augustine, in which knowledge is self-knowing and 
interiority becomes reflected in the exterior that becomes in time with the kingdom of God. 
There is also a dangerous undercurrent of consumption in Levinas’ thought, where the other 
is potentially stripped of alterity - that which makes the other other, an autonomous 
individual – for the self’s benefit. In a discussion of Derrida and Levinas, Kevin Hart 
summarises the exteriority of Levinas’ thought:
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“In acknowledging that the other person is always in principle closer to God than I am, and in acting 
upon the precept that meeting his or her material needs will satisfy my spiritual hungers, I draw closer 
to the deity. In short, God appears within the horizon of ethics, not religion or metaphysics.”332
This is problematic because in finding the other closer to the God, the other becomes little 
more than a gateway in an act of cynical piety where good deeds are traded for transcendent 
rewards and the other is an idol able to be consumed and stripped of alterity. Levinas’ 
thought is superficially helpful in placing the other first, and thus positing a primary 
humanitarian ethic in the relations of humanity, but in doing so it defeats itself. Defeat occurs
because there is a self-limiting construct that finds transcendence in the act of meeting the 
other’s needs and so necessarily needs the other to have needs to fill.333 Ultimately, this 
philosophy has the potential to be the sadist humanitarianism of bare life, where those 
suffering the greatest indignity offer the greatest spiritual satisfaction for those who are not.
In the city it is important to empathise with the other, but this should be limited by the 
understanding that it is an incomplete process that at no stage offers a glimpse of 
transcendence. The alterity and hope that arises through the interactions and violence of the 
city are of just that, hope and alterity, they never overflow their bounds into transcendence or
knowledge. Extrapolating Sartre’s phrase, “the de-totalised totality”, Andy Martin postulates 
it as “...a semi-autistic warning against over empathy and premature, self-deluded 
understanding of the other.”334 Sartre, like Levinas, understood that the other can never be 
fully known, but ultimately concludes differently to Levinas, seeing that the folly in 
dedicating oneself to an unknowable other is destructive to both the self and the other. In The 
Conscience of the Eye, Richard Sennett conceptualises the experience of difference in a way 
that parallels city space:
“...non-linear experience of difference might be thought of as an émigration extériure. One goes to the 
edge of oneself. But precisely at that edge, one cannot represent oneself to oneself. Instead one sees, 
talks, or thinks about what is outside, beyond the boundary...”335
At the edge, one is beyond the Augustinian interiority, not by simple virtue of exposure to 
difference, but by a self-exilic choice that engages the other. The émigration extériure is not 
without bounds, like the city it has permeable boundaries that nonetheless remain providing
structure. Experiencing this, the individual is unshackled from the infinite loop of self-
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definition and yet remains free of the custodian care of an overly empathic other. Like the 
free space of the city, the émigration extériure is a liminal experience that explores the 
bounds of interaction without succumbing to alienating extremes.
Levinas writes of the face of the other as that which signals the journey to the edge of 
oneself, or in his particular case, beyond the edge. He writes that “the face enters our world 
from an absolutely foreign sphere, that is, precisely from an ab-solute, which is in fact the 
name of the completely foreign.”336 The face becomes that which threatens to overwhelm the 
individual; in Lyotard’s words, the face is a landscape, “an excess of presence” which 
“wreaks a very different desolation. You are no longer simply its hostage, but its lost 
traveller.”337 By virtue of its signification of complete alterity, the face threatens to 
overwhelm as it draws the viewer to their limits of self-definition. The face threatens to turn
the émigration extériure into banishment, but if the other is approached within the bounds of 
hospitality it does not need to be so. If the other’s radical alterity is welcomed, even accepted 
before the extension of welcome, then self-autonomy is retained. Even in the event of the 
violent interruption that precedes the offer, the welcome maintains that the self is being 
independently hospitable, maintaining the liminal space within which mutual interaction can 
occur.
Justice and Suffering
In Levinas’ work there is still an explicit hesitancy to completely abandon oneself in the 
other’s vulnerability; for a check is placed on the relationship: justice. Levinas writes:
“If there were no order of Justice, there would be no limit to my responsibility. There is a certain 
measure of violence necessary in terms of justice; but, if one speaks of justice, it is necessary to allow 
judges, it is necessary to allow institutions and the state; to live in a world of citizens, and not only in 
the order of the Face to Face.”338
Justice, both in the complete exteriority sense potentially involving divine violence and in the 
sense of everyday systems of justice, allows the individual a sense of space away from the 
other, maintaining the alterity. As violence performed on-behalf-of, justice ruptures the space 
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between the self and the other.339 It creates the liminal space necessary for the émigration 
extériure, where both the self and the other are called out of themselves, yet remain 
autonomous in their own right. Of course, the application of justice has the potential to 
remove autonomy and to assert the grounds of exception where the individual no longer 
remains in equitable and open relation to the other. The liminal space that justice opens 
becomes, for Levinas, that which allows the Face to Face to overcome the bounds of the 
world by giving this relation an alterity to the normal order. But this approach too easily 
becomes a mere distancing from violence as a means for the self to have access to the other 
who in Levinas’ terms is closer to God and as such provides the possibility of transcendental 
glimpses. Transcendence does not privilege and cannot be discerned in others; it is an event-
rupture rather than inherent in the world. To truly have justice the other must be engaged with 
on the plane of justice, necessarily distanced, but none-the-closer to transcendence.
By placing the ethical call of the singular in exteriority and then allowing cultural forms to 
maintain a certain degree of justice around him, Levinas’ call to ethics becomes akin to a 
personal call to transcendence with the other as consumable mediator. He is correct to avoid 
the swamping effects of unlimited responsibility, but by placing the call in the exterior he
performs a dual unburdening, thus reducing what should be a universal ethical claim to an
individual’s relation to, and quest for, personal transcendence. Richard Rorty also does not 
agree that “...the ethical call of the singular comes to us in the form of a quasi-transcendental 
‘imperative’... we are not called to justice by anything exterior, transcendental, or trace-
like.”340 There is no calling-forth of justice; the face does not summon a sense of justice, it 
merely signals the justice that is necessarily already available via the offer of hospitality. 
Exteriority as described by Levinas would signal an obligation, and just as obligation is the 
death of true hospitality, it equally destroys justice. Justice is a decision made and extended 
forth, and although on occasion it may be accepted before it is offered, it must never reside
primarily in the realm of exteriority. 
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Levinas also allows for the overcoming of choice, writing that “to be dominated by the Good 
is precisely to exclude the possibility of choice, of co-existence in the present.”341 This is a 
way of externalising and ignoring the most difficult aspects of being human, the trauma of 
finite resources and the decisions it necessitates. John D. Caputo explains the reason why 
Derrida finds the story of Abraham so relevant today:
“If I help to feed and clothe this other, I abandon the other others to their nakedness and starvation. If I 
attend to my children, I sacrifice the children of other men. Ours is a world built on the sacrifice of 
others, the faces of whom we daily see on the evening news.”342
Abraham encountered God through a rupture of Religiousness B and was given a choice, one 
that was not able to be translated externally, but it was a choice nonetheless. To claim to be
overwhelmed by “the Good” is to abdicate responsibility, whereas Abraham accepted 
complete responsibility in his action that ruptured the bounds of translation. While choice is 
often unexplainable it will still enter into the sphere of justice, whereas the possibility of its 
complete absence should never be accepted because its denial completes an equivalent denial 
of humanity.   
To primarily place justice in the realm of exteriority is an attempt to call forth the action of 
Religiousness B - exteriority rupturing interiority - which by definition cannot be called forth; 
and so one must act on the plane of Religiousness A, waiting but never expecting, extending 
hospitality, and allowing for the silence necessary for the rupture that may or may not come. 
As Merold Westphal outlines, this is the crux of the chasm between Levinas and 
Kierkegaard:
“For [Levinas] ethics is first, then religion, and the neighbor always stands between me and God, while 
for Kierkegaard religion is first, then ethics, and God always stands between me and my neighbor.”343
Kierkegaard places religion first but has Religiousness B – exteriority that cannot be called 
forth - to prevent cultural forms becoming absolute. God is between the neighbour and the 
self in the understanding that the self, like Abraham, could sacrifice the other in an 
untranslatable act beyond reason. This is not necessarily an act without justice because the
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individual, who commits the act, in absence of reasoning, is open to the full recourse of 
justice and possible justice as complete exteriority. Kierkegaard is merely expressing the 
possibility of an individual’s relation with complete exteriority; a relation that does not 
reduce the neighbour to homo sacer – he who cannot be sacrificed – and is ultimately 
personal before all else. As the act is untranslatable it maintains the complete tragedy of 
suffering, as no life can be described as discardable, meaningless, and no death caused by 
human agency can be regarded as a necessity.
Levinas positions the human neighbour between God and religious self because “he believes 
this is the only protection against religion becoming ideology, the ally of dehumanizing 
violence that desecrates in one and the same moment the infinity of both divine and human 
persons”.344 Levinas is writing from a post-Holocaust position, which arose from the ability 
of humanity to rationally dehumanise the other, but the answer is not to place all neighbours 
first, before the self, in recognition of a perceived divine essence that unites all. For the 
perception of essences and essential humanity was to a large degree the source of the 
problems of the Twentieth Century. An answer to the problem is found in the words of 
Richard Rorty, who argues that importance does not reside in the recognition of essences, but 
in the ability to see more and more differences “as unimportant when compared with 
similarities with respect to pain and humiliation”.345 This allows for cosmopolitanism, where 
difference is perceived, exchanged, evaluated, and remains in place, whilst being relegated to 
a secondary function in the face of suffering. In an effort to defeat the forces that led to the 
Holocaust, Levinas ultimately argues for an essence that links all humanity, thereby going
someway to depriving humanity of what it is to be human. Difference and the real interaction 
with difference is that which makes both humanity and their created space - the city -
dynamic, changing, and worth living amongst. 
Cox’s The Secular City almost falters along the same lines of exteriority, by placing the 
Utopian city as that which calls the individual to action. He writes:
“There is no neutral ground. Man either masters and manages his environment or he is mastered and 
managed by it. The call to freedom is a call to responsibility.”346
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346 Cox, p. 129.
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There is a large degree of Manichaean dualism in Cox’s writing as the middle-ground is 
cleaved away, leaving a survivalist adapt or die, utopia or bust mentality. Cox does, however,
retain a positive message in arguing that humanity must create spaces that positively relate to 
the rest of humanity and promote ideal relations, but there is a violent totalitarian taint as the 
secular is demanded rather than presented as a negotiated praxis. This problem is extended 
with the externalisation of the source of responsibility, called forth through the aggressive 
domination of space, which reaffirms Rubenstein’s linkage of the camp and the technopolis. 
But this is not to say that Cox lacked compassion, as he writes that “man is summoned to be 
concerned, first of all, for his neighbour.”347 It is simply recognition that there is an element 
of brutality in his utopic vision and that in being “summoned” to be concerned, first of all, for 
the neighbour, there is an abjuration of hospitality. One must extend hospitality to the other 
from a personal sense of freedom; to speak of summoning is to enter the hermeneutics of 
domination. The other cannot summon responsibility in the self, but can only accept or 
decline its arrival when offered; justice is that which may or may not follow the interaction. 
Justice ruptures the self first, and the extension of this rupture to the other maintains the 
possibility of hospitality. 
Through the application of justice the other is the subject of violence, but this violence can 
obviously also appear without the mantle of justice. Purposive violence against the other that 
arrives before the extension of justice is the opposite of hospitality as it closes the relation, 
negating alterity. Justice restores alterity by asserting its own violence, restoring the distance 
that was temporarily overcome in the initial act of aggression. Levinas makes the spurious 
claim that “(t)he other is the only being I can want to kill”, but follows it with an astute 
evaluation that “(t)he triumph of this power is its defeat as power. At the very moment when 
my power to kill is realised, the other has escaped.”348 In Levinas’ philosophy, when the other 
escapes the self is worthless, deprived of relation to the Other meaning that murder performs 
a dual extinction. This is a similar process to that which Rodion Romanovich Raskolnikov, 
the central protagonist in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment, undergoes after 
murdering pawnbroker Alyona Ivanovna. In the novel, Raskolnikov exclaims, “[d]id I murder 
the old woman? I murdered myself, not her! I crushed myself once for all, forever...”349 The 
woman escaped as the power was exercised, alterity was bridged, and the full weight of the 
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act was left with the perpetrator. Power is extinguished in the act of violence and a sense of 
justice is achieved as the perpetrator Raskolnikov, by virtue of overwhelming guilty 
interiority, is re-established as alterity. This order is not to be relied upon, however, and nor is 
it in the novel, as the social mechanisms mobilise to bring the individual to justice. The city 
must always be prepared to offer hospitality (and be prepared to receive before the offer) 
even in the face of potential threat. Justice is a restorative action and as such cannot be pre-
emptive – doing so would be a self-defeating expression of power that would necessitate its 
own consequential justice. The path of eye-for-eye equivalent justice should not be taken
either, for that has the air of retributive, vindictive violence, ultimately imbued with the same 
failings as the original act. Justice is the violence of the city against exclusionary power and 
conditions for bare life; it acts to restore the conditions of and for hospitality. 
The concept of suffering, whether experienced by variously the victim, the perpetrator, or
even the voyeur, is an important consideration in the investigation of the city. In the close 
confines of the city, both anguish and joy should be unavoidable and part of the day-to-day 
concerns of the self, yet necessarily limited by the relative anonymity that the city affords the 
individual. In his concern for the other, Levinas has written a vast amount on the topic of 
suffering, but again finds a pure essence which threatens to place his thought in the realms of 
sadism and masochism. Levinas writes: “[f]or pure suffering, which is intrinsically senseless 
and condemned to itself with no way out, a beyond appears in the form of the interhuman.”350
To firstly find purity in suffering and then to glimpse a beyond in the abject senselessness is 
to open the possibility of transcendent charity, where one comes closer to the divine through 
the amelioration of the other’s suffering and the acceptance of one’s own suffering. This 
stems from Levinas’ envisaging of suffering through an interhuman perspective where it is 
“meaningful in me, useless in the Other.”351 Whilst the intentions are commendable, there is a 
dark underside to this idea, as it metamorphosises the other into a consumable object offering
the opportunity for a transcendental glimpse.352 Also, by finding meaning in one’s own 
suffering there is an implicit creation of an ontology of suffering; a self-burdening that 
operates as a masochistic impulse seeking and revelling in suffering, ultimately without the
desire to rid the world of it. This has little place in the world where humanity must work to 
eliminate suffering in all forms. The eradication of suffering is a task that will always remain 
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incomplete, but it must be started with the understanding that suffering is unsatisfactory in all 
forms.
In his writings on postmodern theology and the other, John D. Caputo, takes a similar 
approach to Levinas. In an email conversation with Edith Wyschogrod, Caputo writes:
“The icon incarnates the eros of transcendence, the desire for God, which is made flesh in the 
neighbour and the stranger, above all in the least of these little ones.”353
With this sentence Caputo also takes the step of objectifying the other (poor, sick, suffering, 
disadvantaged), but instead of idolising the sufferers, he views them as icons that cannot be 
consumed in public or private. This creates a situation where the motivation to help the other
arises from the identification of suffering in the other, rather than through selfish self-interest. 
Also, the icon is always in the public sphere incarnating desire, which is positive in denying 
private transcendence through suffering. The main misgiving that arises in the reading of 
Caputo is that transcendence is still present in the conceptualisation of suffering, admittedly 
not as a direct exchange, but nonetheless it is present, thus attaching a trace of meaning to 
suffering. The suffering of the other must remain in the public sphere and obtain no personal 
transcendent value in the private self and as such remains in the public sphere of justice. This 
is the approach that removes the element of spectacle and returns the true weight of 
meaninglessness to suffering. The city whose inhabitants find personal transcendent meaning 
in the suffering of others is an inhuman city, where humanity and object are distinguishable 
only in their ability to suffer.
To live in the city, the individual needs to firstly take account and responsibility for his or her 
self. From this position of self-reflexivity the question of hospitality can be engaged with as a 
truly autonomous offer, rather than a transcendental demand of exteriority that annihilates the 
ego. Self-reflexivity allows one to say “yes” to their God in private, but this affirmation is 
subsequently relativised as it engages with hospitality and secularity that demand that if such 
affirmations are made in the public sphere they must enter into the critical post-Babel 
hermeneutics of translation. Hermeneutics remain open-ended and incomplete, existing in the 
messianic time that remains, and performing necessary violence on public claims of 
singularity. The primacy of the public “yes” is not simply unsure, it is necessarily denied by 
the incompletion of communication, and so the private and possibly certain “yes” can only 
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ever be a provisional public “yes” entering into the subjective infinity of translation. William 
Hamilton in discussion of this topic with particular regard to the genocide writes:
“Saying “yes” to your God not only distinguishes you from those who say “no,” it requires you to say 
“no” to the “no-sayers.” Those I negate I am bound to deny, to their right to deny my affirmation, and, 
finally to deny their right to be.”354
This is why hospitality is so important for life in the city amongst the teeming multiplicity of 
humanity. To say “yes” to your God does not necessitate saying “no to no-sayers” because 
the public “yes” is always limited by its interpretation, and indeed even the private “yes” can 
never really be a capitalised, proper “Yes” because it also enters the hermeneutics of doubt, 
revision, and reflection. To live as a neighbour to the other, the self must come first,
otherwise the walls may come down completely and one is trapped within the private-sphere 
of the other, whereby the self becomes another’s object rather than a fellow subject in 
translation. But this outlook, that is consciously ego-centric, must always be tempered by the 
doubt of one’s own beliefs and the certainty that such beliefs must always be balanced, in the 
act of conversation (a conversation that remains incomplete), with those of the other.  
Therefore, the interaction with difference is the essential quality of city-life and it is by this 
virtue that the city is also a violent space of exchange. City-life can place immense pressure 
on an individual’s beliefs, sense of privacy, concept of otherness, and their boundaries of 
hospitality; this should be a positive experience, but never an easy one. Attempts to short-cut 
this ongoing process either lead to an over-familiarisation of the other, which is an act of 
assimilatory violence, or the violent death of the ego via abandonment of the self. City-space 
must also undergo this constant challenge, reflecting the positive potentiality of the 
inhabitants. Richard Sennett writes: ““character” in urban space, like character in a novel, 
develops through displacements which encounter resistance.”355 Urban spaces must be as 
porous and open to the agents of change and time as the inhabitants. Strong boundaries in 
people and in spaces destroy the public space needed for interaction and exchange which, in 
the post-Babel world of interpretation, is the unending task that befalls humanity. The retreat 
from this task, whether by gated community, the absence of hospitality, or real expressions of 
violence, all degrade humanity’s potential power of creation. Exertion of isolatory or 
assimilatory powers leads ultimately, as with Dostoyevsky’s Rodion, to the causation of 
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violence to the self and the escape of power. To retreat is not to protect oneself, it is to harm 
oneself through the radical repression of alterity; the building of a private Tower that unites 
none and is forever closed to interpretation. In the words of one woman living in a gated-
community:
““The irony is that we are trapped behind our own gates... unable to exit. Instead of keeping people out, 
we have shut ourselves in.””356
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Conclusion
As a polyglot where meaning is hermeneutical and provisional, the city is a site of tension, 
containing the dialectic of the idea of the city - the heteropolis, alterity that is unable to be 
summoned forth into being - and the physical existence of the city itself - the physical, 
hermeneutical city in the temporal. Read through the lens of Judeo-Christianity, the Canon of 
Western civilisation, this tension is first revealed in the myth of the Tower of Babel. Such 
tension did not exist in the city that preceded Babel, Cain’s Enoch; for Enoch was a site of 
absence that homogenously merged the idea and the physical existence of the city into one 
structure, thus becoming a monument, a static vision. Enoch can, therefore, be regarded as a 
beginning of humanity’s creative efforts; as Ellul contends, it is the paradoxical fall from 
myth and the mythological beginning of civilisation. The Tower of Babel was an attempt to 
extend the singularity of Enoch into a transcendent and universally uniting structure; to 
imbue humanity with a name and a mythology. In the Babel myth, divine intervention 
revealed singularity to be an illusion, thus humanity experienced a second Fall, this time into 
incompletion and translation. With God’s revelation of difference and subsequent demand to 
be translated, the dialectic between the idea of the city and the city itself, the heavenly city
and the earthly city, was opened. The idea of the city is the inexhaustible alterity necessary to 
avoid the creation of Enochs and Towers: repressive drives to singularity that deny difference 
and hope in the present. 
Heteropolis - the other city, the idea of the city - is by necessity a secular claim, a claim in 
and of the saeculum, because it is the secular that all the religious and non-religious share, 
and it is the secular that allows all forms of the religious to coexist. To repeat the words of 
Gabriel Vahanian: “secular – [is] a language that all religions have in common”.357 To claim 
alterity, the idea of the city, as a particularly religious expression would be to pre-emptively 
deny the claims of others, and deny the structures of translation and the relativisation of 
values set out with the collapse of the Tower. As Harvey Cox argues, “[t]he relativisation of 
values must now demand that all individuals are included in the secularization process and 
not be allowed to believe that his views are ultimate.”358 Post-Babel, the world is a space of 
absence, a space of distance that must be engaged with through hermeneutics, united 
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provisionally with the language of the secular. Yet the secular is not a Tower of Babel, it is 
not singular unless all reference to religion is removed; for only then does it lose its memory 
and become a meaningless exchange in the present. To maintain plurality and memory, the 
city should be a secular space, including all in hermeneutics, yet never becoming a singular 
language in itself that would in effect be a particular and divisive dialect. As a space 
containing hermeneutics, and as a space as hermeneutic, the city is never complete and 
should not be approached with the mindset of individuals such as Le Corbusier and Jacques 
Ellul, who saw the city as a problem to solved, a modernist project to be completed. To seek 
completion in the world is to will to being an extreme totalitarian violence, a singular that 
eclipses all else. Claims should, therefore, be tempered by the understanding that the city is a 
polyglot that should remain as such, vibrant and open to the opportunities that differences 
allow.
Translation is a necessity in the polyglot city, because it is the attempt to engage with the 
other and be open to the possibilities that one may provide for the other. Ideally the process 
of translation should be a humane experience that promotes understanding between the 
multitudes that exist within the polyglot city. Ideally the languages should sit side-by-side 
and through a dialectic produce a Žižekian ‘short-circuit’, a new understanding, rupturing the 
boundaries of both the original and the translator’s languages. One should not try to deny the 
alterity of the original text by attempting to assimilate the original into familiar forms, 
denying the ‘otherness’, and thus being spared the positive, yet unsettling ‘short-circuit’. The 
‘short-circuit’ of translation allows space for all to engage in the secular structure of the city, 
critiquing the primacy or sacredness of any particular text by entering it into multifarious 
hermeneutics. For, the city is a space of text, translation, and hermeneutics that should be 
open to all to engage in and with, because in the post-Babel saeculum, it is the engagement 
with differences rather their overcoming that brings humanity closer.  
In the saeculum, cities have a close relationship with culture, which is encountered on 
different levels depending on the particular expression of the term ‘culture’. As such, cities 
contain culture, are physical manifestations of culture, and are also contained within culture 
as a totality that is analogous to the saeculum. Therefore, the analysis of culture is vital to 
garnering an understanding of the city, and yet such analysis requires a structure of critique, 
otherwise risks being overwhelmed by the metacultural totality that can include all, exclude 
none, and subsequently be worthless as analysis. Kierkegaard’s existence spheres offer just 
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such a structure of critical hermeneutic that can be applied to city-life. The other-for-me of 
the first sphere, the aesthetical sphere, is violently destructive to the city because it denies the 
unique differences of others in aid of consuming them in the erotic instant. In the ethical 
sphere, there is self-reflexivity and an awareness of the individual needs of others, but still 
lacking is the self-possessed, critical distance that comes with Religiousness A. These three 
existence spheres can be used as a critical hermeneutic with which to self-reflexively engage 
with potentially destructive practices and to promote humane cities in the saeculum. The 
sphere of most critical importance, however, is Religiousness B - the sphere that extends 
beyond the temporal and the immanent. Religiousness B is, effectively, the messianic
hermeneutical rupture that cannot be called forth by human endeavour and so remains as a 
constant critique that limits and challenges any particular cultural claims. Like the heteropolis
- the idea of the city - Religiousness B is exteriority that limits and critiques, leaving the 
saeculum open to all through the relativisation of all claims.
Religiousness B should not be understood to be a distinctly Christian or culturally religious 
expression, but rather it should be imagined beyond any relation to actuality whatsoever. 
Read through Agamben’s conception of the possibility of potentiality without any relation to 
being, Religiousness B is pure critique that even extends to the possibility of critiquing 
Religiousness B itself. The messianic possibility of Religiousness B, that is in fact not a 
possibility, promotes hope in the city through the inconsumable possibility of alterity. In the 
babble of the cosmopolitan city, silence, that which is between action and non-action, 
between response and no-response, also fulfils the messianic role, the maintenance of alterity. 
Silence does not bring the messianic closer, it merely recognises the potentiality for other to 
what is; this is a vital check for the city because it prevents hermeneutics from becoming 
endless and meaningless exchanges that ultimately claim transcendence in the interpretative 
act itself. Silence critiques individual cultural claims, and also, importantly, critiques the 
mediums of exchange and hermeneutical structures. For the city to be a positive and free city
it must contend with the possibility of its negation, silence, and only then translation can 
continue in the understanding that all claims are relative when faced with the response that is 
neither a response nor not a response.
Cities are discontinuous, broken, polyglot structures that through internal plurality enact a 
disruptive violence on the inhabitants; as Lewis Mumford writes: “[c]ities exhibit the 
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phenomena of broken growth, of partial death, of self-regeneration.”359 Cities are reliant on 
the fracturing and regenerative violence in order to remain as cities, but this must be 
tempered by the alternative, the messianic, silence that denies the primacy of any particular 
violence. Mythical violence, as the link between law and violence that accumulates meaning 
in the violence it enacts, should be avoided. Therefore, meaning should not be attributed to 
the violence that one experiences or witnesses in the city. To find meaning is to potentially 
find justification for the violence or tie it to political ends, which dehumanises the tragedy,
either by placing it into the sphere of the homo sacer who can be killed but not sacrificed, or 
worse, by finding meaning in the death, with the individual as a sacrifice - a death deemed 
necessary. As Žižek proposes, we should be like Job and find no meaning in the suffering we 
encounter, only then does violence attain its full, meaningless weight. Only when it is 
accepted that there is no reason for the suffering of humanity can the full tragedy of the world 
be approached appropriately. Living in the city faced with potentially tragic violence, it is 
language and translation that can lessen the frequency of negative violence and the associated 
alienating effects. As William Hamilton writes in reference to Ignazio Silone: [o]ur task, in 
the face of all the ignorance and confusion, is to do what the refugees in Silone’s picture do: 
tell one another the stories of our lives.”360 Silence sits at the limit of this exchange of 
translation, as the ultimate critique that offers no explanation and finds no meaning, and in 
doing so is potentially divine, ending the potential recycling of meaning-full violence.
Whilst finding no meaning in the city, the individual must enact a certain degree of violence 
on oneself. This is the violence of the internal exile, through which one cleaves themselves
from their home and becomes open to the disjunctive experience of the city and the others 
that share in it. By self-reflexively undergoing the fracturing process of the internal exile, the 
individual mirrors the conditions of the city, the dialectics between the city-centre and the 
suburb, no-place and home, change and security. The fractured city-centre offers the chance 
of rapid change and reinvention, whereas a more stable milieu cannot; but this can be 
overwhelming and so it is necessary to strike a balance between the maintenance of and the 
potentially overwhelming violence that could manifest if it is left as singular. This is also the 
case for the individual, who must balance the alienating-yet-liberating fractured exilic 
existence with the need to maintain a grounded sense of ego and personal autonomy.
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The dialectic of the city-centre and the suburb is vitally important because it prevents both
facets from becoming universalisms and as such totalitarian. Suburbs have the potential to
destroy the fabric of the city by creating exclusionary zones of preemptive violence, singular 
through separation. By imposing restrictive covenants or economic stratification, suburbs turn
away from the possibilities of the city-centre, reconfiguring the suburban spaces as nihilistic 
playgrounds for the wealthy to use at their leisure, leaving those excluded exposed to the 
continued violence of the centre. The suburb and the city-centre must be linked in a dialectic 
of exchange that allows all inhabitants the comfort and hope that is possible. Tenements, 
ghettoes, and estates also ruin the fabric of the city through the exclusion of those deemed 
undesirable, thereby reducing their possibilities. The hope, however, that these structures of 
exclusion retain is the lack of internal surveillance, thus allowing for the possibility of 
internal autonomy and avoiding the camp-structure of indistinguishable interiority and 
exteriority. In contrast, gated communities are zones of self-exclusion that attempt to 
maintain purity through rigorous internal surveillance, and as such are attempts to recreate 
Towers as expressions of purity, unified in their abandonment of translation, and timeless 
without alterity. This imposition of rigorous surveillance and discipline actualises a perverse 
camp-structure where exteriority and interiority indistinguishable, of which Giorgio 
Agamben writes: “[i]n the camps, city and house became indistinguishable”.361 Gated 
communities ruin the dialectic of the city through self-exclusion, transmogrifying parts of the 
city into timeless and hopeless camps, silent in their abandonment of translation. Silence goes 
unnoticed in the gated community and alterity is excluded, leaving them structures without 
hope. 
Gated communities and other exclusionary structures are attempts to turn the state of 
exception into a permanent reality, timeless zones where the maintenance of purity turns the 
inhabitants into homo sacer, able to be killed but not sacrificed. They are nihilistic in that 
they find no meaning outside of the maintenance of the security and purity of the 
indistinguishable zone. The stasis and surveillance denies the individual the chance to be 
autonomous, the essential opportunity to choose that allows the individual to act as the 
autistic outsider, in the liminal position of being included, yet able to choose to be exclude 
and thus to define the limits of their own inclusion and critique the limits of the group. From 
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the self-exilic position of the autistic outsider any attempts to rebuild Towers of Babel are 
able to be thwarted, allowing cities to continue as Babylons - pluralistic spaces of absence -
forever incomplete, and thus hospitable to all in the time that remains.
Central to the city’s provision for hospitality is public space, vital to the functioning of a 
vibrant, free and inclusionary city. Cities such as Las Vegas and Dubai with their capital 
intensive hypermodernity fail to provide adequate public space that is genuinely free and 
secular. Las Vegas, with its lack of public space and intensive hyperreal simulacras of other 
cultures, prevents genuine and free interaction. Dubai, with its hyper-capitalism coupled with
Islamic law, must provide public space or risk becoming the equivalent of a theme park, a 
novelty attraction that is largely unliveable. All cities must ensure space is provided that is 
not just in the public domain, but is genuinely public, without surveillance, where one can be 
anonymous. Timothy Gorringe writes: “[w]e have many public spaces of course, but fewer 
and fewer with resonance for civic society, and those we have are increasingly threatened by 
municipal neglect and vandalism.”362 It is the duty of city-planners and legislators to provide 
the space in which free interaction is possible, but it is the responsibility of the inhabitants to 
use that space, to ensure through presence in numbers the space is as safe as possible. To live 
in the city is to engage in translation in the public spaces where all may enter and interact. It 
is also here, in the public space, that silence - the action that is no action - will be noticed and 
the messianic can remain as a possibility that will not and cannot be called forth.
Hospitality is a key factor in the cosmopolitan space of the city that is pluralistic without 
problematic attempts to completely overcome difference. To be hospitable and to engage in 
hospitality, one extends a welcome and is welcoming even before the welcome is extended;
for welcoming only when one is ready or has already offered a welcome is to offer no 
welcome at all, hospitality is absent. However, one must be careful not to be overwhelmed in 
the exchange of hospitality in the city, because to be open to the other and be ready to be 
hospitable, paradoxically, before one is ready, is a potentially violating experience. 
Hospitality should not, and cannot, be an obligation, because obligation only exists in the past 
and present, denying the ability to actually extend an offer. An individual must retain a sense 
of self, an ego that is not overwhelmed in the offer of hospitality; but in retaining this 
necessary autonomy one should not be so completely self-centred as to be unavailable to the 
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other. Richard Sennett writes: “[i]n order to sense the Other, one must do the work of 
accepting oneself as incomplete.”363 Hospitality requires one to limit themselves, to realise 
their own incompletion and in doing so, be open to the other and thus be drawn outside of 
endless cycle of self-definition in an émigration extériure. By engaging in the exchange as an 
autistic outsider, one can include the other, the neighbour, without becoming lost in an overly 
empathetic ignorance of alterity.
In the relationship between the self and the other, justice is an integral part, and as such is 
crucial to the functioning of a cosmopolitan city. As the performance of violence on-behalf-of 
the individual, justice ruptures, creating a liminal space from which alterity can be 
maintained. The sense of justice must not, however, be completely unburdened from the 
individual and should always originate from the autonomous decision-making of interiority. 
Others cannot summon responsibility from the self, as it is a self-reflexive and ethical 
process, they can only engage with it when it is offered. Justice is that which could or could 
not come after the ethical decision and is, therefore, a rupture: first of the ethical, decision-
making self, and secondly, the rupture is extended into hospitality. Of course, justice is a 
violent process, both against the self as singular interiority and also against the other who 
may come under the jurisdiction of the decision. Violence against the other should not come 
before the application of justice, because without justice, violence is an attempt to remove the 
chasm of alterity, to negate otherness. Therefore, justice is the violence of the city that 
ruptures exclusionary power and prevents others from becoming homogenous homo sacer,
able to be killed but not sacrificed. Through the application of justice, that is ultimately 
incomplete and subjective, alterity is restored and with it hope is maintained.
Living in a humane, cosmopolitan city, and engaging with it in the capacities of hospitality 
and justice, the individual must find no transcendent meaning in the suffering of others. The 
pain, distress, and indignity of the city must be secularised so that, whether it occurs in the 
self or the other, it is never justified or privileged. With so many inhabitants living in close 
proximity, suffering will invariably enter the public sphere, where it must be found to have 
no meaning and not become an icon that hints at anything beyond the suffering itself. 
Transcendence must be a private expression, ineffable, that cannot be extended to cover the 
other with whom one shares the space of the city. Attributing meaning to the suffering of the 
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other is ultimately an effort to overcome alterity, to make the suffering understandable and 
less traumatic for the self: the primary aim of this is to decrease the suffering in the self. In 
the fragmentary space of the city, the individual should act as the autistic outsider: included, 
reaching out to the other, but ultimately aware that he/she cannot share in the suffering; and 
so one must extend hospitality and enter into an economy of justice. It is through this 
approach that the city can continue as secular, cosmopolitan, fragmentary, and ultimately 
open to the positive and hopeful possibilities that continue to draw humanity into the city, to 
build, to interact, and to enjoy.
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